THUCYDIDES THE ATHENIAN
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College Year in Athens Papers 1
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It is with profound satisfaction that I write this Foreword to the Proceedings of our 1st International Academic Conference “Thucydides the Athenian” held in Athens, Greece on June 26th to 29th, 2018.

The conference was a significant event for the academic community of our institution as it inspired an engagement of our faculty and students with more acclaimed academics – three of those being members of our faculty – to present and discuss their current research on Thucydides. Their presentations and discussion that ensued both in the formal setting of the conference venue as well as in the more informal afterhours settings, helped to make the conference a truly meaningful encounter. The publication of these proceedings will give to the academic community an excellent volume which we hope will inspire further study and research and will continue this dialogue that started in Athens in the summer of 2018. We thank all authors and participants for their contributions and for creating a collegial atmosphere. A special word of thanks belongs to Nanno Marinatos and Robert Pitt for organizing it in a manner that reflects the mission and aesthetics of our institution.

College Year in Athens, a study abroad program which for the past 60 years has been dedicated to the study of Classics and the humanities, will continue to engage academics in such discussions and to provide a welcoming and bonding environment for outstanding scholars to exchange ideas and debate issues. This volume is the first
in a newly inaugurated series CYA Papers, under which proceedings of future academic conferences of ours will be published. It is also an appropriate contribution to the celebration of the school’s 60th anniversary this year.

Alexis Phylactopoulos
President
Preface

The present volume stems from the conference ‘Thucydides the Athenian’, hosted by College Year in Athens in June 2018 and organized by the editors. In addition to the papers submitted by participants at that conference, we are delighted that Paul Cartledge and Seth Jaffe accepted invitations to contribute to these proceedings.

The purpose of the conference was both to unite a group of European, American and Greek scholars in Thucydides’ birthplace of Athens, as well as to discuss Pericles and Thucydides within their Athenian contexts, hence the chosen title. Indeed, there is a lot of evidence in this volume which ties Thucydides to his Athenian origins. Angelos P. Matthaiou presents for the first time a full collection of epigraphical evidence pertaining to Pericles, along with the latest arguments about the crucial dating of those documents. Sebastian Anderson discusses one of these inscriptions, that on the recently discovered Pericles cup, within a wider appraisal of Pericles’ political and social groupings and the Athenian hetaireiai. Tasos Tanoulas analyses the Periclean building program in order to link recent architectural and restoration work on that great construction project with historical events before and during the Peloponnesian War, particularly in relation to the Propylaia.

Another theme concerns the personalities in Thucydides’ work. The actions, personality, and model of Thucydides’ Themistocles is extensively discussed by Seth Jaffe; the often forgotten but not unimportant Spartan general Lichas is given a biography for the first time...
by Paul Cartledge; and Thomas Scanlon looks at the presentation of the body in relation to individuals in the *History*. As would be expected, Pericles receives much attention throughout the volume, but the one figure who is principally re-evaluated is the underappreciated Nicias (R. Pitt, N. Marinatos, D. Kyrtatas, A. Nikolaidis). Finally, two papers deal with the history of scholarship on Thucydides in the 19th and 20th centuries, looking at the figures of Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, George Grote, and Ernst Curtius (M. Konaris), and Enoch Powell (B. Earley).

We would like to extend our warm thanks to the President of CYA, Alexis Phylactopoulos, and Vice President for Academic Affairs, Theoni Scourta, for their support and encouragement both during the conference and in the production of this volume, which itself inaugurates a new series of proceedings from conferences organised by College Year at Athens and its faculty.

Nanno Marinatos & Robert K. Pitt
Athens 2022
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Sebastian Anderson currently teaches Greek and Latin language, literature, and history at Fordham University and Brooklyn College. His dissertation, *Poetry in Public: Reperformance and Publication of Archaic Greek Epigram*, examined inscribed epigram in the context of archaic song culture, with emphasis on the intersection of reading, writing, and (re)performance. He has also published articles on Herodotus and Athenian tragedy.

Paul Cartledge is an honorary citizen of (modern) Sparta and a Commander of the Order of Honour (Hellenic Republic). He is A. G. Leventis Senior Research Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge and A. G. Leventis emeritus Professor of Greek Culture, Cambridge University. He is currently President of the UK’s Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies. His many published books and articles include multiple studies of Sparta and of Thucydides, including *The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others* (2nd ed. Oxford 2002), and [with P. Debnar] ‘Sparta and the Spartans in Thucydides’ in *The Brill Companion to Thucydides* (Leiden 2006).

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Turn: (Re)Interpreting Thucydides’ Political Thought Before, During, and After the Great War was published in 2020 by Bloomsbury.

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th edition). Note also the following:

*Agora*  *The Athenian Agora: Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* (Princeton, New Jersey)


The transliteration of Greek and Roman personal names and places has been left to the discretion of individual authors.
Walls of Wood and Walls of Stone: Themistocles as Architect of Empire

Introduction

In his Funeral Oration, Pericles beautifully portrays Athens as the common achievement of the ancestors, the fathers, and the men of the present generation (2.36.1–3). The speech is profoundly democratic. Every citizen manifests that rare ‘Athenian’ virtue which built the empire, now standing at the peak of its power. Does Thucydides agree with him? In the prefatory Archaeology, there is a structural account of the growth of Athenian power.\(^1\) Citizen virtue is absent. Instead, peace or rest facilitates growth, while ships bring with them revenue and rule over others (cf. 1.4, 1.12.1, 1.12.4, 1.15.1). Thucydides also presents the Peloponnesian War as a necessity (ἀνάγκη), where rising Athenian power provokes Spartan fear, which renders

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1. The Archaeology offers a punctuated account of the development of Athenian and Spartan power until the eve of the Peloponnesian War, when both parties are at the peak of their military preparation, one by land, the other by sea (cf. 1.1, 1.18.2, 1.19). For an exploration of the Archaeology with reference to war materials, see Foster 2010, 8–43; for a study of the Athens-Sparta antithesis with reference to regime character and the differing developmental trajectories of Athens and Sparta, see Jaffe 2017a, 139–59.
war (somehow) necessary or inevitable (1.23.6).² Despite the differences between these accounts – one foregrounding the structural constituents of power, the other citizen virtue – there is at least one noticeable commonality. Individuals play only minor roles in both.³

It is only in the Pentecontaetia that an empire-building Athenian steps fully onto the stage: Themistocles.⁴ In these narrative passages, it is not common virtue but rather Themistoclean foresight that sets Athens on the path to empire. Themistocles appears as the architect of Athenian power.⁵ Whatever the impression left by the prefatory

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² The verb ἀναγκάζω appears at 1.23.6, the famous line about the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenian envoys at Sparta partly echo this Thucydidean line. They maintain that the growth of Athenian power was a necessity, where necessity encompasses fear, honour, and interest (cf. 1.75.3 with 1.76.2). The thematic meaning of necessity within the History remains a contested subject, whether it is some overwhelming force or a weaker compulsion, whether it is external to the actors or bound up with their own psychologies, or whether it is principally a rhetorical claim or some brute element of political life itself. For a recent study of the Thucydidean account of the necessity for the Peloponnesian war, where necessity proves to be bound up with regime character, see Jaffe 2017a; see the classic study Ostwald 1988; and the clarifying discussion of Fisher and Hoekstra 2017.

³ Individuals do appear in the Archaeology, including Themistocles (1.14.3), but they are without any individuating characteristics. They are presented as almost epiphenomenal to the wider structural dynamics at play, or in the service of those forces. ‘The Archaeology … concentrates on process rather than personality or alludes to individuals largely to illustrate processes and sources of power’, Connor 1984, 48. On individuals in Thucydides, see Westlake 1968; more recently, Gribble 2006 and Stadter 2017.

⁴ For a recent overview, see Kallet 2017; also Jaffe 2017a, 118–39. The Pentecontaetia covers the approximate period from the end of the Persian wars to the beginning of the second Peloponnesian war. The Archaeology and Pentecontaetia isolate key moments in the growth of Athenian power, while the Pentecontaetia represents a displaced and expanded portion of the Archaeology. See Hornblower, CT I 133–4. The Archaeology’s gloss on the Pentecontaetia appears at 1.18.2–3.

⁵ As scholars have often noted, Herodotus is far less glowing in his treatment of Themistocles than Thucydides. See Blösel 2001. For a comparison of
Archaeology or later Funeral Oration, the growth of Athenian power required Themistocles. In the History’s third book, an Athenian speaker, Diodotus, calls the defence of freedom and the pursuit of empire the ‘greatest things’, those political possibilities calling forth the greatest exertions (3.45.6). Thucydides portrays Themistocles as uniquely responsible for the defence of Athenian freedom and for the founding of the empire. Without him, Athens would have been defeated by Persia. Had she somehow managed to beat back the barbarian invader without Themistocles, she would then have failed to establish an empire. As we will see, Thucydides’ portrait of Themistocles is suggestive of how individual characters in the History can illuminate Thucydidean themes, like, for example, necessity (ἀνάγκη).

This paper has two primary aims. First, through a progressive treatment of the Themistocles episodes, to identify the varied ways that the History’s portrayal of Themistocles is bound up with Thucydidean preoccupations. The second objective, linked to the first, is to explore Thucydides’ apology of Themistocles. The paper thus scrutinizes Themistocles in Thucydides’ pages, less with regard to the Themistocles–Pausanias pairing that has so occupied scholars, or to the question of the historical Themistocles – a difficult question – and more to the functions of Themistocles within the thematic arc of the History.

6. For example, if Athenian power is the ‘cause’ of the Peloponnesian war, and if Themistocles is the ‘cause’ of Athenian power, then did Themistocles cause the Peloponnesian war? De Ste. Croix 1972, 176, 178 provocatively suggests Themistocles foresaw a great war between Athens and Sparta.

7. See Hornblower, CT I 211–12 for relevant bibliography; also Rhodes 1970; Konishi 1970; Westlake 1977; and, more recently, Jaffé 2017a, 172–7, which this chapter expands upon. For conjectures about the historical Themistocles, beyond Rhodes 1970, see also Cawkwell 1970; Forrest 1960; and Rhodes 2006, 530–3. The overall bibliography is larger.
In the Thucydidean account, Themistocles is responsible for virtually every constituent of Athenian power. A brief list of his achievements will make this clear. First, he not only persuades the Athenians to build the ships with which they defeat Persia at Salamis, originally constructed for war with Aegina (1.14.3), but he also orchestrates the victory in the narrows itself (1.74.1). Following the Persian retreat, Themistocles encourages the Athenians to rebuild their walls, which were destroyed by the Persians, and he shrewdly delays the Spartans until these walls have reached a defensible height (1.90.3). He moreover advises his fellow Athenians to finish the walling of the Piraeus, which he himself had originally encouraged them to build, sensing the strategic advantages of the harbor (1.93.3). Overall, he exhorted the Athenians to cleave to the sea and thereby to grow great in power, which is exactly what they did (1.93.3–4). He even introduced the seed of that strategy which Pericles implements in the first years of the Archidamian war: the Athenians must defend the Piraeus and their fleet above all (1.93.7).

*A Quintessential Athenian?*

In order to approach the Thucydidean Themistocles, it is important to observe that he appears as the living archetype of the Athenian character, someone who evinces ‘Athenianness’ to some extraordinarily high degree. What does it mean to be an Athenian, let alone an outstanding

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8. These have been assembled, i.e., they are not located in any single place in the *History*.
10. For the trope of the city at sea in the *History*, see Taylor 2010. Themistocles surely recognized the value of the fleet for offensive as well as for defensive purposes.
11. For discussions of the Athenian character, see Edmunds 1975; Jaffe 2017a; and Luginbill 1999.
one? Before Thucydides introduces individual Athenians or Spartans, his Corinthians at Sparta vividly compare the characters (τρόποι) of the representative citizens of Athens and Sparta. As I have argued elsewhere, this speech doubles as Thucydides’ own introduction to the national characters of the war’s principal contestants.\(^{12}\) The Corinthians, whose rhetorical purpose is to bring about a wider war, offer strangely beautiful praise of their adversaries and a corresponding blame of the Spartan character.\(^{13}\) At the same time, the Corinthians anticipate the Periclean praise of the Athenians in the later Funeral Oration (2.35–46). We might even say that Pericles almost goes so far as to claim that every Athenian is a Themistocles.\(^{14}\) Thucydides’ own narrative account is, as we will see, more aristocratic than the Periclean speech.

The Corinthians maintain that the Athenians are inveterate innovators, extraordinarily swift in accomplishing their designs (γνώμη).\(^{15}\) Paradoxically, they are darers (τολμηταί) beyond their power and runners of risk beyond their judgment (γνώμη). In danger, they are full of hope (1.70.3). It is, above all, daring which characterizes the Athenians in Thucydides’ pages. The Corinthians stress that the Athenians are inveterately acquisitive, forever in motion, and, what is more, that they use their private judgment (τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ οἰκειοτάτῃ) for their city (1.70.6). They are never satisfied, never at rest, but forever hungry for acquisition – a trait connected to the empire. Athens, then, is the quintessence of a power in motion, a daring,

\(^{12}\) See Jaffe 2017a, 67, 198–9 for the argument that Thucydides uses the Corinthian speech to furnish framing context for understanding the distinctiveness of individual Athenians and Spartans, who require interpretation against the backdrop of their regimes.

\(^{13}\) See Jaffe 2017a, 66–73.

\(^{14}\) It should be noted that the Periclean account does acknowledge meritocratic distinctions among the Athenians. Indeed, Athens is to be praised precisely for being a democracy which is also a meritocracy (cf. 2.37.1). At the same time, ‘Athenianness’ itself confers a high level of virtue.

\(^{15}\) The indispensable work on γνώμη in Thucydides’ History remains Edmunds 1975.
expansionistic city, while Sparta is her opposite, a cautious, static power. The Corinthians go so far as to claim that the Athenians take no rest themselves and give none to others. They are men who do the necessary things (τὰ δέοντα, 1.70.8). Thucydides will praise Themistocles for his judgement and daring, and he will also claim that he was uniquely able to extemporize the necessary things (τὰ δέοντα, 1.138.3). As we will see, these echoes are thematically significant.16

In the Funeral Oration, among many Athenian virtues, Pericles claims that the Athenians manifest the apparently contradictory virtues of daring and deliberation to an extremely high degree (2.40.3).17 Whereas, for most, deliberation leads to hesitation and slowness, for the Athenians it does not. The Athenians uniquely combine prudent strategy with bold action. At the same time, Pericles maintains that every Athenian evinces a graceful versatility and is almost self-sufficient unto himself (2.41.1).18 These lines, too, would seem to apply more to Themistocles than to any other Athenian. In the speeches and deeds of the History, he comes to light as a man for all seasons, whose aptitude is acknowledged by friends and enemies alike.19

16. Indeed, it is precisely by exploring those ways Thucydides himself echoes the speeches of his characters (or explicitly endorses elements of them) that we can find evidence for his views.

17. See Balot 2001 on opposite virtues in the Funeral Oration, with illuminating reference to courage. On this, see also Edmunds 1975, 46, citing Kakrides, who anticipated Balot’s more developed argument.

18. Edmunds 1975, 83 translates the line at 2.41.1 as follows, ‘One and the same man from our city would present himself as self-sufficient for the most plans of action and with the most graceful versatility’. In Thucydides’ narrative of the plague, there is a reference to the insufficiency of the body, which is intended to pick up this Periclean claim (see 2.51.3).

19. The Corinthians suggest that one might say of the Athenians that it is by nature that they take no rest themselves and give none to others. Thucydides will praise Themistocles’ nature (cf. 1.70.9 with 1.138.3). See also Forde 1989, 69.
Throughout book one, Themistocles’ versatility is on constant display, his ability to act in a public as well as a private capacity, and his adeptness at dealing with men, women, Greeks, and barbarians. The first episode in which he features prominently involves the rebuilding of the Athenian walls after the Persian retreat. During the Persian wars, the Athenians had abandoned their city, taken to their ships, and become a city at sea. After the war, they begin rebuilding their city and its ruined walls. The Spartans, encouraged by their allies, who are newly concerned about the Athenian fleet and Athenian daring, try to dissuade them (1.90.1). Thucydides writes that the Spartans hide their true motive – something they characteristically do (see, for example, 1.92) – and argue that the Peloponnesus is a secure base for retreat and operations in the face of any third invasion, while the absence of walls will deny the enemy a fortified base in Hellas (1.90.2).

Themistocles advises the Athenians to send the Spartan embassy home immediately and to dispatch him to Sparta instead. He then counsels the Athenians to delay his fellow ambassadors and only to send them once the city’s walls have reached a defensible height. In the interim, Thucydides adds, the entire Athenian people (πανδημεί) work tirelessly, men, women, and children, sparing neither public nor private building in the urgency of the rebuilding efforts (φειδομένους μήτε ἰδίου μήτε δημοσίου οἰκοδομήματος, 1.90.3). These lines are more thematically important than has been commonly recognized, precisely because they anticipate later Thucydidean themes that echo them.

20. The two prior references to Themistocles occur in the Archaeology and in the speech of the Athenian envoys at Sparta. In the first, he is noted as responsible for the ships used to fight at Salamis (1.14.3); while in the second he is mentioned as the ablest commander at Salamis and the man responsible for the battle being fought in the narrows (1.74).

21. Compare with 2.65.2.
According to Thucydides, the central problem the Athenian democracy faces is the persistent danger of a disassociation of public and private goods, which is a theme of Thucydides’ later excursus on the revolution at Corcyra.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, the rhetorical purpose of the Periclean speeches, taken together, is precisely to join the public and private together, which risk spinning in opposing directions under the pressures of war.\textsuperscript{23} Thucydides’ assessment of Pericles and his related discussion of the causes of Athenian defeat at 2.65 make this issue explicit (cf. 2.65.7, 11–12). It is disunity and the manner in which disunity generates what we would today call polarization that leads to Athenian defeat, to the oligarchic revolution of 411 BC and to the later regime of the Thirty. The flip side of democratic disunity, however, is remarkable democratic unity, which can be generated by common dangers or even imperial enticements.\textsuperscript{24} In discussing the rebuilding of the walls, Thucydides emphasizes the highly collective character of the construction efforts and the harmony of public and private goods, symbolized by the actual incorporation of various building materials into the walls. The Themistoclean walls them-

\textsuperscript{22} On the regime in Thucydides, see Jaffe 2017b.

\textsuperscript{23} See Thucydides’ famous verdict on Pericles, which includes a programmatic discussion of the reasons for Athenian defeat (2.65); also Rusten 1989, 198; Jaffe 2017a, 123 n. 15. See Pericles’ final speech, 2.60.2–4, which makes this theme especially clear.

\textsuperscript{24} τανδημεί is used by the Athenian envoys at Sparta when they describe the Athenians embarking upon their ships to fight at Salamis (1.73.4). Interestingly, the spectacle of the launch of the Sicilian expedition is also presented as involving the entire Athenian levy (cf. 6.24.3, 6.30.2, 6.31.5 on public and private expenditures, and, lastly, 6.32.2 for the launch itself). The defence of freedom and the prospect of empire are two moments where a remarkable democratic unity is possible, a harmony between public and private. It remains an open interpretive question as to whether true civic unity on the Thucydidean account is merely the result of the alignment of underlying interests, or whether other elements are necessary. What is unambiguous, however, is that the misalignment of these interests risks destroying the civic fabric.
selves, then, symbolize Athenian unity, which must encircle Athens to keep the city safe.

In the anecdote of Themistocles at Sparta, Thucydides engagingly deploys Herodotean colour to recount the outwitting of the credulous Spartans.25 Themistocles takes advantage of the Spartan character, that slowness, suspicion of hearsay, and corresponding thirst for autopsy which becomes comical in the later Pausanias episode, and which was originally introduced in the speech of the Corinthians at Sparta. And, like Thucydides, Themistocles grasps the political importance of national character. As we will see, there are other similarities between Themistocles and Thucydides.26

Upon arriving at Sparta, Themistocles strategically delays meeting with the authorities in his formal capacity. When asked why, he claims that he is waiting for his fellow ambassadors who have been inexplicably delayed (1.90.5). At first, the Spartans trust him and so wait patiently, but, as reports filter in about the ongoing construction efforts, they become worried (1.91.1). Recognizing the need to act, Themistocles deftly plays upon Sparta’s mistrust of hearsay evidence – again, a theme of the Pausanias episode – and encourages the Spartans to dispatch trustworthy inspectors to Athens to see for themselves (1.91.2).27 At the same time, he instructs the Athenians to detain these emissaries to give the construction time, but also to ensure that he and his fellow ambassadors, who had at last arrived,

25. Hornblower, CT I 137, ‘What follows is a thoroughly Herodotean story …’ For one interpretation of these Herodotean evocations, see Jaffe 2017a, 177–80.

26. This should not be taken to imply a complete harmony between the men. If Thucydides has criticisms of Themistocles, however, he keeps them to himself. There is no hint in the History, for example, of his alleged fondness for money which appears in the Herodotean account.

27. On the Pausanias episode and trust, see Jaffe 2017a, 172–4. See also the interesting comments by Meyer 1997, 44 on the evidence that Sparta trusts; see also Reynolds 2009.
would be allowed to depart for home again (1.91.3). When Athens is sufficiently fortified, Themistocles announces this fact to the Spartan assembly in a speech which Thucydides relays in indirect discourse (1.91.4–7). This short speech resonates with other Athenian speeches of the History.

Themistocles reveals to the Spartans that the walls of Athens have reached a sufficient height for the defence of the Athenians (1.91.4). If the Spartans or their allies wish to send embassies to Athens, then they should know that they will be coming before those who can identify their own advantage (τά τε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξύμφορα) as well as the common good (τά κοινά, 1.91.4). The phraseology suggests that these can diverge, while Themistocles’ next lines develop the rationale. When the Athenians abandoned their city to take to their ships to fight the Persians, they did not consult anyone. And during the late war, when they deliberated with the Spartans, they were in no way inferior to them (1.91.5). Now, Themistocles says, the Athenians believe it to be best to wall their city, that it will be beneficial for their own citizens as well as for the allies (1.91.6). For, it is not possible, he adds, without equal (military) preparation to deliberate equally about the common good. Thus, all cities should be without walls, or what Athens has done should be considered right and proper (1.91.7). Here, Themistocles announces the apparent Athenian intention to equal Spartan power.

28. We might say that Themistocles himself is mindful of his own good as well as the common Athenian one. The later account of his escape to Persia would seem to confirm this.

29. This element of the speech represents a direct response to Sparta’s official position (see 1.90.2). Hornblower, CT I 137 argues that this is, in fact, ‘The first suggestion that Athens sees herself as an imperial power …’

30. The reader, of course, knows that (some of) the allies are already worried about the Athenians at this same time (cf. 1.90.1).

31. For παρασκευή in the History, see Allison 1989; also Foster 2010.

32. See Gomme, HCT I 259, ‘This might have come from the Athenian speech at Sparta in 432’.
These lines develop a realpolitik position running through the several Themistoclean speeches, which echo and anticipate other Athenian speeches in the *History*. It is equal power that makes equal deliberation possible. Here, deliberation in speech is tethered to the underlying balance of power. This Themistoclean position picks up something of the speech of the Athenian envoys at Sparta, which precedes it in the literary progression of the *History* but which temporally occurs years later. The speech of the Athenians at Sparta famously introduces what some scholars have called ‘the Athenian thesis’, a series of claims about necessity and power reappearing in the Athenian speeches of the *History*. At Sparta, the Athenians claim that Athens was *compelled* to establish the empire, compelled by fear, honour, and interest (cf. 1.75.3, 1.75.5, 1.76.2). Here, fear stands for security considerations in the shadow of the destruction of Athens during the Persian wars, and so the strategic imperative of defending the city against any similar fate in the future. The short pronouncement by Themistocles shares affinities with the later speech of the Athenian envoys.

After the Themistoclean pronouncement, the Spartans mask their unhappiness and allow the Athenian ambassadors to depart unhindered. The episode foregrounds Themistocles’ obvious talents at deception. He is comfortable bending the truth, but here his deceptiveness is public-spirited. It is important to note that there is no evidence in the *History* of any Themistoclean deception directed toward Athens or Athenians, only against the enemies of Athens.

33. Compare with the infamous line of the Melian dialogue at 5.89 about those circumstances where justice applies.

34. The term is originally used by Strauss 1964, 183; see also Orwin 1994, 64; Jaffe 2017a, 77; and also Jaffe 2015 on the Straussian reading of Thucydides. The use of necessity in these Athenian speeches echoes Thucydides’ own use of a necessity word at 1.23.6. The only non-Athenian who explicitly articulates a version of the thesis is the Syracusan Hermocrates in his speech at Gela (4.59–64).
The narrative passage after the walls episode (1.93) programmatically expands upon Themistocles’ own vision for Athenian power. Themistocles will reappear again only after the Pentecostalia, where his Medizing will be paired with that of the Spartan traitor Pausanias.

According to Thucydides at 1.93, in addition to expanding and rebuilding the walls of the city, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to complete the walling of the Piraeus, which he had earlier advised them to build, perhaps during his year as eponymous archon.\(^{35}\) Thucydides notes that he had instantly grasped the natural advantages of the harbour and the great power the Athenians would acquire in becoming a naval people (αὐτοὺς ναυτικοὺς γεγενημένους μέγα προφέρειν ἐς τὸ κτήσασθαι δύναμιν, 1.93.3). This passage picks up a Thucydidean statement from the prefatory Archaeology. There, Thucydides writes that it was when the Athenians embarked upon their ships to fight the Persians that they first became nautical (ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο, 1.18.2). The Persian invasions themselves, then, contributed to the completion of a political trajectory that Themistocles foresaw before the Persian wars. It was Themistocles who first dared (ἐτόλμησεν) to tell the Athenians to attach themselves firmly to the sea, while he himself straightaway laid the foundations for empire (καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατασκεύαζεν, 1.93.4). With walls that could be defended by only a small contingent, the remaining Athenian forces would be free to serve in the fleet (1.93.6). Themistocles, Thucydides adds, viewed the Piraeus as more strategically important than the upper city. He thus exhorted the Athenians, if they were ever hard-pressed by land, to defend themselves against everyone with their navy (1.93.7). The parallelism with the later Periclean strategy of

\(^{35}\) For the argument that we cannot know with certainty based on Thucydides’ language that this actually occurred during his year as eponymous archon, see Fornara 1971.
refusing to meet the Spartan levy in the field, while engaging in sea-based reprisal raiding, is clear (cf. 1.43.4–5).

After the summarizing passage, Themistocles reappears after the Pentecontaetia but now in a private and not a public capacity. While investigating Pausanias, the Spartans allege that they have discovered unambiguous evidence of Themistoclean Medizing, and so persuade the Athenians to move against him. In these passages, we observe Themistocles on the run from the Athenians and Spartans, on a dangerous and circuitous path which leads him, ultimately, to Persia. The ready Athenian acceptance of Spartan hearsay (i.e., second-hand) evidence of his treason contrasts brightly with Sparta’s comic slowness in the face of overwhelming first-hand evidence of Pausanias’ treachery.

When we meet Themistocles again, he has been ostracized from Athens and is living in Argos and travelling about the Peloponnesus (1.135.2). Thucydides does not discuss the reasons for his ostracism, the domestic political situation at Athens, or Themistocles’ activities in the Peloponnesus, all of which we would like him to do. Themistocles’ Argive base is suggestive, however, as is his reported movement around the Peloponnesus. Argos, of course, is Sparta’s long-standing rival in the Peloponnesus, while the pro-Spartan Cimonian faction is presumably ascendant at Athens. It is worth recalling that although Themistocles had been initially trusted by the Spartans due to their friendship with him – indeed, they had awarded him rare honours – he had abused their trust (1.91.1). The reader also knows that the Spartans held a grudge regarding the incident of the walls (1.92.1). There is no unambigu-

36. The Spartans prove quite willing to attempt to undermine Athenian leaders who oppose them; see, for example, 1.127.1–3.
37. See Jaffe 2017a, 172–7 for an exploration of Thucydides’ account of Medizing of the two men.
38. See Hdt. 8.124.
ous evidence in Thucydides’ text, but the reader can perhaps infer that the Spartans used Medizing as a pretext for moving against Themistocles, who had long been troublesome and was now interfering in their sphere of influence from Argos.39

In these episodes, Themistocles’ natural aptitude shines forth. He learns (προαισθόμενος) that he is being pursued, which leads to a series of vivid anecdotes about his long journey to Persia. First, he flees to Corcyra, where he is a benefactor (1.136.1). The inveterately neutral Corcyraeans, however, afraid of offending either the Athenians or Spartans, hastily send him on his away again (1.136.1).40 Next, he is driven to the house of Admetus, the Molossian King, who is no friend of his (1.136.2).41 Yet the barbarian king’s response proves warmer than that of the Corecyraeans, who are actually in Themistocles’ debt. In the Admetus episode, Themistocles appeals to the king’s nobility while emphasizing his present weakness. When he later writes to King Artaxerxes, he will stress his own great capacity and certainly not any relative weakness.

Upon arriving at the home of Admetus, Themistocles discovers that the king is away. He makes himself the supplicant of Admetus’ wife, who instructs him to take their son and sit before the hearth until the king returns.42 When Admetus arrives, Themistocles deft-

39. For conjectural histories of this period, between Themistocles’ exile and his arrival at the court of Artaxerxes, see Forrest 1960 and the rejoinder of O’Neil 1981. For the most recent account of this period, see the reconstruction of Rahe 2019, 94–115 and notes, 253–60, which contain up-to-date bibliography. There is general agreement that Themistocles was engaged in anti-Spartan agitation from Argos, which allows us to speculate that even in his private capacity he was serving (his vision of) Athenian interests.

40. Geographically speaking, at least, the visit to Corcyra suggests Themistocles’ ultimate destination was not originally Persia.

41. Here, the negation as intensifier. Hornblower, CT I 221, ‘The Greek in fact suggests Admetos was a positive enemy’.

42. This is a remarkable episode. Women appear only rarely in the History. The reader would like to know how Themistocles convinced Admetus’ wife to
ly appeals to the logic of equal power, which resembles the earlier argument he had made at Sparta. First, he reveals his identity and implores Admetus, despite the fact that he had once opposed him, not now to take vengeance upon him (1.136.4). For it is only noble (γενναῖον), Themistocles says, for retribution to be inflicted upon those who are alike and equal in standing (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου) and not upon one weaker (1.136.4). Themistocles had also not opposed Admetus about any matter of life or death. In other words, even if Admetus disagrees with the claim about the relative nobility of revenge among equals, Themistocles argues that retribution would be disproportionate to his original offense. Admetus raises him up, along with his own son, whom Themistocles had been holding the whole while. Thucydides offers the editorializing claim that this is ‘the greatest form of supplication’ (καὶ μέγιστον ἦν ἱκέτευμα τοῦτο, 1.137.1). Persuaded by Themistocles, Admetus, a former enemy, refuses to give him up to his Athenian and Spartan pursuers and facilitates his attempt to reach Persia (1.137.1). In terms of the logic of the speech, just as equal deliberation requires equal power, as in the case of the pronouncement at Sparta, so too, apparently, does noble revenge.

Arriving at Pydna, Themistocles next embarks upon a merchant

become his ally. Regardless, Themistocles proves himself as astute at dealing with barbarian queens as he is at dealing with the Spartans. On women and children in the History, see Wiedemann 1983.

43. γενναῖον and variants appear infrequently in the History and may communicate an archaic flavour. It is perhaps worth noting that τὸ γενναῖον comprises the greatest part of that ‘noble simplicity’ (τὸ εὔηθες) which becomes lost during revolution at Coreyra (3.83.1).

44. Why the greatest form of supplication? See Rhodes 2014, 274. Plutarch suggests it is the most solemn form of supplication among the Molossians themselves, but he is probably just offering an interpretive gloss on this Thucydidean line. See Plut. Vit. Them. 24.3. The role of the implicit (or at least possible) threat to the child remains an open question in the success of the supplication: the petitioner, of course, is holding the cherished son of the king, here the presumptive heir to the Molossian throne.
ship. And here, Thucydides offers us his third anecdote – the first involves the Greek Corcyraeans, the second a barbarian king, and the third a private captain. The ship is accidentally blown by a storm toward an Athenian blockading force.45 Worried, lest his identity be discovered, Themistocles reveals himself to the ship’s captain (1.137.2). He then threatens the man. If the captain refuses to assist him and he is captured, he will implicate the captain, claiming that he had bribed him. Themistocles’ safety requires that no one disembark. If the captain agrees to this, Themistocles promises to pay him. In an obvious bind, the captain conveys Themistocles to Ephesus (1.137.2). Thucydides emphasizes that Themistocles kept his promise and later compensated the man (1.137.3). Despite his talents at deception, then, Themistocles keeps his personal promises, which suggests an underlying integrity.

It is also important to observe how deftly Themistocles turns the unwitting captain into a witting accomplice, since the episode offers one clue for understanding Thucydides’ defence of Themistocles against the charge of Medizing. Although not originally bribed, Themistocles frightens the captain with the punishment for bribery. He thus makes his own fear of capture the equal concern of the captain – they are in the same boat – while offering a reward, i.e., a bribe. In this way, the threat of punishment for bribery becomes bribery itself. The captain might as well have been bribed from the outset. Whereas Themistocles had earlier relied upon Admetus’ noble simplicity, he here relies upon the captain’s calculation of self-interest.

After arriving at Ephesus, Themistocles dispatches a bold letter to Artaxerxes, the new Persian King, which Thucydides wishes the reader to compare to the letter Pausanias sent to Xerxes (1.137.3).46

45. For the famous difficulty about whether the blockading force is at Naxos or Thasos, see Hornblower, CT I 221–2.
46. On the parallelism of the letters, see Konishi 1970. For speculation about Thucydides’ use of a written source, see Westlake 1977, 102–3.
Once again, equality plays a role in Themistocles’ petition, and, again, his deceptiveness is on display. Themistocles also speaks to the King as almost a king unto himself. The letter Thucydides recreates reads as follows:

I, Themistocles, have come to you. I did the most harm (κακὰ μὲν πλεῖστα) of the Greeks to your house during the time when your father was attacking me and I was forced to defend myself (ἐμοὶ ἀνάγκη ἠμυνόμην), but much more good (πολὺ δ’ ἐτι πλεῖον ἀγαθά) when I was in a position of safety but he was in a position of danger and his return conveyance took place. A benefaction is owed to me [he had written from Salamis warning Xerxes of the withdrawal and telling him that because of himself the bridges would not be destroyed – for which he falsely claimed the credit]; and now when I have opportunity to do you great good (μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ δρᾶσαι). I am here, pursued by the Greeks because of my friendship with you. I wish to hold back for a year and then in person disclose what I have come for (1.137.4).

The King, it was said, was impressed by this plan and so agreed to this proposal (ἐθαύμασέ τε αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν, 1.138.1). In the interim year, Themistocles learned as much of the Persian tongue as possible as well as the customs of the country (1.138.1). When he arrived at court, Thucydides relays, he found greater favour with the King than any other Greek, partly because of his great reputation, partly because of the promise he made of enslaving Greece (τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἐλπίδα, ἣν ύπετίθει σὺτῷ δουλώσειν), but especially because of the constant evidence he gave of his intelligence (ξυνετός, 1.138.2).

47. The literal translation is that of Rhodes 2014, 167–9. For the Herodotean account, see Hdt. 8.108–10. For a discussion of the scholarly debate surrounding the Persian withdrawal as tied to this passage, see Gomme, HCT I 440–1; and Marr 1995a.

48. On ξυνετός in Thucydides, see Hornblower, CT I 124–5; and de Ste. Croix 1972, 16 n. 33. On the relationship between ξυνετός and γνώμη, see
This letter to Artaxerxes requires interpretation. Themistocles speaks to the Persian King as a political force unto himself. Xerxes, of course, did not attack Themistocles the individual but rather the Hellenes as a collective. Moreover, unlike the situation with Admetus, Themistocles does not foreground his weakness but rather his great capacity. True, he did the King’s house more harm than any other Greek, but he was compelled to inflict it (ἐμοὶ ἀνάγκη ἠμυνόμην). In this way, whatever evil he did the King is excusable because it was compulsory, i.e., necessitated by his own self-defence, which is irreproachable. He cannot be blamed, for he had no choice. At the same time, he did a still greater good to the King’s house once his safety had been assured. This later act, in contradistinction to his compulsory self-defence, was freely performed and so praiseworthy. Indeed, he deserves gratitude for it. If the King remains unpersuaded that the great harm he inflicted was in fact compulsory, then his good turn outweighs the bad one. Themistocles is thus owed a benefaction, either for that full measure of good he freely did Xerxes, or for the surplus good left over once the harm has been duly subtracted.

In this letter, Themistocles also makes a move reminiscent of his manipulation of the ship’s captain, which suggests that the episodes illuminate one another. Thucydides’ own narrative suggests that the Spartans and Athenians drove an unwilling Themistocles into the arms of Persia. But just as Themistocles transformed a threatened

Edmunds 1975, 9–10. Note also 1.74.1 from the speech of the Athenians at Sparta, where Themistocles is ξυνετώτατος.

49. In my view, Gomme, HCT I 440 too quickly denies that Themistocles is speaking as a king of the Greeks. Thucydides surely intends his readers to compare the Themistoclean speeches, which vary considerably in their modes of address as well as in their rhetorical strategies.

50. Of course, he is not at the direct mercy of the King as he was at the house of Admetus. His bold letter is dispatched from a safe distance.

51. Here, interestingly, the programmatic Thucydidean term ἀνάγκη appears (1.137.4).
allegation of bribery into bribery, he now adroitly turns a (false) accusation of Medizing into Medizing. In addition, the great harm and still greater good he did to Persia equally communicate his rare ability, which is exactly why he stresses them. Now, he claims to be endangered precisely because of his friendship with the King, while the fact of his hot pursuit by the Athenians and Spartans surely gives the ring of truth to the claim. Finally, he promises to do great (future) good for the King (μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ δρᾶσαι). In a few short words, Themistocles has squarely met the matter of the harm he once did Persia, while extending the promise of some equally great benefit. It is no wonder the King welcomes him with open arms. At the same time, Thucydides will soon suggest that Themistocles has no intention of enslaving Hellas. He embraces a Medism of convenience because it is foisted upon him by Athens.

The Apology of Themistocles

Unlike the Herodotean account, the Thucydidean portrait of Themistocles is wholly positive. There is no reference in the Pentecontae-tia to any Themistoclean actions in the service of Persia, where we might expect to find it. At 1.138.3–6, just following the line about the King’s appreciation of Themistocles’ obvious intelligence (ξυνετός, 1.138.2), Thucydides offers his own praise of Themistocles, including of his rare ξύνεσις. Moreover, as we have seen, Thucydides’ presentation of Themistocles’ speeches and deeds does not corroborate

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52. I agree with de Romilly 1963, 231 that Thucydides’ goal is here to exonerate Themistocles of Medizing. On 1.138 generally, see de Bakker 2017, 249, ‘The historian uses six superlatives to praise his [i.e., Themistocles’] foresight and extemporizing talents’. See de Ste. Croix 1972, 177 and n. 34, who counts seven superlatives and three adverbial expressions of approval in 1.138. Again, there is no hint of the self-dealing that we find in the Herodotean account. On the differences, see Gomme, HCT I 444.
the allegations of premeditated Medizing.\(^{53}\) Indeed, the anecdote with the captain offers one key for unlocking Thucydides’ apology of him. Under the pressure of necessity, Themistocles transformed a false reputation for Medizing into Medizing, all of which explains his posthumous reputation for treachery. In truth, however, he was driven to Persia by an unproven allegation offered up by the duplicitous Spartans, who were unhappy about his anti-Spartan agitation. The Athenians readily accepted his guilt, while his earlier ostracism doubtless reflects the activities of his domestic rivals, probably the (pro-Spartan) Cimonian faction.\(^{54}\) Athens then betrays Themistocles and not vice versa.

In terms of the great praise Thucydides heaps upon Themistocles, he is a whirlwind, a force of nature (βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχύν δηλώσας, 1.138.3). Artaxerxes is right. His ξύνεσις is unrivalled. And like Thucydides himself, Themistocles grasps τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, which means, literally, the human thing, though the term surely refers to something like human nature or the human condition (1.22.4). Moreover, his intelligence is inherent and not the product of education. He evinces the strongest judgement (κράτιστος γνώμων) about his immediate circumstances with the smallest deliberation, while simultaneously being the most excellent forecaster of the future (ἄριστος εἰκαστής, 1.138.3).\(^{55}\) He can furthermore explain whatever it is that he sets his mind to do, and he is able to judge sufficiently even things of which he lacks experience.\(^{56}\) He is especially

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\(^{53}\) Konishi 1970, 62 captures the contrast, ‘In other words, according to Thucydides, Pausanias’ Medism was a planned scheme from the outset, while Themistocles’ Medism was not a premeditated scheme’.


\(^{55}\) Gomme, HCT I 443 claims that this line references spatial more than temporal forecast, that it communicates, in other words, the ability to see the greatest range of events which will occur and not to see the furthest into the future.

\(^{56}\) On understanding and explaining τὰ δέοντα, see Pericles’ statement
gifted at foreseeing the better and worse in the indeterminate future (τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἄφανεῖ ἐτι προεώρα μάλιστα). To sum up, it is by his strength of nature (φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει) that he is the strongest (κράτιστος) at extemporizing the necessary things (αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δεόντα), i.e., those things required by each and every circumstance (1.138.3). This extraordinary praise surely implies that Themistocles is able to assist Artaxerxes in the promised conquest of Greece, but, again, Thucydides narrates no Themistoclean efforts of this kind. The account of his death and burial further reinforces the portrait of Themistocles as a loyal Athenian.

Thucydides writes that some assert he died of self-administered poison because he was unable to fulfil his promise to the King, this being the presumptive promise to help enslave Hellas (1.138.4). But Thucydides' own praise makes him appear capable of fulfilling almost any promise. Moreover, Thucydides stresses that he in fact died from illness, giving the apparent lie to any suggestion that he felt guilty about his failure to keep his promise (1.138.4). Lastly, Themistocles' desire to have his bones repatriated to Attic soil is sug-

about his own abilities at 2.60.5. On the echo, see Hornblower, *CT* I 223. Note also 2.43.1 of the Periclean Funeral Oration. Thucydides himself, of course, famously claims that he has added τὰ δεόντα to the recreated speeches of his *History* (1.22.1).

57. This is a paraphrase of the Thucydidean text at 1.138.3.

58. This was Pausanias' promise, too (1.128.7).

59. This perhaps underlines the question of how and why he was exiled from Athens in the first place, if he is such a political savant, a subject Thucydides declines to discuss. To develop a comprehensive understanding of Thucydides' praise and blame of individuals, one would need to compare all of the authorial passages involving praise or blame, and then begin cataloguing (and comparing) the virtues and vices identified. The most obvious candidate for a more thorough comparison with 1.138 is 2.65, the encomium of Pericles, which is done only suggestively below.

60. On the rival accounts of his death, see Marr 1995b. We know Themistocles can keep his promises, as with the case of the merchant captain.
gestive of his patriotism (1.138.5).\(^{61}\) Thucydides writes that Themistocles’ family had his bones repatriated secretly, since it is forbidden for someone prosecuted for treason (προδοσία) to be buried in Attic soil (1.138.6).\(^{62}\) The thrust of the presentation, however, implies he was never guilty of treason, while his own desire to be buried in Attic soil corroborates his ultimate loyalty.\(^{63}\) At the same time, his Medizing casts a shadow upon his legacy, which Thucydides is intent on dispelling. As an exile, Thucydides surely knew all too well that the Athenians can at times fail their best men.

\textit{Themistocles, Pericles, and Thucydides}

The praise Thucydides offers Themistocles is very high indeed. It cries out for comparison with Thucydides’ later praise of Pericles at 2.65. For the sake of parallelism with the passage known as the encomium of Pericles, we can call 1.138.3 the encomium of Themistocles.\(^{64}\) It appears just before the introduction of Pericles, the greatest man in speech and deed of the contemporary generation (ἀνήρ κατ᾽ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον πρῶτος Ἀθηναίων, λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος, 1.139.4).\(^{65}\) Now, Thucydides could have introduced

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\(^{61}\) Or the desire of his family to defend his posthumous reputation.

\(^{62}\) These lines perhaps suggest that Themistocles’ family was one of Thucydides’ sources.

\(^{63}\) Interestingly, the greatest of Athenian benefactors is dishonoured by his own city, but honoured in Persia, just as he was once uniquely honoured at Sparta (cf. 1.138.5, 1.74.1). See Orwin 1994, 76, n. 14; and Jaffe 2017a, 175.

\(^{64}\) 2.65 is known as the obituary of Pericles, but it also furnishes a programmatic Thucydidean statement about the reasons for Athenian defeat. On this important passage, see Hornblower, \textit{CTI} 340–9.

\(^{65}\) Interestingly, this is the boast of Protagoras in the Platonic dialogue bearing his name, to make a man most powerful in speech and deed (cf. Pl. \textit{Prt.} 319a.1–2 with Thuc. 1.139.4). Protagoras, of course, was an associate of Pericles. The sons of Pericles are moreover depicted as present in Plato’s \textit{Protagoras} (315a.1–3).
Pericles earlier, for example, during the debate at Athens between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians early in book one (1.32–44). But Thucydides chose to reserve the introduction of Pericles until after the account of Themistocles, the most outstanding Athenian of the previous generation. This is not accidental. It encourages the reader to compare the two men, just as Thucydides invites his readers to compare Pericles with his less illustrious successors. As scholars have observed, Thucydides’ Pericles is profoundly characterized by his γνώμη. Themistocles is praised for the same faculty (1.138.3).

As has already been mentioned, the Periclean war strategy is also an extension of the Themistoclean vision of naval empire. Themistocles had maintained that the Athenians must hold tightly to the sea, and that the Piraeus is more important than the upper city (1.93.3–7). Pericles, for his part, tells the Athenians to imagine that they are islanders, to focus on their navy, and to embrace their mastery of the sea (cf. 1.93.7 with 1.143.5, 2.62.2–3, and 2.65.7). In the Funeral Oration, Pericles also sketches an ascent to the present, where the Athenians of the contemporary generation appear worthy of the greatest honour. Before the oration itself, Thucydides offers the editorializing comment that the man selected to deliver the speech is always a preeminent one (ἀνὴρ ἀρημένος υπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃς ἂν γνώμῃ τε δοκῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι καὶ ἀξιώσει.

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66. Plutarch tells us that Pericles advocated alliance with Corcyra (Plut. Vit. Per. 29.1).
67. See Hornblower, CT I 203, ‘... the account of Themistokles’ qualities prepares us for those of Pericles’. For a comparison of Themistocles and Pericles in Thucydides’ History, see Foster 2010, 129–31; also Rood 1998, 138. For the Thucydidean suggestion that it is crucial to compare Pericles with his successors, see 2.65.8–11.
68. For the best and most comprehensive treatment of Pericles and γνώμη, see Edmunds 1975, 7–88. Forde 1989, 69 raises the possibility that Thucydides’ praise of Periclean patriotism and incorruptibility may represent a covert critique of Themistocles. If so, it is a highly implicit one.
προήκη, 2.34.6). In the speech itself, Pericles praises Athens as not only a democracy but also a meritocracy, where talent is gratefully acknowledged (2.37.1). In this way, Pericles subtly styles himself the preeminent Athenian of the preeminent generation, while his fellow citizens deserve praise, at least in part, for their recognition of his own obvious merit. Thucydides’ portrait of Themistocles complicates this Periclean self-portrait. It is not clear that Pericles is superior to Themistocles, certainly not in terms of their natural endowments or in their understanding of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. At the same time, it must be immediately conceded that Pericles is never ostracized. He maintains a lengthy domestic pre-eminence unmatched by Themistocles, although he is fined and temporarily removed from office at one point. Yet, even during this period, the Athenians adhere to his judgment in public matters (2.65.3–4). The most patriotic of Athenians, then, can fall afoul of his fellow citizens. The later Thucydidean presentation of the mercurial Alcibiades cries out for comparison with Themistocles, because he too evinces remarkable aptitude, offends his fellow citizens, and ultimately becomes a Medizer. Any assessment of Pericles or Alcibiades in Thucydides, then, cannot be made without comparing these men to the Thucydidean portrait of Themistocles. To state the overall interpretive matter programmatically, the bright galaxy of Athenian characters in the History shed mutual light upon one another. They cannot be studied in isolation.

69. As we have already discussed, the word ξυνετός also attends Themistocles.

70. The Funeral Oration can be read as a self-praise of Pericles. See Edmunds 1975, 52, who makes a similar point, ‘… to put it another way, Pericles’ praise of Athens is Thucydides’ praise of Pericles’. I suspect it may actually represent Thucydides’ praise of Themistocles more than of Pericles.

71. Hunter Rawlings has suggested that Thucydides’ Themistocles and Pausanias pairing may anticipate an unfinished but intended Thucydidean comparison between Alcibiades and Lysander: Rawlings 1981, 96–100.
Moreover, many scholars have been preoccupied with the seemingly inexhaustible Thucydides–Pericles question, the question of Thucydides’ assessment of Pericles and of his relative sympathy with his views. Comparatively less attention, however, has been paid to the Thucydides–Themistocles question, which is intimately connected to Thucydides’ assessment of Pericles. An answer to one requires an answer to the other. In addition to the question of how Thucydides’ portrait of Themistocles bears upon Pericles, there are also textual resonances between Themistocles and Thucydides himself. At the surface level, both men were Athenian exiles, of course, but the connection is deeper. Thucydides and Themistocles share an abiding interest in and a profound knowledge of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. They also share a corresponding ability to recognize and articulate τὰ δέοντα. This recognition of τὰ δέοντα is at the heart of the Thucydidean claim that his work will be a possession for ‘all time’ (1.22.4). It is also, of course, bound up with adept statesmanship.

Themistocles manifestly grasped what was required for a remarkable growth in Athenian power, which Thucydides himself outlines in his prefatory Archaeology: walls, ships, and revenue. In this way, the Archaeology is actually a Themistoclean account of the rise of Hellenic power. What Themistocles foresaw in prospect, Thucydides wrote up in retrospect, extending his structural account temporally backwards to explain the longer developmental arc of Hellas. Importantly, the depiction of Themistocles squarely puts to rest any claim that Thucydidean necessity is deterministic in any simple or quasi-mechanistic sense. The rise of Athenian power was no foregone conclusion. It was one political trajectory facilitated by a uniquely foresighted statesman. Both Thucydides and Themistocles, then, demonstrate a deep aliveness to the structural constituents of power, whose building blocks are put in place by astute statesmen.

72. See Foster 2010, 1–7 for a synthetic account.
73. The Syracusan Hermocrates appears as new Themistocles. See Connor
To return to the Funeral Oration a final time, several additional lines resonate with the Thucydidean account of Themistocles. For example, Pericles claims that the truest tomb is not where one’s bones are actually buried. Instead, heroes have the whole earth for their shrine (2.43.2–3). The reader of course knows that Themistocles’ tomb is unknown, while his natural talents were obvious to everyone, Athenians, Spartans, and Persians alike. These lines suggest a subtle memorialization of Themistocles. We can go further. The Themistoclean walls themselves, portions of which stand in Athens today, may represent a more profound funeral monument than even the great Periclean speech. In discussing their construction, Thucydides notes almost offhand that in the haste of the building efforts, variegated stones were incorporated into the walls, including tomb monuments (πολλαί τε στῆλαι ἀπὸ σημάτων καὶ λίθοι εἰργασμένοι ἐγκατέλεγησαν, 1.93.2). Some Athenians are then memorialised in the walls of Athens, where they loyally remain at their posts, serving their city even beyond death. Their memory shines forth as an enduring and useful monument to Athenian greatness, a symbol of that remarkable democratic harmony of public and private goods which emerged from the Persian wars (cf. 1.22.4 with 2.41.4). Such men are honoured by deeds alone, which Pericles himself says is the most fitting of tributes (2.35.1). The very name of the walls keeps alive the memory of that man who so uniquely contributed to those other imperishable monuments of good as well as evil for which we remember the Athenians and their empire (cf. 2.41.4).

1984, 198 n. 35; and Orwin 1994, 167. See also Rood 2006, 232–3, who suggests Thucydides has Themistoclean (and Periclean) foresight; see also Kallet 2006, 363 on Thucydides himself as conjecturer.

74. On the later tomb of Themistocles in the Piraeus, see Wallace 1972.

75. See Garland 1985, 121–2.
References

Edmunds, L. 1975: *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides*, Cambridge MA.
Luginbill, R. D. 1999: *Thucydides on War and National Character*, Boulder CO.

Strauss, L. 1964: The City and Man, Chicago.
Pericles: The Direct and Indirect fifth-century Epigraphical Evidence

In his address to the Athenian assembly on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles explicitly and forcefully put forward his opinion: Τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίοις… (Thuc. 1.140.1). This was an indirect response to the Lacedaemonians’ embassy to Athens claiming that: Λακεδαιμόνιοι βούλονται τὴν εἰρήνην εἶναι, εἰ ἤ δ’ ἂν εἰ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖτε (1.139.3).

This was not the only embassy that the Lacedaemonians sent to Athens just before the War. The historian tells us that: Ὅστερον δὲ φοιτῶντες παρ’ Ἀθηναίους Ποτειδαίας τε ἀπανίστασθαι καὶ Αἴγιναν αὐτονόμου ἀφιέναι, καὶ μάλιστα γε πάντων καὶ ἕνδηλότατα προύλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθελοῦσι μὴ ἂν γίγνεσθαι πόλεμον, ἐν ὃ εἴρητο αὐτοὺς μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἀγορᾷ (1.139.1).

* I warmly thank Prof. Nanno Marinatos and Robert K. Pitt for their kind invitation to participate in the conference. To the latter I am also indebted for his patience in editing my paper and correcting my English.

1. The bibliography on Pericles is vast; I cite here only three books where earlier bibliography can be found: Schubert 1994; Podlecki 1998; Tracy 2009.

2. Thucydides refers indirectly to the content of the Megarian decree twice more, see 1.67.4 and 144.2.
Pericles, in the speech just mentioned, explicitly refers to the claims of the Lacedaemonians: Ποτειδαίας τε γὰρ ἀπανίστασθαι κελεύουσι καὶ Αἴγιναν αὐτόνομον ἀφιέναι καὶ τὸ Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα καθαρεῖν· οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι οἴδε ἢκοντες καὶ τοὺς "Ελλήνας προσαγορεύουσιν αὐτονόμους ἀφιέναι (1.140.3).

The reason why the Athenians issued the Megarian decree is alluded to by Thucydides: ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων (1.139.2).

Aristophanes offers a different explanation for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ach. 524–9): πόρνην δὲ Σιμαίθαν ἰόντες Μεγαράδε / νεανίαι ἱερὰς παρεὶς / ἀντεξέκλεψαν Ἀσπασίας / κἀντεῦθεν ἀρχή τοῦ πολέμου κατερράγη / "Ελλησι πάσιν ἐκ τριῶν λαϊκαστριῶν. What is important, however, is that Aristophanes also reveals that the mover of the decree was Pericles himself (Ach. 530–4): Ἐντεῦθεν ὀργῇ Περικλέης οὑλύμπιος / ἢτραπτ', ἐβρόντα, ξυνεκύκα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, / ἐτίθει νόμους ὡσπερ σκόλια γεγραμμένους, / ὡς χρὴ Μεγαρέας μήτε γῆ μήτ' ἐν ἀγορᾷ / μήτ' ἐν θαλάττῃ μήτ' ἐν ἣπείρῳ μένειν.3

There are three further decrees that were moved by Pericles. The first is the so-called Congress decree.4 Plutarch is the only source for this document (Vit. Per. 17.1): Ἀρχομένων δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων άχθεσθαι τῇ αὐξήσει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐπαίρων ὁ Περικλῆς τὸν δῆμον ἐτί μάλλον μέγα φρονεῖν καὶ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῦν πραγμάτων γράφει ψήφισμα, πάντας "Ελλήνας τοὺς ὁποίποτε κατοικοῦντας Εὐρώπης ἢ [τής] Ἀσίας παρακαλεῖν, καὶ μικράν πόλιν καὶ μεγάλην, εἰς σύλλογον πέμπειν Ἀθήνας ὑπὸ θυσίων τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἱερῶν, αὐτόν ἀξιόν οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ τῶν θυσίων, ἀς

3. Aristophanes paraphrases here the content of the decree, cf. Thuc. 1.139.1. For the decree see also Peace 606–11.
The decree calls for an assembly of the Greeks to discuss three points: 1) the rebuilding of the temples that had been burnt by the Persians; 2) the payment for the sacrifices vowed during the struggle against the Persians; and 3) the protection of maritime activity for all Greeks and the preservation of peace.

Plutarch does not offer any precise date for the decree. The majority of scholars place it in the early 440s; H. B. Mattingly has argued for a date after 438 B.C. The cities, however, did not send any deputies and the decree enjoyed no success.

The second decree which was moved by Pericles is mentioned in a very fragmentary papyrus (The Strasbourg Papyrus, l. 5). It refers mainly to a fund of five thousand talents. Its date is given by the archon Euthydemos who is named in the text. The second editor of the papyrus, U. Wilcken, suggested that the decree should probably be associated with Thucydides 2.24, identifying the archon with that of 431/0. According to the historian, the Athenians decided to reserve 1000 talents on the Acropolis and 100 triremes and not to use them except if an enemy were to attack the city of Athens by sea. The editors of ATL proposed instead that the fund was used for the building of the Parthenon and the Propylaia, that the decree was passed in 450/49, and that the name of the archon mentioned in the papyrus is mistakenly recorded instead of Euthynos.

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6. Keil 1902; Wilcken 1907.
7. Wilcken 1907, 391–403.
9. For a comprehensive presentation of its content and date and a discussion see Samons 2000, 143–4, and 146–50.
The third decree is related to the construction of the Middle Wall, one of the major public works attributed to Pericles. The sources for this are: a) a fragment of Cratinus mentioned by Plutarch (*PCG IV* 326; *CAF I*, 300): Πάλαι γὰρ αὐτὸ / λόγοισι προάγει Περικλέης, / ἐργοισι δὲ οὔδὲ κινεῖ; b) Plato’s *Gorgias* (455d-e): ΓΟΡΓ. Οἶσθα γὰρ δήποτε ὅτι τὰ νεώρια ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἢ τῶν λιμένων κατασκευή ἐκ τῆς Θεμιστοκλέους συμβουλής γέγονεν, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τῆς Περικλέους ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργῶν. ΣΩΚ. Λέγεται ταῦτα, ὥς Γοργία, περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους· Περικλέους δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἤκουον ὅτι συνεβούλευεν ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ διὰ μέσου τείχους; and c) Plutarch’s *Life of Pericles* (13.7): …τὸ δὲ μακρὸν τείχος, περὶ οὗ Σωκράτης ἀκοῦσαί φησιν αὐτὸς εἰσηγουμένου γνώμην Περικλέους, ἡργολάβησε Καλλικράτης. κωμῳδεῖ δὲ τὸ ἔργον Κρατῖνος ὡς βραδεώς περαινόμενον. The Wall was built between the North and South Long Walls in the decade 460–450 B.C. Cratinus poked fun at this work for its slow progress (see above).

Yet another public building constructed under the superintendence of Pericles was the Odeion. Cratinus again comments (*PCG IV* 73; *CAF I*, 71): ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεὺς ὁδὶ προσέρχεται / Περικλέης, τῶιδεῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ κρανίου / ἔχων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦστρακον παροίχεται. It is unknown whether its construction was resolved following a decree moved by Pericles.

I have not so far touched upon the main topic of my paper, the direct and indirect epigraphic evidence for Pericles. It will be evident that this is a small dossier, in which the indirect epigraphic evidence prevails. By the term indirect evidence, I mean those public documents that are dated to the time after the ostracism of Thucydides Melesiou (a little after 444/3?)10 and until Pericles’ death in 429, a period in which he was the leading figure in Athens. And it is ex-

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actly this evidence, combined primarily with Thucydides’ historical narrative but also with some other literary sources, that, as the late Peter Rhodes (d. 2021) aptly noted, ‘our sources associate him with enough items in both internal and external affairs to justify the more usual assumption that, although Pericles can never have been sure that a particular vote in the assembly would go as he wanted, the assembly’s votes did go as he wanted more often than not’.  

**Indirect evidence**

I begin with the indirect pieces of epigraphic evidence, restricting myself to those that are either securely or almost securely dated.

1. **Construction projects and accounts**

Pericles, in his account of Athens’ financial resources, as told by Thucydides, refers to the money that was spent on construction, namely of the Propylaia (437/6–433/2) and of some other buildings that he does not name; he presumably implied the Parthenon, which had been completed only two years before (433/2), and possibly the Odeion: 

\[\thetaαρσεῖν\ \tauε \ \κε\κε\λ\ε\υ\ε\π\o\ τ\o\ \π\o\λ\o\υ\ \φ\ό\ρ\ο\υ\ \κα\τ\ε\ν\ι\α\υ\τ\ο\ν\ \α\π\o\ τ\o\ \τ\o\w\ ξ\υ\ι\μ\ι\α\χ\o\w\ τ\i\ \p\o\λ\e\i\ \\a\n\e\u\ \\i\ \\a\l\l\h\i\ς\ \p\r\o\s\o\δ\o\δ\o\u\, \ \u\p\a\r\c\h\o\u\t\o\w\ \d\e \ \e\n \ \t\i\ \ \a\k\r\o\p\o\l\o\l\e\i\ \e\t\i \ \t\o\t\e\ \a\r\g\u\r\i\o\u\ \e\p\i\s\i\m\o\u\ \e\x\a\k\i\s\i\x\i\l\i\w\o\n\ \t\a\l\a\n\t\o\w\( \tau\a \ \g\a\r\ \p\l\e\i\s\t\a\ \t\r\i\a\k\o\s\i\w\o\n\ \a\p\o\d\e\\o\u\t\a\ \m\u\r\i\a \ \e\g\e\n\e\t\o\, \ \a\f\i\ \ \o\w\ \e\s \ \t\a \ \p\r\o\p\u\l\a\i\a \ \t\i\ \ \a\k\r\o\p\o\l\o\l\e\w\o\s \ \k\a\i \ \t\a\l\l\a \ \o\i\k\o\d\o\m\i\m\a\m\a \k\a \ \e\s \ \P\o\t\e\i\d\a\i\a\n \ \a\p\a\n\h\l\o\\w\h\e\t\), \ \c\h\r\o\i\s \ \d\e \ \c\h\r\u\s\i\o\u \ \a\s\i\m\o\u \k\a\i \ \a\r\g\u\r\i\o\u\]

12. For the crucial passage on the amount of money kept on the Acropolis, see the discussion of Gomme, *HCT II* (corr. repr. Oxford 1969) 26–33, who refutes the interpretation put forward by the editors of *ATL III*, 118–32; also Hornblower, *CT I* 253–4, where earlier bibliography is cited; Kallet-Marx 1993, 96-203; Samons 2000, 143-145.
ἐν τε ἀναθήμασιν ἰδίοις καὶ δημοσίοις καὶ ὅσα ἱερὰ σκεύη περὶ
tε τὰς πομπὰς καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ σκύλα Μηδικὰ καὶ εἴ τι
tοιουτότροπον, οὐκ ἐλάσσονος [ἦν] ή πεντακοσίων ταλάντων.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ τά ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν προσετίθει χρήματα οὐκ ὀλίγα,
οἷς χρήσεθαι αὐτοῖς… (2.13.3–5). He also makes specific refer-
ence to the statue of Athena Parthenos: καὶ ἢν πάνυ ἐξείργωνται
πάντων, καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς θεοῦ τοῖς περικειμένοις χρυσίοις· ἀπέφαι
δ᾽ ἔχον τὸ ἄγαλμα τεσσαράκοντα τάλαντα σταθμὸν χρυσίου
ἀπέφθου, καὶ περιαιρετὸν εἶναι ἅπαν. χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ
ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἔλάσσω ἀντικαταστήσαι πάλιν (2.13.5).

1a. Fragments of the accounts for the construction of the Par-
thenon (447/6–433/2), the Propylaia (437/6–433/2) (see Tanoulas in
this volume), and the chryselephantine statue of Athena Parthenos
(completed by 438/7) are preserved (see IG I3 436–451, 462–466 and
453–460, respectively). These programs are traditionally attributed
to Pericles.

1b. Concerning the construction of the Propylaia, Plutarch (Vit.
Per. 13.7–8) provides the following story: ‘The Propylaia of the
Acropolis were brought to completion in the space of five years,
Mnesicles being their architect. A wonderful thing happened in the
course of their building, which indicated that the goddess was not
holding herself aloof, but was a helper both in the inception and in
the completion of the work. In the course of their building one of
the foremen, the most active and zealous of them all, lost his foot-
ning and fell from a great height, and lay in a sorry plight… Pericles
was much cast down at this, but the goddess appeared to him in a
dream and prescribed a course of treatment for him to use, so that he
speedily and easily healed the man. It was in commemoration of this
that he set up the bronze statue of Athena Hygieia on the Acropolis
near the altar of that goddess, which was there before, as they say’
(Loeb trans.). The inscribed base of the statue can be seen even today
in its original place: Ἀθεναῖοι τεὶ Ἀθεναίαι τεὶ ᾽Ὑγιείαι. | Πῦρρος
ἐποίησεν Ἀθεναῖος. (IG I3 506).
1c. The works on the Acropolis. A fragmentary decree (IG I3 32) on the creation of the money of the two Eleusinian Goddesses. Ll. 7–13 read as follows:

\[ \text{ἄνδρας δὲ ἥλεσθαι Αθηναίον πέντε ... τούτος δὲ ἐπιστάτην τοῖς χρέμασι τοῖς τοῖς θεοῖς καθάπερ \ οἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐμ πόλει ἔργοις καὶ τῶι νεῶι καὶ τῶι ἀγάλματι.} \]

Kevin Clinton aptly noted that the parallel between the officials to be elected and the epistatai ἐπὶ τοῖς χρέμασι τοῖς τοῖς θεοῖς (who were to oversee the works for the Temple and the Statue on the Acropolis), and the use of the imperfect ἐπεστάτον for their activity, reveals that the construction of the Parthenon and the statue of Athena Parthenos had already been completed. He suggested therefore that the inscription must be dated after 433/2.13

2. Internal affairs

2a. The decrees of Callias. These two important financial texts are inscribed on an opisthographic stele that was found at Charvati, modern Pallene, which was subsequently at some point between 1842 and 1855 taken out of Greece and has ever since been on display at the Louvre. As Rhodes noted:14 ‘By these decrees the Athenians put their finances in good order, paying outstanding debts to the sacred treasuries, combining a number of small treasuries in a treasury of the Other Gods, winding up a building programme (as a result of which the Propylaia was left unfinished) and resolving to spend further surpluses on dockyards and walls’. The relationship between the two decrees and their date or dates has been long debated. Rhodes himself strongly favours the year 434 B.C.15 He connects the order in the decree of Side B l. 26 of a full inventory of the treasures with the inscribed records of the treasures of Athena

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that begin in 434/3 (IG I3 292, 317, 343). I believe that Lisa Kallet’s
dating of the decree of side A to the summer of 431 is very persua-
sive.\textsuperscript{16} Kallet based her dating on Thucydides’ contrast (2.13.3–4)
between funds ὑπαρχόντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἔτι τότε... (‘there
were still ... on the Acropolis’) and ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων
ἱερῶν προσετίθει χρήματα οὐκ ὀλίγα (‘to this he added the trea-
sures of the other temples that were by no means inconsiderable
and might fairly be used’). This contrast is thought by Kallet to be
a strong indication – and I agree with this proposition – that the
funds of the Other Gods had not yet been moved to the Acropolis
in Spring 431. As for the decree of side B, I suggested in 2014\textsuperscript{17}
that it should be dated within 426 BC. I based this dating on lines 5–15,
where references are repeatedly made to repair works of certain
buildings on the Acropolis.

I append below the relevant lines of IG I3 52B:\textsuperscript{18}

kai tēn ākrōpolin [.....10.....]

[.....9.....]γρηγένα καὶ ἐπι[σκευά]ξεν δέκα τάλαντα ἀ[ναλίσκοντα]-
[5 τὸ ἐνιαυτ]ό hēkásto hēos [...6...]θεί καὶ ἐπισκεύα[σθεὶ h os κάλ]-
[.....9.....]μα τὸν ἄρχιτέκ[τον ποι]έν [ὁ]σπερ τὸν Προ[πυλαίον h oū]-
[.....10.....]ἐσεται he ἀκρ[όπολις] καὶ ἐπισκευασθε[σται τὰ ἀδεό]-


\textsuperscript{17.} At the International Epigraphic Conference in memory of D. M. Lewis
that was organized by the Epigraphic Museum and Greek Epigraphic Soci-
ety (Athens, 30.5–1.6.2014). I also put forward this suggestion in Matthaiou
2016a, 107–8, adding that IG I3 64 might refer to repairs needed because of the
damage caused by the same earthquakes.

\textsuperscript{18.} I have not included all the restorations accepted in the IG I3 edition.
I note the use of the verb ἐπισκευάζειν three times, and of the noun ἐπισκευή once. The amount allocated to these repairs was a rather hefty ten talents that had to be invested every year until the completion of the works. The need for repairs of this scale could only be addressing some serious damage, and one thinks automatically of the strong earthquakes that, according to Thucydides (3.87.3, 89.2), hit various regions throughout Greece, including Attica, in the Winter of 427/6 and the Summer of 426 B.C.\textsuperscript{19}

2b. The long decree (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 78) that contains provisions for the offering of first-fruits by the demos, Athens’ allies and other Greek cities to the two Goddesses at Eleusis has been dated a few years ago around 435 or earlier.\textsuperscript{20} One of the major arguments on which this date was based is the mention of the hieropoioi as being in charge of the collection, storage and selling of the first-fruits, rather than the newly-created board of the \textit{epistatai} (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 32).\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} Rhodes, in \textit{OR} pp. 255–6, hastened to reject my suggestion on the date, unfortunately underestimating the use of the verb ἐπισκευάζειν and Thucydides’ references to earthquakes in 426. But, as Professor M. Korres informs me, these earthquakes caused serious damage to various fifth-century constructions in Athens and, moreover, to the Parthenon; for the latter, see Korres & Bouras 1983, 328–30.


\textsuperscript{21} See under 1c above.
The decree includes a rider by the seer Lampon, who is well-known from literary sources. Among other things the rider provides that (II. 54–9): τὸν δὲ βασιλέα ἱερὰ τὰ ἐν τῷ Πελαργικῷ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὲ ἐνδιδύμεναι βομός ἐν τῷ Πελαργικῷ ἀνευ τῆς βολῆς καὶ τὸ δέμο, μεδὲ τὸς λίθος τέμνειν έκ τῶν Πελαργικῶν, μεδὲ γέν ἐχάγειν μεδὲ λίθος, ἐάν δὲ τις παραβαίνει τὸν δὲ βασιλέα ἐς τὴν βολήν.

What is prescribed in these lines has an obvious and direct connection to the oracle about the Pelargikon referred to by Thucydides as early as the first year of the Peloponnesian War, and its occupation by those Athenians who were forced to evacuate the Attic countryside and move into the city of Athens (2.14.1): Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἀνεπείθοντό τε καὶ ἐσεκομίζοντο ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κατασκευὴν ἐκ τῶν ἄγρων καὶ τῶν οἰκιῶν καθαιροῦντες τὴν ξύλωσιν. 17.1: ἐπειδὴ τε ἀφίκοντο ἐς τὸ ἄστυ, ὀλίγοις μὲν τισιν ὑπῆρχον οἰκήσεις καὶ παρὰ φίλων τινὰς ἢ οἰκείων καταφυγή, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τὰ τε ἐρήμα τῆς πόλεως ὑκησαν καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰ ἡρώα πάντα πλὴν τῆς ἀκρόπολεως καὶ τοῦ Ἕλευσινίου καὶ τοῦ Πυθικοῦ μαντείου καὶ τὸν Πελαργικὸν καλούμενον ἀργὸν ἄμεινον, ὁμως ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρῆμα ἀνάγκης ἐξωκήθη.

Lampon’s rider, seen in the light of Thucydides’ references to the Pelargikon, offers a strong argument in favour of dating the decree to the very first years of the Archidamian War. The Athenian demos voted Lampon’s proposition a little after the relocation of the Athenians to the aсты, when the maleficent consequences of the accumulation and housing of so many people in every available space of the aсты, sanctuaries and shrines of heroes included, began to be obvious to all.
2c. A very fragmentary decree (IG I 3 58) found in Eleusis was rightly dated, both on palaeographical and historical grounds, to 430 B.C. by A. Papayiannopoulos-Palaios, whom subsequent editors have invariably followed. Its content, as he convincingly argued, refers to the settling of both Eleusinians and other Athenians in Eleusis. Papayiannopoulos based his analysis on the Thucydidean passage (2.24) concerning the appointment of guards after the first invasion of the Peloponnesians into Attica, by land and sea, namely where the Athenians intended to have regular stations throughout the War.

3. External affairs

3a. In 447, a revolt against Athens broke out in Boeotia, which received support from Euboea. The decisive defeat of the Athenians at Koroneia encouraged Euboea to revolt from Athens in 446. Pericles marched against the island, but eventually returned to Athens because Megara also revolted, and the Peloponnesians were on the brink of invading Attica. They did so, but ultimately withdrew without advancing beyond Eleusis. At that point Pericles returned to Euboea and regained control of the island, destroyed the city of Histaia, and expelled its inhabitants. Shortly afterwards, a thirty-year peace was made between Athens and Sparta. Thucydides’ account of this Euboean revolt (1.114–5) is supplemented by three decrees. Two of them are fragmentary: the first (IG I 3 41) regulates Athens’ relations with Histaia, and the second decree (IG I 3 39) regulates relations not with Eretria – as is the firm and almost

22. Papayiannopoulos-Palaios 1929, where only fr. b, the major one found in 1928, is published. Of the two other fragments, c was found in the 19th century and was included in IG I (no. 92); a of unknown provenance was seen and identified by H. T. Wade-Gery, who published the three fragments, see ABSA 33, 1932–33, 127–31.

23. See IG I 3 58, also the edition of Clinton, I.Eleusis, I, no. 31 and his comments in vol. II, p. 58.
unanimous belief of modern scholars – but with another Euboean city-state, a small one, possibly the Διακρίους (ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ). The third document (IG I3 40) survives on an intact stele, and is a decree on the oaths that Athens and Chalcis exchanged, but it also includes two riders containing further harsh decisions concerning Chalcis. Unfortunately, this important document does not contain any explicit chronological formula, and its date has been the topic of a long debate. Based on prosopographical and epigraphical criteria, Harold Mattingly consistently argued that the decree should be connected with a campaign against Euboea in the archonship of Isarchos in 424/3 mentioned in a fragment of Philochorus (FGrHist 328 F 130). Mattingly’s low date has gained a growing scholarly approval. In recent years I have been thinking more and more about his suggestion. Before I turn to the next document, I would like to emphasize that the first editor of the stele, S. A. Koumanoudes (1818–1899), was absolutely right in noticing that the left side of the stele bears anathyrosis, which shows that another stele was affixed to it, and he concluded that the main decree on the treaty was inscribed on that neighbouring stele.

3b. The war between Corcyra and its metropolis Corinth, that broke out because of Epidamnos and the military intervention of

25. Ἀθήναιον 5, 1876, 74–9.
26. C. L. Lawton, Hesperia 61, 1992, 248–50, argued that due to the lack of any clamp ‘the anathyrosis on the left side might have been intended to ease the stele into an architectural setting’. Her conclusion was accepted in OR 131, pp. 174–5, in spite of the unusual omission, as they remarked, of any mention of the secretary in the prescript. Doubts are also expressed by S. D. Lambert, Two Inscribed documents of the Athenian Empire, (AIO Papers no. 8), 2017, 34 and n. 16. At my request, Prof. M. Korres examined the stele on display in the new Acropolis Museum in December 2018. Korres was categorical that the treatment of the left side of the stele is certainly anathyrosis and that another stele was affixed to it. Moreover, he added that, because of the small thickness of the stele (0.13 m), there was no need for a clamp.
Athens on the side of the Corcyraeans, is narrated by Thucydides in the first Book of his ξυγγραφή as being one of the αἰτίαι (grounds for the quarrel) of the Peloponnesian War. The surviving fragmentary inscribed expenses of the squadrons sent to Corcyra in 433 (IG I3 364) is compatible with Thucydides’ account: the Athenians successively sent two squadrons of ships, the first is mentioned in 1.45.1, and the second in 1.50.5; according to the inscription, both were sent when Akamantis was the first tribe in office.

3c. Fragments (IG I3 366) of the accounts of the expenses of the years 432/1 of the Athenian expedition to Macedonia and the revolt and siege of Poteidaia in 432 (Thuc. 1.58ff.) are also preserved. The lower part of this fragmentary stele contains the expenses for a naval force of one hundred ships sent to the Peloponnese in 431 under the command of three Athenian generals. The expedition to the Peloponnese is explicitly mentioned by Thucydides (2.23).

3d. A good impression of the Athenians’ conflict with the Macedonian King Perdiccas, but also of his relatively weak position at the time of the siege of Poteidaia, is provided by the first Athenian decree on relations with Methone (IG I3 61.18–29; cf. Thuc. 1.58ff.). Perdiccas’ predicament is particularly apparent in the following proposal conveyed by the three Athenian ambassadors to the Macedonian King: εἰπ̣ε̥ν δὲ [Π]ερδίκκαι hότι ἐὰν hοι στρατι[ται | hοι] ἐμ Ποτειδ[αι] ἐπαιν̣ε̥σι, γνόμας ἀγαθὰς hé[χσοι | περὶ] σαύ̣το Άθε[ν]αιοί (‘If the soldiers who are in Poteidaia speak well of him, a favourable opinion will be held towards him by the Athenians’). To put it bluntly, Perdiccas was reminded that he, a king, had to butter up the Athenian ranks, to flatter the scum of Athens.


28. However, there is a discrepancy in the names of the three generals of the second squadron. Thucydides’ text mistakenly gives only two generals, one of whom is different from that recorded in the inscription; see ML 61, p. 168; cf. OR 148, p. 281.
(with cakes and dancing girls, and who knows what else), before
the Athenians could even begin to consider taking him seriously, a
great shame for a king.

3e. Neither Thucydides nor any other literary source offers an
explicit explanation of the need on the part of Athens to conduct
treaties with Rhegion and Leontinoi in 433 B.C., of which two frag-
mentary stelai are preserved (IG I3 53, 54). Of course, it is no co-
incidence that treaties with these two western cities were conclud-
ed in the same year in which Athens made an alliance with Corecyra
and two naval squadrons were sent to assist the Corecyraeans. The
involvement of Athens in the last re-foundation of Sybaris, and the
new foundation of Thurii, in the mid-forties, strongly suggest that
Athens was thinking of a future intervention in the affairs of Sicily
and South Italy. This indeed happened with the general Laches’
expedition to Sicily in 428/7, known from Thucydides (3.86), only
five years after the alliances with Rhegion and Leontinoi.

3f. Literary sources provide information for a number of set-
tlements founded by Athens from the middle of the fifth century
onwards. I mentioned Thurii above. A fragmentary decree (IG I3
46) preserves the provision for the colonization of Brea, a place
otherwise known only from Stephanus Byzantius and Hesychius.
The site of Brea was unknown and has triggered much debate.
The date of the decree has also proven particularly problematic.
Some years ago, the archaeologist Theocharis Pazaras suggested
that the site of Βεργια, where he excavated the remains of a Classi-
sical settlement on the west coast of the Chalcidic peninsula near

29. In both decrees the original prescript has been replaced with a new
one, the inference being ‘that the 433/2 agreements represented a renew-
al of alliances made earlier’, probably in the forties (cf. Thuc. 3.86.3: κατὰ
παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν), see ML 63, p. 173; also OR 149, pp. 286–7.
30. See ML 49, p. 130, 132; OR 142, pp. 242–3.
Amphipolis, should be identified as ancient Brea.\textsuperscript{32} Pazaras’ suggestion received further support from S. Psoma. Following Mattingly, who suggested the late 430s for the decree,\textsuperscript{33} Psoma placed the foundation of Brea in the context of Athens’ turbulent relations (as per Thucydides) with Poteidaia and its neighbours and with Perdiccas of Macedon, in other words in 432, the year of the revolt of Poteidaia, or shortly before it.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{Direct evidence}

I finally move to the quasi-direct or outright direct epigraphic evidence referring to Pericles.

The so called ‘Springhouse decree’ (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 49) is very fragmentary, but what little is preserved on the stone shows that it concerns public works for the water supply of the city of Athens. The mover of the second rider, ll. 13–14, probably proposes that the two sons of Pericles, Paralos and Xanthippos, should be praised. The reason for the praise is unknown. Before the name of Paralos, the line length necessitates the restoration of one further name. That of Pericles himself has been accepted by modern scholars, and I too think that this is a probable supplement. The two sons of Pericles were also victims of the plague, but they died before him in 430.\textsuperscript{35} The decree must therefore be dated before or very early in 430.\textsuperscript{36} As for the upper chronological limit, various dates have been proposed, ranging from 440 down to 432/1,

\begin{itemize}
\item 32. Pazaras 1996.
\item 34. Psoma 2009. More recently she has suggested 433, see Psoma 2016.
\item 35. See Davies, \textit{APF} 11811, p. 459.
\item 36. Independently of the exact meaning of ll. 13–14 of the decree, the names of the two sons of Pericles provide an indirect \textit{terminus ante quem} for its date. Therefore, the date ca. 422 that S. V. Tracy, \textit{Athenian Lettering of the Fifth Century B.C.}, Berlin 2016, 123, recently suggested cannot stand.
\end{itemize}
where Mattingly had placed it. Wesley Thompson, whom I follow, argued that the decree should be placed ‘as late as 430, when the influx of country people into the city put a strain on the water supply’. Surprisingly, the name of Pericles Xanthippou has been preserved only on four ostraka. Two of them were found in the Athenian Agora, and two among the great Kerameikos assemblage. Unfortunately the context in which the ostraka were found cannot offer a more precise date than the years around the middle of the fifth century. They have been tentatively connected with the ostracism of Pericles’ great rival Thucydides, son of Melesias, possibly a little later in 443/2, which is known from Plutarch (Vit. Per. 14.3, cf. 16.3).

A major military operation in which Pericles was personally involved, and which we know about both from Thucydides’ detailed account (1.115.2–117) and from two fragmentary inscriptions, is the war against Samos in 440–439. Athens took the side of Miletus in its quarrel with Samos regarding their claim over Priene. The Athenians intervened in Samos, took hostages, installed a garrison, and set up a democracy. Samian fugitives regained control of the island with the help of Pissounthes the satrap of Sardis. Athens sent sixty ships under Pericles, and then a further forty Athenian ships, which were reinforced by twenty-five ships from Chios and Lesbos. They won a naval battle and set about besieging Samos. Shortly afterwards, Pericles, with a segment of his fleet, sailed against

42. For the date of Thucydides’ ostracism, see Rhodes 2006, 66 and Brenne 2018, II, p. 595.
the Phoenician naval contingent that was approaching with the aim of supporting Samos. In his absence the Samians won a naval battle and took control of the sea. Pericles returned, received further reinforcements, and, following a nine-month siege, the Samians surrendered. They concluded a treaty according to which, as per Thucydides, the Samians were obliged to demolish part of the city walls, surrender their ships, provide hostages, and to refund Athens for the expenses of the war. One of the two fragmentary inscriptions I mentioned earlier records payments from the Treasury of Athena for the Samian war; the total adds up to 1400 talents or slightly more, an enormous amount.

The second fragmentary inscription is the treaty of Athens with Samos (IG I 3 48); it consists of four fragments, one of which (fr. d) preserves part of the list of the Athenian generals and other military commanders that swore the oath. The number of generals and taxiaruchs, or most probably trierarchs, adds up to 17, of which ten were the generals, as I have argued in my recent study and republication of this important document. The generals are listed according to the official tribal order. After the name of Glaukon, the first letter of the name of his tribe A[kamantis] is preserved, and before Glaukon the ending of the name of another general of the tribe Akamantis can be read. The ending is [- - -]ες and the name that can be securely restored is [Pericl]es, whose deme, Cholargos, belonged to Akamantis. Moreover, apart from Thucydides’ account, Androton (FGrHist 324, F 38) gives the names of the generals who participated in the Samian expedition: listed among them we find both Glaukon Leagrou, and Pericles Xanthippou.

44. Matthaiou 2014 (SEG 64-31); cf. OR 139, pp. 224–9.
Until recently, this fragmentary name, along with the four aforementioned ostraka bearing Pericles’ name, were the only direct pieces of epigraphical evidence on the man who defined the most illustrious period of Athenian history.

In 2009, an excavation at Kephisia brought to light a series of rather humble graves. One of them contained no bones, no doubt due to the acidic nature of the soil, a phenomenon that been observed before in many burials, but merely two small vessels, a small lekythos and a black-glazed skyphos. The skyphos bears two inscriptions. A. On the exterior, after the cup was turned upside down, a rectangular area was marked off by means of an incised line. In this panel six masculine names were inscribed in stoichedon, or quasi-stoichedon style, in the old Attic alphabet and in the genitive case. Taking into account that the letters were few, the incision of the names was sloppy, and the inscribing was not made in a moment of sobriety, it is very probable that the names were not incised by the same hand. B. The second inscription is inscribed on the bottom of the vase; it is a single name, in the nominative and in the Ionic alphabet: Δραπέτης.

45. The text is based on my new edition of the inscription, see Matthaiou 2014, 151, and my discussion on 160–2. For the convenience of the reader, I have inserted the restorations of ll. 1, 2, and 4. Except for the name of Pericles, the three other names restored are recorded by Thucydides (1.117.2) as commanders (generals) at the head of the additional naval force (of forty out of sixty ships) sent by the Athenians against the Samians.

46. Ed. pr.: Daskalaki 2010–13, where an analytical report for the excavation can be found.
On stylistic grounds, the pot can be dated to ca. 480–440 BC, whereas the letter-forms of the first inscription point to a date around the second quarter of the fifth century. The Ionic lettering of the name on the bottom of the vase does not preclude this date.

Four of the six names in the Attic script do not allow any firm prosopographic identification. Matters are different, however, in the case of the those of Ἀρρίφρων and Περικλῆς. The first is very rare and is found almost exclusively amongst members of Pericles’ family. What is more, the fact that it is followed by the name Pericles allows us to suggest that the two individuals can be identified with Pericles and his brother Arriphron.

I have already suggested elsewhere that some informal gathering involving drinking was probably the reason that the six men got together – I prefer this explanation to that of a symposium (cf. Anderson in this volume). I note here that, whereas we know a lot about symposia, our knowledge about informal drinking gatherings is frail, to say the least, although there is quite a lot of scattered information found in ancient writers. Where did the six men gather? It could, of course, be at a residence in some property belonging to one of the six men, or – and I consider this more likely – it could have been at a tavern (καπηλεῖον).

The six men wrote their names on the cup as a memento of their gathering and as each of them was in a sense the owner of the cup, they wrote in the genitive. I note here that the tradition of inscribing the name of the owner or of the user of a cup is a very old one. Some of the earliest surviving inscriptions, as early as the late eighth century B.C., record precisely ‘owners’ of vessels.

47. Matthaiou 2016b, 53–65, especially 54.
48. See Osborne – Byrne, LGPN II, 63, s.v.
49. For Pericles and Arriphron, see Kirchner, PA 11811, and Davies, APF 11811, pp. 456–8; also Brenne 2018, II, nos. 82–84, pp. 15–16 (Arriphron) and nos. 6895–6896, pp. 479–80 (Pericles).
50. I present here a summary of the interpretation that I have previously suggested; for further documentation, see Matthaiou 2016b.
As for the relation of the second inscription, that of Drapetes, to the first, I would like to suggest that Drapetes was the owner of the tavern, the *kapelos*, the tavern-keeper. Drapetes is very likely a nickname, something not unusual in the case of tavern-keepers. The six Athenians left the *kapeleion* intoxicated, and also left behind them the inscribed cup as a reminder that they had drunk in that very place, a gift to the *kapelos* for his services. Placed by the tavern-keeper in a conspicuous place, the cup would have served as an advertisement for future customers. The tavern-keeper added his own name in order to include himself among the καλοὶ κἀγαθοί. He wrote it in the Ionic alphabet because of his origin, and on the bottom in order not to diminish the message of the advertisement.

Finally, how did the cup end up in the small grave where it was excavated? I suggest that when the tavern ceased to operate, the cup was transferred to the tavern-keeper’s home as a souvenir. When Drapetes died, the cup was placed by his relatives in the grave as something that was very dear to him.

The inscribed skyphos from Kephisia commemorates and vividly preserves for us a private moment of jollity, in which six Athenians of the fifth century B.C. came together to imbibe. But the skyphos also preserved a seventh name, of a nonperson, Δραπέτης. Most importantly, the inscription on the skyphos has shown that two of the six συμπόται (fellow-drinkers) were Pericles and his brother Arriphron.

What a strange ξυντυχία – to use a Thucydidean term – it is that we cannot read in full Pericles’ name even on a single inscribed document of the period of his predominance on the political stage of Athens, but we can sneak a peek into his private life through a humble cup. No decree recording Pericles’ name as that of a proposer has been hitherto found. If we did not have Thucydides’ recording of his three speeches (δημηγορίαι), his descriptions of the military expeditions in Euboea and Samos, the account of the power and dynamics of the Athenian polis just before the beginning of the devastating Peloponnesian War, Thucydides’ account of Pericles’ character, ac-
complishments and leadership, and furthermore if we did not have Plutarch’s *Life of Pericles*, the picture of this leading figure, of this most important personality, would be very faint indeed.\(^{51}\)

**Postscript**

An autopsy of side B of the so called Callias decrees (*IG* I\(^3\) 52) by Dr. S. Prignitz, whom I most warmly thank for his kindness in sharing with me the results of his examination of the stone, gave me the opportunity to write down very briefly (and I hope to expand my ideas elsewhere in the very future) what has for some time occupied my thoughts. Lines 1–2, as have been read and restored by H. T. Wade-Gery and adopted in the *IG* I\(^3\) edition, raise an important problem. They require us to accept that on the same day two decrees on the same issue were decreed by the Athenian demos, proposed by the same orator. I fear that there is no other such parallel.

**References**


\(^{51}\) Aristophanes and the other comic poets offer a very vivid picture of Pericles indeed, but of course a fragmentary one; for a brief and concise reference, see Rhodes 2006, 66–7.


Early in the *Histories*, the *demos* (populace) of the Epidamnians expels the *dynatoi* (powerful) in a period of *stasis* (civil strife) that attends a war that drained the city’s resources; the *dynatoi*, once ejected, make common cause with the enemy against the other Epidamnians (1.24.4–5). This episode prefigures the *stasis* with which ‘almost the entire Greek-speaking world was shaken’, as recounted in book three: ‘there were divergent moves everywhere, between the leaders of the *demoi* ... and *hoi oligoi* (the few)*. Such strife befell Athens herself in 411, when the Athenian *dynatoi* at Samos initiated a conspiracy to change Athens from democracy to oligarchy, with one of their aims being the acquisition of Persian support in the war.
The \textit{dynatoi} believed that they were owed a greater share in government because they bore the greatest share of the burdens of war.\textsuperscript{3} Considering such faceless blocs, the reader is to be forgiven for inferring that Thucydides saw the cause of \textit{stasis} in a persistent divide between \textit{demos} and the powerful or the few.\textsuperscript{4} But what, if not ideology, was the source of such unrest?

Thucydides offers his fullest – if rhetorically charged – answer in the aforementioned passage from book three. He declares that \textit{stasis} arose not simply because war afforded a pretext but because war made people desire revolution as they would not in peacetime (ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἑτοίμων παρακάλεῖν αὐτούς [i.e., τοὺς Αθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους], 3.82.1). As Colin Macleod perceptively noted, Thucydides is not here interested in recounting what \textit{did} transpire in peacetime – in essence, nothing

\begin{itemize}
\item[2.] 8.48.1: ἐκινήθη (cf. 3.82.1, n. 1 above) ἐπὶ τὸ στρατοπέδῳ πρῶτον καὶ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐνενεθεὶν ύστερον ἥλθεν.
\item[3.] 8.48.1: πολλὰς ἐλπίδας εἶχον αὐτοὶ τε ἑαυτοῖς οἱ δυνατοὶ [δυνατῶτατοι v.l.] τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ πράγματα, οἵπερ καὶ ταλαιπωροῦνται μάλιστα, ἐς ἑαυτοὺς περιποιήσεσθαι [Andrewes’ emendation of περιποιήσειν] καὶ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατήσει. Cf. 8.63.4. The so-called Old Oligarch echoes the debate: he allows that the poor deserve more owing to their military service, but cites ‘some’ who object that the basest receive more than the \textit{χρηστοί} (Xen. [\textit{Ath. Pol.}] 1.2–6). Hornblower 2000, 363–84 argues that this author engages with Thucydides and dates to the fourth century. At any rate, the value of this strange work is uncertain.
\item[4.] Thucydides does not use \textit{hoi dynatoi} and \textit{hoi oligoi} alike: \textit{hoi dynatoi} (or \textit{dynatotoi}) broadly denotes those with resources and power (e.g., 1.89.3: οἱ δυνατοὶ τῶν Περσῶν), only sometimes in contrast with the \textit{demos} (e.g., 1.24.4–5), and Hornblower, \textit{CT} III 808, observes (at 8.21) that the word need not imply oligarchs (contra Ostwald 1986, 345). \textit{hoi oligoi} always contrasts with the \textit{demos}, in a context of \textit{stasis} (never of a settled regime): 3.74.2 (Corcyra), 5.82.2–3 (Argos), 5.84.3 (Melos), 8.9.3, 8.14.2 (Chios); examples from the speeches are similar. The term \textit{demos} is notoriously multivalent, denoting the populace, the \textit{common} people, or popular government. The accounts of \textit{stasis} (just cited) are notably confusing about the sides, and in none of these is it clear what the existing constitution was.
\end{itemize}
but draws the contrast (πολεμουμένων δὲ, 3.82.1) to link stasis with war. But the historian’s vision of the situation prior may be glimpsed in the portrait of Athens under Pericles, who was certainly upper-class but enjoyed long-term popular support: Thucydides calls him dynatos, but specifies that this was owed to his honourable standing and judgment (δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ ἀξίωματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ, 2.65.8). In the Funeral Oration, a united city is depicted, though differences and heterogeneity are acknowledged. In 411, such differences, magnified by the pressures of war (economic and otherwise) and the attendant degradation of morals and values, spurred Athenian dynatoi to claim a greater political share. ‘Political equality of the masses’ and ‘temperate aristocracy’ were mere slogans wielded in this time of crisis (3.82.8). These are two stark visions of political life: peacetime flourishing, as under Pericles, and the instability of wartime. But the reader may look elsewhere than to ideology to understand their relation.

In book three, Thucydides declines to name names, but he intimates that there was a force encouraging unrest: the hetair(e)ia.

5. Macleod 1983b [orig. 1979], 136 n. 5.
6. With διαφορῶν (3.82.1, at n. 1 above), compare τὰ ἴδια διάφορα (2.37.1), and Pericles’ boast of Athenian tolerance for difference in both public and private affairs (2.37.2–3).
7. As described at 3.82: see Macleod 1983b [orig. 1979], 123–39.
8. Such sloganeering is in evidence when, in 411, a group of 300 Samians that was once demos and opposed to hoi dynatoi were persuaded to switch sides and intended to attack the rest of the Samians for being demos (8.73.2). The 300, after being defeated by the rest of the Samians, are reabsorbed by the democracy under an amnesty (8.73.6).
9. Raaflaub 2006 concludes that Thucydides was pessimistic about both democracy and oligarchy, except the Periclean model; Thucydides never shows a peacetime oligarchy, but Raaflaub infers that he favoured ‘moderate’ oligarchy. Ober 2006 sees Thucydides as a political scientist but reduces his view of the war to one of constitutional ideology. Nicolai 2008, 23 adds that later authors overgeneralized from Thucydides’ study of stasis.
It has been remarked that Thucydides ‘likes big memorable individuals and the great collectives, and does not care for anything in between’. The *hetaireia* (spelled thus henceforth, except in quotations) is largely something in between; it appears where Thucydides has the opportunity to cast it as an important but elusive personality:

Anyone who achieved his purpose in plotting was considered intelligent, while the one who accurately suspected (that of others) was cleverer still. But one who took measures to have no need of them was a dissolver of *hetaira* and terrified of the opposition. In short, the man who beat another in doing some harm was praised, as was the man who encouraged another who had no intention of doing some harm. Indeed, the tie of kinship became more alien than that of *hetairia* (*to hetairikon*), because (a member of) the latter was all too ready to act boldly, without opportunity for excuse. For such gatherings were made not with the benefit that derives from the laws laid down, but contrary to the existing laws, with a desire to get more. Their pledges to themselves they gave strength not by divine law but by transgressing the law in common (3.82.5–6).

Although Thucydides’ description here is purportedly general (springing from the particular example of Corcyra), there can be little doubt that it is largely based on the case of Athens in 411. By the fourth century, the terms used by Thucydides (*hetaireia, to hetairikon*) had become semi-technical, though in later sources they often connote anti-democratic activity at Athens.

Major questions remain. The origins and identity of these groups have been much debated, owing particularly to a lack of contemporary evidence for them prior to the late fifth century. There is

11. The Greek (3.82.5–6) is quoted and discussed below.
12. Calhoun 1913, 4–24 discusses the terms and dates the *hetaireia* to the time of Cylon (cf. Hdt. 5.71.1): cf. Sartori 1957, 18–30; Ghinatti 1970;
general agreement that they were small groups of elite men who met in private, chiefly – but perhaps not exclusively – for political purposes, but the nature and extent of their operations are uncertain. Thucydides sketches their personality, deploining their deleterious activities during the war, but his reasons for this judgment have not been fully explored.

The purpose of this paper, then, is twofold. My first task is to scrutinize Thucydides’ antipathy towards the _hetaireia_. Although I treat matters of definition – which are, in part, also historical – my focus here is on Thucydides’ conception of the phenomenon. Second, I consider a new piece of evidence that I argue pertains to the historical _hetaireia_: an inscribed cup suggesting that none other than Pericles himself belonged to such a group. By way of conclusion, I consider how this new evidence may affect our understanding of Thucydides, the _hetaireia_, and leading politicians of fifth-century Athens.

_Perceptions of the hetaireia_

We have noted how the _hetaireia_ could be identified with conspiracy against the _demos_, particularly after the constitutional upheavals

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Aurenche 1974, 15–32. Connor 1971, 25–9, stressing the limits of the sources, views _hetaireiai_ as informal social groups; Andrewes, _HCT V_ 128–31 notes that ‘_hetairoi_’ could, but need not, denote _hetaireia_-members; Rhodes 1981, 243 doubts their existence in Cleisthenes’ time (implied by Hdt. 5.66.2, Arist. [_Ath. Pol._] 20.1); Ostwald 1986, 354–7 argues that the terms were not used of political groups before 411; Welwei 1992 sees the _hetaireia_ rise with the _polis_; Hansen 1999, 279–83 claims that the terms designate revolutionary cells, not political parties; Bearzot 1999 sees them as opposed to ‘democratic machinery’ in the fifth century and speculates about their methods; Hornblower, _CT III_ 916–20 focuses on Thucydides’ account; Nicolai 2008, 15–23 has them in the sixth century as sites of elite conflict, developing into fifth century oligarchic havens.
of the later fifth century. Indeed, later sources exclusively view the *hetaireia* from this perspective: the author of the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians*, describing the conflict in 404, sharply distinguishes between ‘the nobles who belonged to *hetaireiai* and sought oligarchy’ and ‘those who belonged to no *hetaireiai* and sought the ancestral constitution’. Thucydides, however, does not equate the *hetaireia* with oligarchy, and, as we shall see, he positively indicates that it existed under the democracy. He implicates such groups in the coup of 411, but a careful reading suggests that they were not essentially antidemocratic. As to what the *hetaireia* actually was, Thucydides is vague, but, as I shall argue, this is likely by design and is itself revealing. Two probable *hetaireia*-members, Phrynichos and Peisander, feature here and may provide some insight into these groups.

Describing the birth of the conspiracy at Samos, Thucydides distinguishes between the roles played by the masses (ὁ μὲν ὀχλος, who grudgingly contemplate the scheme in hope of payment), the oligarchic conspirators proper (οἱ δὲ ξυνιστάντες τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν), and ‘the majority of the *hetairia*-element’ (τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ τῷ πλέονι, 8.48.3), the latter two of whom deliberate about the proposals of the exile Alcibiades concerning constitution change. This tripartite divi-

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13. Hyperides (4.7–8) quotes a law against the overthrow of the *demos* that bars ‘assembly of a *hetairikon*’ (ἐάν τις ... ἑταιρικὸν συναγάγῃ). It probably dates ca. 410–404: Hansen 1999, 213, 279, 281; cf. Whitehead 2000, 187–8; Hornblower, *CT* III 918. [Dem.] 46.26 quotes a narrower rule against formation ‘of a *hetaireia* for the overthrow of the *demos*’ (cf. Whitehead 2000, 187): how carefully would a jury distinguish anti-*demos* *hetaireiai* from those ‘for lawsuits and offices’ (Thuc. 8.54.4, discussed below)?

14. Arist. [*Ath. Pol.*] 34.3 τῶν δὲ γυναικῶν οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἑταιρείαις ὀντες ... ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπεθύμουν, οἱ δ’ ἐν ἑταιρεία μὲν οὐδεμιὰ συγκαθεστώτες ... τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν ἐξήτουν.

sion indicates that some of the hetaireiai-members were assumed to be opposed to the conspiracy (why else were they excluded from the deliberations?), and the majority, who were in favour of it, were not identical with the revolutionaries proper.\textsuperscript{16}

One personality is highlighted in this debate: the general Phrynichos. This man was\textit{ opposed} to the oligarchic scheme, but he was clearly party to the deliberation and hence a member of the hetaireia-element. Powerful men were among the members of\textit{ hetaireia}, but they were not necessarily ‘oligarchic’. Nor, however, was Phrynichos’ opposition ideological: he wanted to prevent the recall of Alcibiades, a political foe (8.48.4).\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, Phrynichos soon became a zealous\textit{ supporter} of the Four Hundred.\textsuperscript{18} Thucydides explains: Phrynichos came to believe that the oligarchy would never recall Alcibiades (8.68.3) – the same consideration as motivated his earlier opposition. To become ‘most eager for the oligarchy’ (προθυμότατον ἐς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, 8.68.3), means this regime (τὴν), which Phrynichos now thought his means to oppose Alcibiades. As we shall see, such opportunistic thinking was a hallmark of the hetaireia.

\textsuperscript{16} 8.48.3: οἱ δὲ ξυνιστάντες τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἐπειδὴ τῷ πλήθει ἐκοίνωσαν, αὖθις κἀν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ τῷ πλέον τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐσκόπουν. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἐφαίνετο εὖ πορικαὶ καὶ πιστά, Φρυνίχῳ δὲ στρατηγῷ ἔτι ὄντι οὐδὲν ἠρεσκέν, ἀλλ’ ὅ τε Ἀλκιβιάδης, ὧν καὶ ἦν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δεῖσθαι ἐδόκει αὐτῷ οὐδ’ ἄλλο τι σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ὅτῳ τρόπῳ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος κόσμου τὴν πόλιν μεταστήσας ὑπὸ τῶν ἑταίρων παρακλήσεις κάτεισι. At 8.47.2 the initiators are trierarchs and δυνατώτατοι.

\textsuperscript{17} Phrynichos, as a general, relied on popular support. The symposium in Ar. \textit{Vesp.} has οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον (1302), implied to be notorious, and this Phrynichos is likely the same man: Biles and Olson 2015, 461–2. Ἀλκιβιάδης ... ὑπὸ τῶν ἑταίρων παρακλήσεις (8.48.4, at n. 16) implies pro-Alcibiades hetaireiai. See Ostwald 1986, 348–50.

\textsuperscript{18} After his murder, Phrynichos was a ready scapegoat, a justly punished foe of the democracy (cf. Ar. \textit{Ran.} 689).
After the debate at Samos, Peisander travels to Athens and advocates a modifiable oligarchy to the Assembly, which reluctantly accepts that it may be a source of salvation (8.53–54.3). Peisander was a demagogue, which no doubt recommended him for the job: a frequent target in comedy, he was even the titular character in a play by Platon (without even the sort of thin disguise for Cleon used in *Knights*). One fragment from *Peisander*, an ugly bit of ‘wisdom’, may provide a hint of his politics: ‘a woman, if you always beat her, is the mightiest of all possessions, but if you leave her be, she is a wanton and uncontrolled thing’ (*PCG* fr. 105). Alan Sommerstein suggests reading the ‘woman’ as the Athenian empire, the ‘husband’ as Athens, and he well compares the arguments of Cleon in the Mytilenian debate (esp. Thuc. 3.39.5–6), to the effect that Athens must punish her subjects, as proved by the behaviour of well-treated Mytilene.\(^{19}\) Peisander, then, may have been a hawkish figure like Cleon, and this would square with his portrayal in comedy as a coward:\(^{20}\) all bellicose bluster, without mettle.

Thucydides, however, shows no interest in the question of his ideology or personality.\(^{21}\) Peisander’s disclosure to the Assembly replicates the one that had been made to the masses at Samos, and, as at Samos, it is followed by separate efforts with the *hetaireiai*:

\[καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τὰς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἴτερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὕσαι ἐπὶ δίκαιας καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἁπάς ἐπελθὼν καὶ παρακελευσάμενος ὅπως ἔστεραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δήμον.\]

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19. Sommerstein 2000, 439–40, dating the play to 422/1, before Peisander’s political prime (415–411). But surely Platon would not dedicate a play to a minor figure, so either Peisander’s prime began earlier or the play dates later.
21. Woodhead 1954 defends Peisander against his ancient critics; Ostwald 1986, 350–9 speculates that he was a trierarch and hence had economic motives for pursuing oligarchy; cf. n. 16.
Peisander approached all of the sworn associations that previously existed in the *polis* for lawsuits and offices and exhorted them to dissolve the democracy by collecting together and taking counsel in common (8.54.4).

Like Phrynichos, Peisander was doubtless a *hetaireia*-member himself, as indicated too by his denunciation of Phrynichos to the Assembly, owing to his perceived opposition (8.54.3). But he here advocates something new – a confederacy of *hetaireiai* in pursuit of oligarchy. A crucial word, highlighting the present novelty, is ‘previously’ (*πρότερον*): these groups operated *before*, under the democracy, where they evidently had a significant political function. As Thucydides later recounts, on this occasion they heeded Peisander and proved instrumental in establishing the new regime: when Peisander and company returned to Athens, ‘they discovered that almost everything had been done in advance by the *hetairoi*’, a restrained description for activities that included the murder of Androcles, a representative of the *demos* (8.65.2).

Here Thucydides offers innuendo, which is fitting: central to the *hetaireiai* appears to be their unofficial, even secretive nature. The groups Peisander approaches are termed *synomosiai* (‘sworn associations’, 8.54.4), not *hetaireiai* or *to hetairikon*, but critics agree that Thucydides has these in mind: Simon Hornblower rightly stresses that *‘synomosiai’* connotes conspiracy, but this might imply that, for Thucydides at least, *‘hetaireiai’* did not *per se* denote conspiracy (see above on 8.48.3). Their purported purpose, ‘for lawsuits and of-

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22. Peisander *slandered* Phrynichos (*διαβαλόντος*, 8.54.3), says Thucydides, suggesting a partisan fight.


fices’ (8.54.4), merely connotes clandestine political activity. This loose portrait well captures their sketchy nature.

This indistinct image is corroborated by the book three account (see note 11), where ‘such gatherings’ are said to happen ‘without the benefit of the laws laid down’ (3.82.6). The verbal forms in this passage are suggestive, and Thucydides does not fully distinguish his narrative of the *hetaireia* from the larger account of the *stasio-tai* proper: plotting and encouraging by a representative of the latter (ἐπιβουλεύσας, ὑπονοήσας, προβουλεύσας, ἐπικελεύσας, 3.82.5) verge into *actions* imputed to the *hetaireia* (τολμᾶν, ἐκρατύνοντο, παρανομῆσαι, 3.82.6). The rhetorical abundance is remarkable, but Thucydides employs this verbiage to create an impressionistic image, not a sharp and specific one.

A similarly vague reference to the *hetaireia* is found in Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata*, produced in 411, shortly before the coup. In the famous wool-working metaphor prescribing how to clean up the city, Lysistrata articulates the need ‘to card out those who band together and who felt themselves together for the offices’ (καὶ τοὺς γε συνισταμένους τούτους καὶ τοὺς πιλοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀρχαῖσ διαξῆναι, 577–8). The phrasing resembles Thucydides’ ‘sworn associations ... for lawsuits and offices’ (τὰς τε ξυνωμοσίας ... ἐπὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀρχαῖς, 8.54.4), but the ones thus designated (τούτους was probably accompanied by a wave to the audience) are unnamed, and their precise activities are left to the audience’s imagination or inference. Surely Aristophanes did not predict the

25. Calhoun 1913, 37–8; Ostwald 1986, 356–7; Bearzot 1999, 266–9, noting the contrast with Pericles’ emphasis on openness (2.37.1).

26. The first mention of the *hetaireia* (τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτής 3.82.5) occurs in the larger discussion of *stasis*, which is rounded off by the last sentence in the section (ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακὸν τι δράν ἐπηνεῖτο..., 3.82.5). Thucydides then treats the *hetaireia* as its own topic (καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ξυγγενὲς τοῦ ἑταιρικοῦ..., 3.82.6), before reverting to the subject of *stasis* (τὰ τε ἀπὸ τῶν ἑναντίων καλῶς λεγόμενα, 3.82.7).
coup that was to come or identify the conspirators before they had acted.27 Like Thucydides, he draws attention to a source of popular fear and suspicion at a time when Athens’ fortunes in war were wretched: powerful men conspire for their positions and may not have only the city’s interests at heart.

There are other signs that the *hetaireia* – or various kinds of gatherings that might look like a *hetaireia* – was indeed suspect even earlier. The caricature of Cleon in *Knights* (produced in 424) indicates how various groups could be classed together by an alarmist as treasonous threats: ‘I’ll go straight to the *boule* and tell of the sworn associations (τὰς ευνωμοσίας) of all of you, and the night-time gatherings against the *polis* (τὰς έυνόδους τὰς νυκτερινὰς ἐπὶ τῇ πόλει), and everything you swore with the Medes and King, and those things cheesed up with Boeotians’ (475–9). Paphlagon begins with vague *synomosiai* (cf. Thuc. 8.54.4), escalates to night-time *synodoi* (cf. Thuc. 3.82.6), and concludes with charges of outright treasonous intrigues. Since the *hetaireiai* were unofficial, their membership limited, and their precise nature perhaps not widely known, they will have readily attracted suspicion of being opposed to the *demos*.

I suggest, then, that it was the popular *perception* of clandestine activity that constituted one of Thucydides’ chief grounds for hostility towards the *hetaireia*. That is, to set aside for a moment what the *hetaireia* was in reality, we may suppose that the hysterical attitude of Paphlagon is representative of popular suspicion during the war. Thucydides corroborates such an atmosphere in his account of the affairs of the Herms and the Mysteries:28 His explanation consists of

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27. Henderson 1987, 143 sees two groups, anti-*demos* conspirators and ‘open factions of competitors for public influence’. But συνισταμένους is non-specific, and with τούτους it hardly points to real conspirators in the audience. τούς γε συνισταμένους τούτους prepares for the metaphor τούς πιλούντας, just as in 576: τούς μοχθηρούς καὶ τούς τριβόλους ἀπολέσατε.

28. Contrast the image in the Funeral Oration, where Athenians are said to be above mutual suspicion (2.37.2–3).
an excursus setting straight the ‘national myth’ of the tyrannicides (6.53–61): the tyranny had been a good one; the ‘tyrannicides’ in fact were involved in a private quarrel. Hans-Peter Stahl shows that this account draws out the import of the Athenians’ mistaken view of their own history, how they made consequential decisions founded on misperception and suspicion.29

The ironic ‘resolution’ to the episode has the Athenians convert their ‘certain’ knowledge about the Herms into the conviction that Alcibiades was behind the profanation of the Mysteries, which was ‘really’ a conspiracy against the demos.30 Thucydides here employs phrasing (6.61.1 τῆς ἕλενωμοσίας ἐπὶ τῷ δήμῳ, cf. 6.60.1 ἕλενωμοσία ἀλλιγαρχικῇ καὶ τυραννικῇ) that is echoed in his account of the habitual function of the hetaireiai (τὰς τε ἕλενωμοσίας ... ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἄρχαίς 8.54.4), and this points to the popular identification of hetaireia with conspiracy. But Thucydides does not care to confirm or deny whether there really had been a conspiracy against the demos prior to the Sicilian Expedition;31 what matters is that the Athenians suspected that there had been one and they (over)reacted accordingly, affecting their conduct of the war.

Once elsewhere Thucydides refers to such a conspiracy, and, although not mentioning the hetaireia, he emphasizes how suspicion determined the conduct of affairs. In the Pentekontaetia, he recounts how a Spartan force tarried in Boeotia, at a loss for a route home, but also because ‘some Athenians, hoping to hinder the demos and the building of the long walls, were trying to bring them [the Spartans] in secretly’ (1.107.4).32 The other Athenians gathered a force, with two motives mirroring those of the Spartans:

30. 6.61.1.
31. As he says of the Herms, it could not be determined whether the man who confessed did so truthfully (6.60.2).
32. 1.107.4: τὸ δὲ τι καὶ ἄνδρες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπῆγον αὐτοὺς κρύφα, ἐλπίσαντες δὴμόν τε καταπαύσειν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη οἰκοδομοῦμενα.
they believed that the Spartans were at a loss, and they suspected an overthrow of the *demos* (καὶ τι καὶ τοῦ δῆμος καταλύσεως ὑποψίᾳ, 1.107.6). Thucydides here highlights not the reality or unreality of the threat but the Athenians’ suspicion and consequent decision-making. The result was the Battle of Tanagra, with heavy losses on both sides but a victory for the Spartans (1.108.1, where Thucydides foregrounds the victory).³³

Thucydides’ handling of these conspiracies should be borne in mind when considering his accounts of the *hetaireiai*, which only appear in connection with their corrosive effect on the city in wartime. It is not his purpose to elucidate them. Yet to appreciate his negative treatment, we must attempt to identify his conception of them, despite his purposeful reticence.

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**Pinpointing the hetaireia: Social and Political Contexts**

Previous scholarship has largely concerned itself with intractable matters of definition: What *exactly* was this phenomenon? How does one distinguish the political *hetaireia* from other social groups of various descriptions? The symposium, for example, has many similar features.³⁴ Even when restricting the question to Thucydides, a satisfactory definition remains elusive: Antony Andrewes distinguished no fewer than five categories of *hetaireia,*

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³³ For Thucydides, the results went further: the Battle of Oenophyta, conquest of Boeotia and Phocis, and Aegina’s surrender (1.108.2–4) – the preliminaries for the War. The rapid, paratactic narration gives an impression of causation.

³⁴ Calhoun 1913, 4–7, 24–7. Alcaeus, for example, treated politics in poems widely thought to be addressed to his social and political comrades: Rössler 1980. Caciagli 2017 argues that Solon’s poetry addressed a *hetaireia* sharing his democratizing values and well suggests (313) that the *hetaireia* may not have always been destabilizing.
which, as Simon Hornblower rightly objected, is too schematic. But this very difficulty of pinpointing the political *hetaireia* suggests that we would do better to situate the malign entities described by Thucydides in a context broader than that afforded by the historian’s scant allusions.

We can see, in fact, from contemporaneous authors how ‘the’ *hetaireia* was only tenuously defined in the popular imagination as a distinct entity. Andocides, in his speech *On the Mysteries* (dated 400 or 399), indicates that his accuser charged him with belonging to a *hetaireia* (1.100), but Andocides undermines the accusation about the planning of the mutilation of the Herms by claiming that it occurred merely ‘while we were drinking’ (1.61). He also cleverly deflects any political connotation of the term *hetaireia* by asserting that it is his accuser who ‘associates’ (*ἡταίρησας*) with any man who wishes, for a low price, earning his living by most shameful deeds (1.100). Andocides thus claims that his accuser prostitutes himself (if so convicted, his accuser would suffer *atimia* and hence be ineligible to bring suit in court).

One of the earliest attestations of the restricted, Thucydidean usage of the term *hetaireia*, from Eupolis’ *Demoi*, likewise exploits, albeit to comic effect, the word’s broad semantic range. The passage in question (*PCG* fr. 99.23–34) is vituperation directed at an Athenian

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36. Cf. Andocides’ defence (1.54) against the charge that he betrayed his ἑταῖροι, with Hornblower, *CT* III 918 on Andocides’ use of this semantically broad term. For the popular link between drinking-gatherings (esp. of youths), physical violence and destruction (with consequent threats of lawsuits), see Ar. *Vesp.* 1253–64, 1296–1340; cf. the terse sequence at Epicharmus, *PCG* 146: sacrifice, feast, drinking, *komos*, boorish behaviour, lawsuit.
demagogue (possibly Hyperbolos, ostracized in 416), but the key lines (PCG fr. 99.25–8) are lacunose:

κοὐδ’ ἂν ἠττίκιζεν, εἰ μὴ τοὺς φίλους ἠισχύν[ετο,]
τῶν ἀπραγμόνων γε πόρνων κοὐχὶ τῶν σεμνῶν [‒ –]
άλλ’ ἔδει νεύσαντα χωρεῖν εἰς τὸ κινητήρ[ιον·]
τῆς ἑταιρίας δὲ τούτων τοὺς φίλους ἐσκ[‒ –]

Line 25 is unproblematic: ‘[the demagogue] wouldn’t have even spoken Attic [sc. to the Assembly], if he weren’t ashamed before his philoi’. For the sequel, Ian Storey gives the general sense: ‘[w]hat we want this line [26] to mean is “this man hangs around with good-for-nothing perverts and not with decent people”, with line 28 adding that “these are the sort of friends that he has in his hetaireia”.’

The barb indicates that such a leader was normally expected to associate with the semnoi – respectable, stately individuals – in his hetaireia. The point seems to be that this politician is unfit for the Assembly (earlier in the passage his citizenship is disputed) and all of his supporters are barred from politics anyway.

Eupolis’ humour relies on the easy slippage in connotation between social and political ‘relations’, much as in Andocides’ speech. Such slippage is found later, even after the hetaireia was widely

37. The play is usually dated to 412, but Storey 2003, 112–14 sets the termini as 418–411 and argues for 417 or 416. It is earlier than the Lysistrata (411), with its reference to hetaireiai (577–8, above). For the identification of Hyperbolos, note Storey’s dating, and cf. the jest in Platon’s Hyperbolos: ‘he could not speak Attic’ (PCG fr. 183).

38. Storey 2003, 152. Line 27 may be a joke that the demagogue ‘should have gone “where things get moved”’, not the Assembly. τὸ κινητήρ[ιον], connoting a brothel, may play on Assembly ‘movements’; cf. Cratinus, PCG fr. 327.

39. In comedy, the word is often ironic (‘grand’), but the key contrast here is with τῶν ἀπραγμόνων γε πόρνων.
identified with antidemocratic conspiracy. In the *Theatetus*, Socrates explains how philosophers avoid politics and adds that they do not even dream of joining ‘efforts of *hetairiai* for offices, gatherings, banquets, or reveling-bands with *aulos*-girls’ (σπουδαὶ δὲ ἐταιριῶν ἐπὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῦπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κώμοι 173δ; cf. Thuc. 8.54.4: τὰς τε ἐξυπνοσίας ... ἐπὶ δίκαιας καὶ ἀρχαῖς): although the *hetaireia* was distinct enough to warrant a restricted term, in practice it verged into various elite gatherings – *komos*, banquet, symposium. As seen in Aristophanes’ *Knights*, such groups fell under suspicion of conspiracy during the war, and the *hetaireia* scorned by Thucydides should be viewed in this broader context.

**Thucydides’ Account of the hetaireia**

To return, then, to the historian: while it is true that his description of the *hetaireia* in book three belongs in the context of wartime *stasis*, it would not be correct to infer that the gatherings (ξύνοδοι, 3.82.6) there described were entirely new phenomena (cf. above on 8.54.4 πρότερον). Rather, the point being made is that the nature of existing institutions – albeit unofficial ones – proved dangerous in time of crisis. He does not spell this point out, but it is apparent, as we shall see, in his account. The unchecked nature of the *hetaireia* offers our second clue to explaining Thucydides’ animosity. I give here the passage translated above (at n. 11):

ἐπιβουλεύσας δὲ τις τυχὼν ξυνετὸς καὶ υπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος. προβουλεύσας δὲ ὅπως μηδὲν αὐτῶν δεήσει, τῆς τε ἑταιρίας διαλυτὴς καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐκπεπληγμένος. ἀπλῶς δὲ ὁ

40. Macleod 1983b [orig. 1979], 126 suggests that *stasis* invented new and dangerous associations, whereas I argue that *stasis* leant new and dangerous significance to existing groups. Hornblower, *CT* I 478–9 notes how in 3.82–3 Thucydides moves between universal (human) experience and the particulars of *stasis* in Greek cities.
φθάσας τὸν μέλλοντα κακόν τι δρᾶν ἐπηνεῖτο, καὶ ὁ ἐπικελεύ-
ςας τὸν μὴ διανοούμενον. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον τοῦ ἐταιρι-
κοῦ ἄλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο διὰ τὸ ἑτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπρο-
φασίστως τολμᾶν· οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὑφελίας
αἱ τοιαύται ξύνοδοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξία.
καὶ τάς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκα-
τόνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῷ τι παρανομήσαι. (3.82.5–6)

Thucydides’ first definite statement about the hetaireia is that it be-
came a closer tie than family or kin (καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον τοῦ
ἑταιρικοῦ ἄλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο). It is implied that this outcome
would otherwise be unthinkable, but for the war and rise of stasis.
The tie of kinship is unambiguously a source of strength, not least
because it forms the basis for the polis.

The account of the hetaireia that is then offered as explanation,
‘because it was all too ready to act boldly, without opportunity for
excuse’ (διὰ τὸ ἑτοιμότερον εἶναι ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν), is a
general view, not one peculiar to wartime. In context, however, this
is tied to the change in people that transpired as a result of war: ἐν μὲν
εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοντων πρόφασιν οὐδ’ ἑτοίμων ... πολεμουμένων
dὲ, Thucydides had said at the outset (3.82.1). The hetaireia, then,
in contrast to the leading men in the various cities in peacetime (i.e.,
in both democracies and oligarchies), is home to the propensity
(ἐτοιμότερον) for reckless daring without opportunity for excuse
(ἀπροφασίστως τολμᾶν, which superficially recalls πρόφασιν).41
This distinction between people and institutions is important, for hu-
man beings act corresponding to their circumstances (both good and

41. For ἀπροφασίστως, ‘without prophasis’, i.e., ‘without demur’ (Gom-
me, HCT II 377, not his alternative ‘without cause’), cf. 6.72.5 ἀπροφασίστως
παρασκευασθῆναι (of generals with total authority), 8.2.4 ἀπροφασίστως
ἀπτεθαί τοῦ πολέμου (of Sparta when convinced of Athens’ loss). Stahl
2003, 5 connects the negative sense of τολμᾶν with that implied in the tyran-
nicides’ ‘reckless act’ (τόλμημα 6.54.1, τόλμα 59.1). Might the tyrannicides,
those democratic heroes, be cast as a hetaireia?
bad), whereas institutions function as designed. The hetaireia, by its very nature, somehow encourages humans’ worst impulses.

Thucydides continues to explain just what it is about the hetaireia that is so dangerous:

οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας οἱ τοιαύται ξύνο-
δοι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας πλεονεξία. καὶ τὰς ἐς σφᾶς
αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ
κοινῷ τι παρανομήσαι.

For such gatherings were made not with the benefit that derives from the laws laid down, but contrary to the existing laws, with a desire to get more. Their pledges to themselves they confirmed not by divine law but by transgressing the law in common.

As with the explanation for the triumph of hetaireia over kinship (διὰ τὸ ... τολμᾶν), here too Thucydides is defining his terminology in order to explain it: οἱ τοιαύται ξύνοδοι are not a new species of hetaireia that arose during the war, but that well-known phenomenon that now merits a restricted designation because it has become such an important factor in the rise of stasis.

Such a reading is borne out by the change of verb-tense: ‘the tie of kinship became (ἐγένετο, aorist) more alien than that of hetaireia’, for ‘they (members of hetaireiai) ... gave strength to (ἐκρατύνοντο, imperfect) their pledges’. The distinction is not easy to bring out in English, but the imperfect verb states an existing fact, one antecedent to and explaining (γὰρ) the event of the aorist verb. Thucydides

42. pace Hornblower, _CT_ I 484, who argues, with Andrewes, _HCT_ V 128–31, that Thucydides particularizes about a harmful type of hetaireia. Cf. Hornblower, _CT_ III 917–18, where Andrewes’ typology is criticized.

43. This interpretation is implied also by Dionysius’ paraphrase, αἱ τῶν ἑταιριῶν ἐγίνοντο σύνοδοι (de Thuc. 31), αἱ τοιαύται ξύνοδοι being ‘those of the hetaireiai’, not ‘malign hetaireiai as opposed to harmless ones’.

44. Cf. 5.51.1–2 Ἡρακλεώταις ... μάχη ἐγένετο πρὸς Αἰνιᾶνας .... προσοικοῦντα γὰρ τὰ ἔθνη ταύτα τῇ πόλει πολέμια ἢν. At 4.40.1 παρὰ
asserts that such pledges and pleonexia were part-and-parcel of the hetaireia. Certainly the imperfect verb does not imply that the description now no longer applies (we have noted the fourth-century Athenian perception); rather, Thucydides records an essential quality that explains why the hetaireia had the role that it did during the war.

As noted above, the verbiage paints a picture of hostile calculation: ἐπιβουλεύσας, ὑπονοήσας, προβουλεύσας, ἐπικελεύσας, τολμᾶν, ἐκρατύνοντο, παρανομῆσαι (3.82.5–6), but this does not make explicit the nature of the danger. This information is provided by the key noun-forms: πλεονεξίᾳ and the deeply ironic πίστεις and κοινῇ, which are interrelated.

We begin with κοινῇ. As Colin Macleod observed, here the expectation is perverted that politicians – who are notionally identical with the male citizen population – will legislate and administer ‘in common’ or ‘for the commonwealth’ (κοινῇ): the ‘common good’ was instead the satisfaction of the members’ desire for more. The same ironic point is made when Peisander, in 411, exhorts the syno- mosiai to collect together and take counsel ‘in common’ to dissolve the democracy (κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον, 8.54.4).

The pledges or assurances of mutual trust (πίστεις) among members were not words alone, but a shared criminal act (τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι). Walter Burkert pointed out that a joint crime is the
strongest form of *pistis*, and he well cited the mutilation of the Herms and the murder of Hyperbolos during the coup of 411 (8.73.3), in comparison.\(^{48}\) As I have been arguing, however, Thucydides is offering a generic account, and his overriding rhetorical point is to contrast the perverse *pistis* of the *hetaireia* with the normative one that regulates political life.

In fact, we have here the counterpart to a specific normative claim made by Pericles in the Funeral Oration. Commentators have largely been silent about the threefold reference to laws (οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὑφελίας ... ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας (sc. νόμους) ... τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτούς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ μᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῷ τι παρανομήσαι 3.82.6),\(^{49}\) but this responds, I suggest, to Pericles’ words:

> ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἄρχῃ ὄντων ἀκροά- σει καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτών ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὑφελίᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες αἰσχύνην ὁμολο- γουμένην φέρουσιν.

While associating with one another in our private affairs without offense, we are above all law-abiding in public affairs on account of fear, because of our obedience to whoever is holding office and the laws – especially those laid down for the benefit of the wronged and those that, though unwritten, bear an acknowledged shame. (2.37.3)

\(^{48}\) Burkert 1993, 146, with 150 n. 41. Samian conspirators (ξυνωμόται, 8.73.2) joined with the general Charminos and other Athenians in killing Hyperbolos to establish *pistis* with them (πίστιν διδόντες αὐτοῖς, 8.73.3).

\(^{49}\) τῶν κειμένων νόμων ... παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας would be awkward pleonasm if the participles had no difference of meaning. Rhodes 1994, 237 (with 206) hints at the connection with 2.37.3.
οὔ γάρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὄφελία (3.82.6) answers ὃσοι τε ἐπ’ ὄφελία τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται (2.37.3) and connotes man-made law, while ὅσοι τῷ θείῳ νόμῳ (3.82.6) responds to ὃσοι ἄγραφοι ὤντες (2.37.3), for divine law is not written as the law of the polis may be. I interpret παρὰ τοὺς καθεστῶτας (3.82.6) as the umbrella designation for both kinds of law, answering τῶν νόμων (2.37.3). Pericles claimed that Athenians, who enjoy license in private life, abide by the law in the public sphere owing to their fear of and obedience to the magistrates and both classes of law. The later passage, by contrast, indicates the hazy context in which the distinction between private and public life is blurred and where the confidence of Pericles’ μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν is replaced by trust confirmed τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανομῆσαι.

The key-word πλεονεξία, often translated as ‘greed’, means ‘getting more’ (i.e., than one’s share or due, whence the negative connotation). Again, the historian is pointing to a fundamental principle of these groups, not a new impulse occasioned by the war: they served to secure more – above all more political power. Implicit in the charge of pleonexia is the hetaireia’s conception of political power as a zero-sum affair: one hetaireia gained more at the expense

50. Some emend ὄφελία (3.82.6) to the dative, balancing πλεονεξία. The dative would also be closer to 2.37.3 ἐπ’ ὄφελία. But Macleod 1983b [orig. 1979], 134 with 139 n. 53 defends the paradosis.

51. νόμος with the verb κεῖμαι is not restricted to this sense, but a ‘laid’ law entails a legislative agent (the active τίθημι is usual in this sense: LSJ’s.v. V), whereas the intransitive καθεστῶτας (‘existing’, ‘prevailing’) does not.

52. Hornblower, CT I 302–3; cf. Finglass 2018, 433–4 (Soph. OT 865–70) on the divine origin of unwritten law.

53. Macleod 1983b [orig. 1979], 128–9 argues that Thucydides treats greed as a basic impulse, not a special defect of oligarchy or democracy. I submit that the hetaireia is singled out as an institution predicated upon such greed. The symposium (and hetaireia?) in Ar. Vesp. is hosted by Philoktemon (1250), whose name is chosen for its etymology, ‘fond of acquisition’ (cf. Biles and Olson 2015, 445–6).
of another. Thucydides’ point, and the source of his opprobrium, is that such competition was carried on at the expense of the *polis*, and disastrously so in wartime.

Thucydides also draws attention to the element of *pleonexia* in connection with the 411 coup: the *dynatoi* of Athens, some of whose numbers will have in part comprised the *hetaireiai*, thought to turn affairs over to themselves because they bore the greatest burdens (*πολλὰς ἐλπίδας εἶχον αὐτοὶ τε ἑαυτοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τὰ πράγματα, οἱ δυνατοὶ τῶν πολέμων ἐπικρατήσεις*). Thucydides compresses two thoughts into one, insightfully capturing the ‘logic’ of the *dynatoi*: they believed that they deserved greater political control owing to their outsized contribution; they had great expectations that they would succeed in seizing control because they made such a contribution. The *hetaireia* was the ideal locus for the expression of such logic, where the ambition and success of the group was hazily assimilated to that of the *polis*.

*The Cup of Pericles*

We have thus far explored Thucydides’ concept and criticism of the *hetaireia* and have broadened our scope beyond the historian to encompass the phenomenon’s larger social context. We now turn to a tantalizing new piece of evidence that documents, I argue, the historical phenomenon to which Thucydides refers, located precisely in the context of elite socialization. To anticipate the argument, I here offer a summary and disclaimer. A recently discovered vessel, inscribed with six names, may attest a *hetaireia* in the earlier fifth century (ca. 480–465) comprised of Pericles, his brother Ariphron, and perhaps other known figures. If this view holds, we gain insight about Pericles, his milieu, as well as about the history of the *hetaireia*. But, as we have seen, definition of the *hetaireia* is fraught, and we can-
not hope to pinpoint the historical moment when ‘the’ hetaireia was recognized. It cannot, of course, be determined whether Thucydides would label the group documented on this vessel a hetaireia. Nevertheless, I believe that Thucydides and the inscribed cup, when read together, may be mutually illuminating.

Implicated here is none other than Pericles, whose own politics are difficult to pin down: his contemporary the comic poet Cratinus called him ‘the greatest tyrannos’, the offspring of personified Stasis, whereas Eupolis, in his play Demoi, portrayed Pericles (after his death) as one of the four great statesmen of Athens’ past. Thucydides thus summarized his tenure: ‘in name it was democracy, but in practice rule was exercised by the first man’ (2.65.9), which scholars read variously as praise or indictment. Such ambiguity is reinforced by Plutarch (a depot for modern biographers), who regarded him as an unnatural democrat who chose the interests of the many and poor, contrary to his elite nature (Vit. Per. 7.2–3). Plutarch writes in the vein of ps.-Aristotle, sorting politicians into populist-democratic and aristocratic-oligarchic camps, but he treats his sources (Thucydides among them) well enough to betray his awareness that the scheme is faulty: he had to reconcile aspects of the tradition that seemed antithetical.

For Plutarch, sociability among elites was at odds with upstanding leadership: in order to court the demos, Pericles is said to have refused all invitations and never dined with his philoi, with a single exception that proves the rule – he attended the wedding of a kinsman but departed before the wine was poured (Vit. Per. 7.5). The anecdote is remarkable, for it reflects Thucydides’ account of

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54. Cratinus PCG fr. 258: Στάσις δὲ καὶ πρεσβυγενής Χρόνος ... μέγιστον τίκτετον τύραννον..., quoted by Plu. Vit. Per. 3.4.
55. Eupolis PCG fr. 102, 104 with test. i, 115.
56. Plutarch contrasts Pericles with Cimon, who he thinks was beloved by the aristocrats (Vit. Per. 7.4).
the hetaireia, as elucidated above: mistrust of the hetaireiai obviated all socialization. Plutarch repeats versions of it elsewhere: the demagogue Cleon repudiates his friends before entering politics (Mor. 806f); Aristides refuses to join his hetairoi in illegal activity (οὐ βουλόμενος συναδικεῖν τοῖς ἐταῖροις), in contrast to Themistocles, who joins a hetaireia and professes to disdain any office ‘from which my philoi will get nothing more than outsiders’ (ἐν ᾧ πλέον οὐδέν ἔξουσιν οἱ φίλοι παρ’ ἐμοί τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, Vit. Arist. 2.5–6). This last rendition well reflects Thucydides’ observation of pleonexia in connection with the hetaireia, but, while these tales may be useful for succinct biography, they likely lack strict historical value. Fortunately, there is now a further means of checking the biographer.

We possess a new piece of evidence that appears to contradict Plutarch’s account of an antisocial Pericles: the Cup of Pericles. The vessel, a black-glazed Corinthian-type skyphos dated ca. 480–465, or perhaps as late as 440, was discovered along with an olpe in a tile grave excavated in Kifisia, a modern suburb of Athens. On the outside of the vessel are incised, post-firing, six anthroponyms, all in the genitive, one written below another, and they are enclosed by an incised quadrilateral. The names read from left to right when the vessel is turned upside down. The letterforms, in the old Attic script, date roughly to the second quarter of the fifth century. Angelos Matthaiou, in his thorough study of the cup, observes sufficient variation

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57. τῶν ἀλλοτρίων could imply ‘the opposition’. Plutarch inconsistently connects hetaireia and aristocracy: Aristides preferred an ‘aristocratic politeia’, but Themistocles the ‘democrat’ (Vit. Arist. 2.1) had the hetaireia.

58. Daskalaki 2010–13; Matthaiou 2016. Matthaiou 2016, 54 with n. 4 adopts a wider range, ca. 480–440, for the date, but the parallels cited by Daskalaki 2010–13, 181 n. 4 and the opinion of the experts cited by Matthaiou 2016, 54 n. 4 weigh in favour of the ca. 480–465 range.

59. The letters are approximately aligned, as on a grid, but the inscription is not truly stoichedon.
of the letterforms to suggest that more than one person inscribed it – perhaps each man his own name.\textsuperscript{60}

On the bottom of the cup there is incised one more word, δραπέτης (‘runaway slave’), written with \textit{eta} as in Ionic script, and Matthaiou has interpreted it as a personal name, borne by a slave from Ionia.\textsuperscript{61} Yet, for δραπέτης as a personal name, we have but one possible parallel, the one-word graffito (δραπέτης) on the bottom of a lamp (dated to the last quarter of the fifth century) from the Athenian Agora.\textsuperscript{62} Both of these occurrences are more readily interpreted as the common noun. I suggest that the word on our cup designates not a person but the vessel, and this explains the syntax of the six names on the side:

δραπέτης | Αριστείδο | Διοδότο | Δαισίμο | Αρρίφρονος | Περικλέος | Ε[υ]κρίτο.

\textit{(sc. I am the)} runaway of Aristides, Diodotos, Daisimos(?), Arhipron,\textsuperscript{63} Perikles, Eukritos.

Of the six names, that of Pericles is paramount. But the name Arhipron is key, for it aids the identification of the more famous signatory: a rare name in Attica, its only attested bearer from the first half of the fifth century is the brother of Pericles.\textsuperscript{64} The collocation of the

\textsuperscript{60} Matthaiou 2016, 54. See further Matthaiou in this volume.

\textsuperscript{61} Thus Matthaiou 2016, 57, 59, 61. As Matthaiou 2016, 57 with n. 29 observes, such use of Ionic letterforms alongside Attic ones is well attested in the 5th century, so there are no grounds for supposing that these are separate graffiti.

\textsuperscript{62} L 3088, \textit{Agora} XXI F 93: Mabel Lang (\textit{Agora} XXI, 36) read this as a personal name; cf. Richard Howland, \textit{Agora} IV 49, no. 175.

\textsuperscript{63} For the false gemination of \textit{rho}, see Threatte 1980, 522, 533.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{PA} 2204, named for his grandfather (\textit{PA} 2203). A casualty list (\textit{SEG} 52-60 col. 1.23) attests another Arhipron, but it dates to the 420s, which is too late for its Arhipron to be that of the cup: Matthaiou 2016, 55–6 with nn. 14–15.
names Pericles and Ariphron on the cup all but demands their identification as the sons of Xanthippos.

As for the other names, Aristides could be the statesman (son of Lysimachos) active in the first half of the fifth century. Diodotos could be the orator whom Thucydides records (3.41) as contending with Cleon in the Mytilenian debate in 427. These tantalizing possibilities will be addressed below. The name Daisimos, if correctly read, is otherwise unattested, while Eukritos is not readily identifiable with any otherwise attested bearers of the name.

But why would Pericles, Ariphron, and company have incised their names upon this vessel, and why label it a ‘runaway slave’? The habit of incising names in this fashion is attested as far back as our earliest evidence for Greek alphabetic writing: an early example from the Athenian Agora (mid-seventh century) is the graffito on the side of a skyphos that reads ‘I am the cup of Tharios’. The cup speaks, as it were, and identifies its owner. But the function of such a graffito was likely not utilitarian: a recurrent theme is the theft of property, specifically that of the vessel. For example, on a sixth-century amphora from Kamiros on Rhodes is incised: Ψοσία εἰμί· ἀγε δέ με Κλιτόμιας, ‘Kosmias I am; but Klitomias took me.’ The verb agein, ‘to take’, is the vox propria to describe the act of carrying someone off into slavery: the amphora has been plundered by Klitomias. The claim of ownership is hardly serious but serves as pretext to portray Klitomias jestingly as a thief. Presumably the two belonged to the same circle of friends. We can imagine, too, how wine would facilitate such banter.

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68. *LSAG* 356 no. 18 (*Tit. Cam.* no. 178, *IG* XII 1 718).  
69. *LSJ* s.v. ἀγεω 1.3.  
70. For fifth-century Athens, cf. Eupolis *PCG* fr. 395: ‘picking up the song passed to the right (τὴν ἐπιδέξια, cf. n. 78) ... he (Socrates) stole an oinochoe’. 
Sometimes the property claim is accompanied by an exhortation to use the vessel, as on an Ionic skyphos from Leontini (first quarter of the fifth century): ‘By Iphidamos, Aretides and Meinon am I shared; [don’t] steal me, but, use (sc. me), whoever wishes’ (Ἰφ[ιδάμος (?), Ἀ][ρε[τίδεος (?) κα][ι] Με[ι]νον ἐμὶ φο[ινέ, μὲ[] κλεπτέαι, χρ̣[σ]θαι | δὲ τὸν θέλον|τα, SEG 45-1378). The assertion ἐμὶ φο[ινέ] marks the cup as the common property of the men named.

To return to Pericles’ cup: in the context of an epigraphic habit centred on the ownership, theft, and usufruct of wine vessels, the designation ‘runaway slave’ becomes intelligible. In fact, such a label may refer to the written-ness of the cup, since actual runaway slaves were tattooed with the word δραπέτης, ‘runaway’, after their recapture.71

But Pericles’ cup resembles that from Leontini in another way that is crucial for our analysis: the ‘runaway’ vessel is jointly owned – or shared, κοινή – by a specified group. Three further comparanda, from late archaic Gela, employ the adjective κοινός/-ή/-όν: note especially the graffito of Panchares, inscribed on the foot of a black-glazed kylix: ‘Panchares’ I am, and I am shared by his friends’ (Πανχάρεός εἰμι | καὶ τὸν φίλον κοινά εἰμι).

Although Panchares is named as owner, the kylix evidently circulated among his philoi. Compare the graffito in Achaian script under the foot of an Attic Black Figure eye-cup (found near Poseidonia, dated 520–510): ‘Pat-

71. Cf. Ar. *Av.* 760: δραπέτης ἐστιγμένος, with Dunbar 1995, 470; Hdt. 5.28, 65; Plu. *Vit. Per.* 26.4. Hsch. gamma 896; Latte & Cunningham 2018, 522 indicates that ‘runaway’ was the tattoo: γράμματα τῆς δραπέτης (cf. Latte *ad loc.*, ‘litterae VII fugitivo inustae’). The lamp graffito (*Agora* XXI F 93) may be explained in the same terms.

menon’s I am, and Strinpon’s. Let nobody steal me away’. Nor is the phenomenon confined to the West: κοινά is inscribed on a cup from Cynos, in eastern Locris.

There are also a few possible parallels from Athens. A lamp (recall that drinking gatherings would typically occur at night), of a type dated to the fifth century, was discovered at the Pnyx; it is inscribed κοινός. On the bottom of a black-glazed skyphos dated to the mid-fifth century and found in the Athenian Agora is a partially preserved graffito reading κοινά. Finally, a fragmentary skyphos from the Agora dated to the second quarter of the fifth century – contemporaneous with Pericles’ cup – is inscribed with possibly two named owners.

On the basis of these parallels, I suggest that Pericles’ cup was shared among his circle of philoi, as indicated by the five other names. The unusual layout, with the incised frame enclosing them, may be understood as a visual expression of the principle of sharing that is made verbally explicit with the adjective κοινός in the graffito adduced above: if there is any hierarchy in the order of names, this is muted by the overall uniformity of the inscription. Indeed, with the quasi-stoichedon arrangement of the letters, the list bears resemblance to catalogues inscribed on stone.

73. *IGASMG* IV 30 (*SEG* 34-1019, *LSAG* 457 H): Παρμένουτός · ἐμι · καὶ Στρίνπονος · ἐμὲ · μεδὲς · ἀνκλετέτο·
75. Davidson and Thompson 1943, 41, 49, 53, fig. 21, no. 7.
76. P 21404, *Agora* XXI F 83. If this is the feminine plural, then perhaps the cup belonged to a shared drinking-set.
The hetaireia of Pericles?

One might reasonably wonder why individuals as eminent as Pericles or his brother Ariphron would have had recourse to share a simple terracotta cup to drink their wine. But the drinking gathering at which such a cup would have been used was a ritualized occasion, at which participants would drink, sing songs, and more, performed ἐπὶ δεξιά, or ‘to the right’, indicating that each participant would drink in turn. The custom of a single, shared drinking vessel is well attested, and the cup so used was termed ἡ φιλοτησία (κύλιξ) ‘the cup of friendship’.

But the Cup of Pericles and its inscription are, I suggest, more than a mere token from a drinking-party. The graffiti such as that of Panchares (Πανχάρεν ἐμί | καὶ τὸν φίλον φοινόν ἐμί ἤ ‘Panchares’ I am, and I am shared by his friends’), with the adjective κοινός, represent our earliest extant evidence of the proverbial phrase κοινά τὰ τῶν φίλων, ‘the stuff of friends is shared’. The expression is attested in the literary tradition into the Roman period and even later, in both Greek and Latin. Among extant literary texts, it appears first in tragedy (see below), but the epigraphic evidence, which is earlier, suggests that the phrase had currency in sympotic contexts. What might the Cup of Pericles, with its allusion to this proverb, have signified?

Aristotle’s explication of the proverb indicates that it pertained to the specific form of philia shared between hetairoi. Discussing

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78. See Wecowski 2014, 85–97. In Plato Symp. 177d3 it is decided that the speeches too will pass ἐπὶ δεξιά.

79. First attested as ἡ ... φιλοτησίας at Thgn. 489 (which some eds. ascribe to the 5th-century Parian Euenus). A red-figure kylix (ca. 500) from the Athenian Agora bears the graffito [φιλ]οτέσιον (Agora XXI C 6, probably feminine, as Thgn. 489, pace Lang ad loc.). See also Ar. Ach. 983, with Olson 2002, 314–15.

80. Per Diogenes Laertius (8.10), Timaeus attributed the proverb to Pythagoras, but this is probably spurious. Peruzzi 2002 accepts it and conjectures that the graffito of Panchares plays with the sage’s dictum.

the varieties of friendship in different partnerships (κοινωνίαι), he adduces the expression and specifies that the kinds of philoi who share all things are brothers and hetairoi, whereas other sorts of philoi share only certain things. The proverb denoted the strong form of community that Aristotle associates with male comrades, and one obvious locus for the articulation of such philia is the symposium. Maria Letizia Lazzarini observed of the graffito of Parmenon and Strinpon (IGASMG IV 30, quoted above) that such joint-ownership is motivated by a claim of philia expressed at the symposium. The bond of philoi and hetairoi is tightened through ritualized drinking, and the conviction that the participants are equals and share all is even recorded on a vessel from their ritual. Both the laborious task of incising the names on the vessel and the use of the augmented vessel on future occasions of drinking would serve to strengthen the powerful connection that these men shared.

Yet the group on the Cup of Pericles also resembles W. R. Connor’s image of fifth-century Athenian politicians organized by ‘political friendship’. As seen above, the hetaireia verges into other groups, and the principle that ‘the stuff of friends is shared’ would be a fitting

82. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1159b31–33: καὶ ἡ παροιμία “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων”, ὀρθῶς· ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία. ἔστι δὲ ἄδελφοις μὲν καὶ ἑταίροις πάντα κοινά, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις αφωρισμένα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν πλείω τοῖς δὲ ἐλάττω...

83. I.e., the phrase was probably not understood to encompass forms of philia in which only some things are shared.


85. Lazzarini 1984, 408. Raccuia 2000, 323–5 argues that such shared cups reveal a Doric type of symposium (analogous to Doric syssitia), but SEG 45-1378 from Ionic Leontini and the Attic parallels (above) are against this.

86. Connor 1971, 30–84. Hansen 1999, 281–3, focusing on formal institutions, downplays the role of philia and denies that hetaireiai were political parties: but note that informal institutions can still be significant.
byword indeed for it: recall Thucydides’ observation that *pistis* was cemented by what members shared (κοινῇ, 3.82.6). The distinction between a drinking-gathering, a partisan group, or a conspiracy cannot be pressed, for a ‘harmless’ association might, in a new context, transform – or outwardly seem to transform – into a more sinister entity. We may compare the rumour told by Sallust about Catiline’s conspiracy: members swore an oath and drank from circulated *paterae* of human blood mixed with wine, ‘that there be more *fides* between them, as they mutually shared the knowledge of such a great atrocity’. Sallust is sceptical, but, like any good rumour, it derives force from its depiction of a scenario otherwise ordinary, but for a single perverse element.

Moreover, the earliest literary attestations of the proverb ‘the stuff of friends is shared’ date during the Peloponnesian War, and they cohere with Thucydides’ image of the *hetaireia*. In Euripides’ *Orestes*, answering Orestes’ despair, Pylades claims he too will perish, for the affairs of friends are shared (729–36). The context is important. Pylades has just arrived, observing that the assembled people intend to kill Orestes and Electra. The play, staged in 408, has been read in light of the reprisals against the Four Hundred by the revived democracy. Orestes and Electra are lawless elites opposed by the mob, and Pylades – Orestes’ accomplice in murder – professes solidarity. Menelaus’ designs on power, at the expense of his kin, and the counterplot against him, also recall Thucydides’ deploring account of *hetaireia* trumping kinship (3.82.6).

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87. *Sall. Cat.* 22.1–2 ... quo inter se fidi magis forent, alius alii tanti faci-noris conscii.

88. Before Pylades’ entrance, Menelaus at first admits his own duty to share Orestes’ misfortunes owing to their kinship (682–5), but he claims that the only hope of appeasing the angry *demos* is with ‘soft words’ (692–3).

89. Cf. *Eur. Andr.* 374–7, 585 (ca. 425): Menelaus tells the enslaved Andromache that Neoptolemos rules over his slaves, as he and Hermione rule over Neoptolemos’, for *philoi* hold nothing private, but true friends share (*koina*).
In the *Lysistrata*, we find a link between our proverb, the cup, and a *hetaireia*-conspiracy. Lysistrata proposes a mutual oath to her co-conspirators (182), and they agree to ‘sacrifice’ a jar of wine into a kylix (195–9). This is a farcical conflation of blood-sacrifice and libation, but it also reflects the conceptual overlap between drinking-gathering and *hetaireia*. Lysistrata invokes their vessel as κύλιξ φιλοτησία (203),

90 ‘cup of friendship’, and the oath is solemnized when they share in drinking from it (233–4). Lysistrata is cautioned to drink only her share, that they be φίλαι (τὸ μέρος γ’, ὡς φίλη, ὃς ὄμεν εὔθυς ἀλλήλων φίλαι, 238–9). The humour of dipsomania is clear, but the insistence of ‘your share only’ (τὸ μέρος γε) points also to the proverb: the conspiracy is confirmed by each taking her coequal portion of the wine.

With the Cup of Pericles, then, might we have a specimen of a *hetaireia*? Might Pericles himself have belonged to one? As seen above, Thucydides reveals that the *hetaireia* was a usual – if unofficial – element in the democracy, and the fact that his account of it centres on its role in the war need not preclude its existence earlier. With such a labile concept, the question of historical origin cannot be pressed, and there is no doubt that there were always factions competing for dominance. Prior to the Cleisthenic reforms, however, such alliances were based largely on kinship,

91 and they had no need to restrict membership or to operate secretly.

92 Thucydides contrasts the *hetaireia* with kinship (3.82.6), and his account of it as extra-legal (3.82.6), serving for lawsuits and

90. The φιλοτησία connotes a strong bond, which can show treachery: Demosthenes (19.128) accuses Aeschines of celebrating with Philip the destruction of Athens’ allies; last and worst, he drank to Philip from the φιλοτησία.

91. E.g., Peisistratos’ marriage-alliance with Megacles (Hdt. 1.60–1) and his dynasty.

92. Herodotus (5.71.1) ascribes a *hetaireia* to Cylon, but the term, if not the concept, is anachronistic; cf. n. 12.
offices (8.54.4), suggests something more specific than intra-elite competition.

Here I can only mention the hypothesis that the *hetaireia* developed at Athens in tandem with the democracy, as a means for elites to cope with new structures. There is evidence, for example, of manipulation of a key democratic institution – ostracism – in the late 480s: a cache of some 190 ostraka for Themistocles inscribed on uniform vessel-types, in as few as 14 hands. These were likely prepared by Themistocles’ opponents – whether for distribution or ballot-stuffing. The flurry of ostracism-elections in the 480s also suggests that this was a time of fierce competition. The *hetaireia* suits such an environment, but its presence cannot be proved.

More significant is the notion that the Cup of Pericles, the common property (a ‘runaway slave’) of a clique, manifests an ethos consistent with Thucydides’ image of the *hetaireia*. The graffiti may be read as the converse of ostracism, affirming the group’s mutual affinity. The men who wrote it may have done so in parody of ostracism: their names show membership in, rather than ejection from, a community. Pericles well knew the power of ostracism, from the ejection of his father Xanthippos in 484. We should not, then, be surprised if the young, aspirant Pericles had recourse to a *hetaireia*, whose functions may have included influence on ostracism-votes.

What is obtained from this interpretation of the Cup of Pericles as evidence of a *hetaireia*? First, we gain insight into Thucydides’

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93. The deme-system and expansion of sortition might have spawned *hetaireiai* based on mutual support.
94. Broneer 1938, 228–43, who assigns the cache to the ostracism of 482 (Themistocles was ostracized in the late 470s); cf. M. Lang, *Agora* XXV 142–61; Missiou 2011, 60–71.
96. Steiner 2002 argues that graffiti on a group of Agora vessels dated to the 460s document officials who dined at the *demos*’ expense but exhibited elite habits and parodied democratic institutions like ostracism.
veiled account of this part of the democracy’s inner workings: the *hetaireia* seems to have had a long history prior to the ruinous role it played in fomenting wartime *stasis*. We can see the germ of that role, I have suggested, in the proverb ‘the stuff of friends is shared’ (reflected on Pericles’ cup), which betrays a clannish outlook beneath its convivial appearance. Second, we are afforded a glimpse into the milieu of Pericles.

If the cup (ca. 480–465) may be evidence of Pericles’ *hetaireia*, then it is worth considering the company he kept. We start with his brother Araphron. He is otherwise little more than a name, for which he is thought the elder brother (named for his grandfather); a note in the *Protagoras* (320a) implies that he was alive in the 430s, entrusted with the tutelage of Cleinias, brother of Alcibiades. But Araphron has no known political profile: his name on the cup would suggest, as one might expect, that *hetaireiai* included adjutants for their better-known comrades.

Aristides could be the son of Lysimachos, from the deme Alopeke. This Aristides had been archon (489/8), but he was ostracized in 482, only to be recalled owing to the Persian threat. Herodotus vouched for his quality, and he was known to posterity as the ‘Just’. It may not be coincidence, then, that he was linked with Pericles (plus Miltiades and Solon) as one of Athens’ best leaders in Eupolis’ *Demoi* (cf. n. 55). His political activity is telling, too: he is credited with organizing and first assessing tribute from the members of the Delian League in 478–477, a role corresponding with the image of Pericles as confident manager of revenues at the start of the

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97. The anecdotes in Plut. *Vit. Alc.* 1.1, 3 add little, if anything, of value.
100. Hdt. 8.79.1: πυθανόμενος αὐτοῦ τὸν τρόπον, ἄριστον ἄνδρα γενέσθαι εν Ἀθήναι καὶ δικαιότατον.
war (Thuc. 2.13). Also like Pericles (Thuc. 2.14), Aristides reportedly advised the Athenians, as their wealth and power grew, to leave their fields and live in the city (Ath. Pol. 24.1); whether or not this report is true, it may reflect a tradition that associated the two men.

Finally, one is tempted to identify Diodotos with the son of Eukrates, whom Thucydides records speaking (twice) in opposition to Cleon in the Mytilenean debate in 427 (3.41, 49.1). He is otherwise unknown, and it has been said that Diodotos’ defeat of the strident demagogue is narratively satisfying owing to his relative obscurity. If the Diodotos of the cup is the same, then we might infer that he was competent but subsidiary, like Ariphron. One has the impression that Diodotos, for all his support of debate (3.42–3), was not a customary voice at the Assembly, but that he came forward for a vital issue. Echoing Pericles as he does, Diodotos has the aspect of an elder statesman, perhaps a contemporary of Pericles. As Tim Rood notes, Diodotos tries to imitate Pericles in controlling the demos’ passions and echoes his conviction that Athens must maintain rule by measured force (3.46.5–6). Yet W. R. Connor argues that his speech depends on a deceptive rhetorical strategy, dissociating advantage from justice, and ‘reveal[s] a world of shadowy powers, who, momentarily personified, swiftly retreat into darkness... [a world] of nature without limitation or restraint, uncontrolled by...


103. Hornblower, CT I 432; Rhodes 1994, 210 points out that the success of ‘an apparent nonentity’ is more ironic to us than to Thucydides owing to our lack of knowledge. But it is Thucydides’ choice to reveal no more about him.

104. Connor 1984, 83–5, noting how Diodotos, arguing for advantage, likely supported the claim of justice, too.

105. If he were the age of Pericles (whose birth is put ca. 494), Diodotos would be in his mid to late sixties in 427.

106. Rood 1998, 147–8, noting that Diodotos evidently failed in the first debate. I suspect that Thucydides saw the failing in the demos, less so in Diodotos; this might explain Diodotos’ strategy in the second (see n. 107).
THUCYDIDES THE ATHENIAN

nomoi”.

107. Behind Diodotos’ worthy cause lurks a pragmatic, even
(if we follow Connor) brutal stance. Although Diodotos sharply con-
trasts with the vicious Cleon (3.36.6), his shrewd approach would be
at home in a Periclean hetaireia.

And what of Pericles? If we entertain the idea that he was mem-
ber of a hetaireia in the years prior to his political dominance, then
how does this Pericles correspond with Thucydides’ image of the
mature statesman? We have noted how Pericles, especially in the
Funeral Oration, serves as an emblem of peacetime flourishing. I
must reserve fuller treatment of this important speech for another
occasion, but, by way of conclusion, I offer a few preliminary ob-
servations.

Pericles, relating his vision of democracy, recognizes ‘their in-
dividual differences’ (τὰ ἴδια διάφορα, 2.37.1; cf. n. 6) but insists
that the Athenians’ obedience to law (2.37.3, above, from n. 49)
protects the good of the polis. Pericles, I submit, is not hinting at a
mere hypothetical alternative (viz., the sort of stasis to come), but is
speaking from experience: Athens may have already grappled with
the self-serving rivalry endemic to the hetaireia. In his last speech,
desperate to persuade the people, Pericles admonishes: ‘a polis, if it
prospers as a whole, benefits its individuals more than if it flourishes
in respect of its citizens taken singly but, as a collective, it is failing’
(2.60.2).

108. Thucydides portrays him as prescient, attributing to his
successors the infighting and greed
(αὐτοὶ ἐν σφίσι κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαφορὰς περιπεσόντες ἐσφάλησαν,
2.65.12). But if it is allowed that the historical Pericles was once

96–102, observing that Thucydides’ intent here is as much to uncover the lim-
its of human reason as it is to document the speakers’ thoughts and arguments.

108. 2.60.2: ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην
ὡφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ’ έκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν,
ἀθρόαν δὲ σφαλλομένην.

109. Cf. 2.65.7: κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἱδία κέρδη. 2.65.11:
party to a *hetaireia*, then a retrospective reading of Thucydides may also be in order.

So I conclude by drawing a connection – admittedly speculative – between Thucydides’ Pericles and the one who put his name on that cup. If Pericles in his youth belonged to a *hetaireia*, one serving the political prospects of its members – *philoi* who ‘share’ – then perhaps the Pericles of the Funeral Oration knew first-hand the appeal of such groups. Perhaps, unexpectedly, part of the rhetoric of Periclean democracy had its origin in the ethos of the *hetaireia*. Perhaps Pericles took its exclusive brand of communitarianism, which in peace was self-serving and in war would become a vehicle of *stasis*, and converted it into the foundation of the unified, happy city, appealing to the *dynatoi* and the many alike. Conceivably, Plutarch’s anecdote about Pericles wooing the *demos* by refusing his *philoi* (*Vit. Per. 7.5, above*) recalls something of Pericles’ self-presentation: a promise that Athens would be his *hetaireia*?

Thucydides’ Pericles, at any rate, in a bid to allay the *demos*’ notorious suspicion (ὑποψία), inverts the code of the *hetaireia* by promising in the Assembly to render public (δημόσια) his own property if it be left undamaged by his invading guest-friend Archidamos.

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κατὰ τὰς ἵδιας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας. Τὸ γάρ τὰς ἵδιας διαβολὰς, cf. n. 22.

110. There is other evidence of such ‘rebranding’: ‘standard’ cups, some incised ΔΕ for *demosition, “the demos”*, from the Tholos in the Agora, used by the *prytaneis* from ca. 460. Steiner 2018, 227 comments: ‘the principle of equality ordained by the circular commensal space reverberates ... in the ceramic assemblage. The city distributes equally to each member’. These cups may refashion for the *demos* the ownership graffiti and proverb discussed above.

111. Connor 1971, 119–36 sees Pericles as transitional, both a master of political *philia* and an expert public servant.

112. Herodotus styles Cleisthenes thus: ‘he added the *demos* to his *hetaireia*’ (τὸν δήμον προσεταιρίζεται, 5.66.2; cf. *Ath. Pol.* 20.1); cf. 5.69.2. As I hope to show elsewhere, Herodotus ascribes to Cleisthenes Periclean rhetoric.
(2.13.1). This is a powerful index of his claim to be φιλόπολις, a philos of the polis (2.60.5), a term he may have introduced into political discourse. Athenians acquire philoi, he explains, by benefitting others, rather than deriving benefit for oneself (2.40.4). Pericles reiterates: ‘we alone are benefactors not out of calculation of our own interest, but in our confidence of our freedom, without fear’ (2.40.5). This is the selfless interpretation of the proverb κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

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113. Connor 1971, 102–3. Cf. the striking exhortation at 2.43.1: ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς (i.e., τῆς πόλεως).

114. 2.40.5: καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ἐξμιμέροντος μᾶλλον λογισμῶ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῶ ἀδεῶς τινὰ ὁφελοῦμεν.
Revisiting the Pylos Episode and Thucydides’ ‘Bias’ against Kleon*

Thucydidean scholarship is unanimous, I think, on the importance of the Pylos affair. The Sicilian expedition aside, no other single episode of the war takes up almost one third of a book, and on no other single episode does Thucydides return time and again, however briefly, in three more books.1 Apart from its very interesting mili-

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1. From the 135 chapters of book 4, almost all of the first 46 concern the
tary aspects, this affair provides insights into the character, abilities, and the whole personality of such significant protagonists as Nikias, Kleon and Demosthenes, thus allowing us to assess and evaluate Thucydides’ attitude to these men, but also to explore the historian’s political judgement through some details that he stresses or omits as well as through the diction that he employs. Our guide to all this will mainly be the celebrated passage above, on which we shall primarily focus; but first, let us briefly be reminded of what had just preceded and how we were led to this passage.

After the Athenian commander Demosthenes had somehow fortified Pylos in the spring of 425, the Spartans decided, *inter alia*, to put more than 400 soldiers on Sphakteria, the oblong island that closes the bay and the big harbour of the mainland opposite, and block the entrances to it so that the Athenians would not be able to support the men of their makeshift fort there. The Athenian fleet, however, entered the bay, defeated the Spartans in a decisive sea battle, and blockaded their soldiers on Sphakteria (4.14). Confronted with this calamity and greatly concerned for the safety of their marooned men, the Spartans sent an embassy to Athens with a general peace offer culminating in a proposal to conclude a formal alliance between the two cities.\(^2\)

Thucydides bluntly recognizes that his compatriots, now having the upper hand, believed that they could obtain the peace of their choice any time they wished and so they were greedy for more, as the Spartan envoys had feared they would and had tried to admonish them and talk them out of their avidity,\(^3\) toward which, Thucydides

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\(^{3}\) Cf. 4.17.4 and 21.2. *A fortiori*, the Athenians were reaching out for more after they had captured the Spartans of Sphakteria; cf. 4.41.4: οἱ δὲ μειζόνων τε ὠρέγοντο καὶ πολλάκις φοιτώντων (Spartan envoys kept coming to Athens to solicit peace) αὐτοὺς ἀπράκτους ἀπέπεμπον. See also n. 9 below.
adds, they were mainly incited by Kleon, a popular leader of that
time with exceptional influence upon the multitude (4.21.3: \(\mu\)\(\alpha\)\(\lambda\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\sigma\)\(\iota\)\(\alpha\)\(\varsigma\) \(\delta\)\(\acute{e}\) \(\alpha\)\(\upsilon\)\(\tau\)\(\omicron\)\(\upsilon\)\(\varsigma\) \(\eta\)\(\nu\)\(\gamma\) \(\Kappa\)\(\lambda\)\(\epsilon\)\(\omega\)\(n\) \(\circ\)\(\iota\)\(\epsilon\)\(\acute{e}\)\(i\)\(o\)\(t\)\(o\)\(u\)\(m\) \(\alpha\)\(\nu\)\(m\)\(a\)\(\gamma\)\(w\)\(g\)\(o\)\(s\) \(\kappa\)\(\alpha\)\(t\)\(i\)\(\epsilon\)\(i\)\(n\)\(o\)\(n\) \(\tau\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(n\) \(\Downarrow\) \(\upsilon\)\(n\)\(\iota\)\(\theta\)\(i\)\(e\)\(i\)\(z\)\(e\) \(\pi\)\(l\)\(\nu\)\(h\)\(a\)\(n\)\(o\)\(\nu\) \(\theta\)\(a\)\(m\)\(w\)\(a\)\(t\)\(o\)\(s\)\(h\)\(o\)\(s\)). The Athenian
counter-proposals, therefore, were heavy on the Spartans, yet
their envoys agreed to discuss them all the same; not openly and in
front of the whole assembly, though, but in a private session with the
commissioners whom the Athenian assembly would appoint; a quite
reasonable request, given that the interests of the Spartan allies were
also involved in these talks (4.22.3). Kleon, however, persuaded the
Athenians to reject this request and even accused the Spartan envoys
duplicity. The latter eventually realized that the Athenians had no
intention of granting their proposals on tolerable conditions and left
Athens. Interestingly, we hear nothing of Nikias in connection with
this Spartan embassy, and in general Thucydides’ account gives the
impression that the Athenian mood was so openly warlike that Kleon
simply took advantage of this feeling and perhaps exacerbated it
even more. This might also explain why Thucydides chose not to

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4. This description \textit{per se} (as well as 4.22.2: \(\Kappa\)\(\lambda\)\(\epsilon\)\(\omega\)\(n\) \(\delta\)\(\epsilon\) \(\epsilon\)\(n\)\(t\)\(a\)\(u\)\(\theta\)\(a\) \(\delta\)\(\eta\)\(\pi\)\(\lambda\)\(\upsilon\)\(\varsigma\) \(\epsilon\)\(n\)\(e\)\(k\)\(\epsilon\)\(i\)\(t\) \(=\)pressed hard)) is, in my view, unwarrantedly regarded by
Woodhead 1960, 311, as an indication of Thucydides’ bias against Kleon. For
a politician to exert influence through his persuasiveness is not a fault and thus
\textit{pithanotatos} is not a derogatory term (\textit{pace} J. H. Finley 1940, 285 (=1967,
154); Woodhead above; Westlake 1968, 8; Dover 1973, 36; Kagan 1974, 234
n. 53), but rather a complimentary one; cf. also Hornblower, \textit{CT} I 420 (‘not
an unflattering word’) and Rhodes 1998, 220. As for \(\delta\)\(\eta\)\(m\)\(a\)\(s\)\(g\)\(w\)\(g\)\(o\)\(s\), a \textit{hapax} in
Thucydides (plus \(\delta\)\(m\)\(a\)\(s\)\(g\)\(w\)\(g\)\(i\)\(a\) in 8.65.2), even though this term was perhaps
still free from the sinister connotations it subsequently acquired (see Westlake
above), it can hardly be regarded, \textit{pace} Gomme, \textit{HCT} III 461–2, as a respect-
able one; the quotation from Ar. \textit{Eq}. 191–3, which Gomme himself adduces,
seems to suggest the opposite, I think. Cf. also Classen & Steup 1900, 45; M. I.
5.2.7, \textit{demagôgos} is already a derogatory term.

5. See the relevant account and observations in Kagan 1974, 231–8, and
provide the Athenian counter-speech to the Spartan proposals; finding, that is, the arguments of the envoys weak and unconvincing – let alone the unbearably didactic tone of their speech, which probably made their rejection easier – and Nikias’ (?) counter-arguments in favour of accepting the Spartan peace offer not particularly compelling either, Thucydides decided against recording Kleon’s spectacular show of belligerence and an easy public triumph. Yet, other sources suggest that the situation may not have been so clear-cut: Plutarch, to begin with, implies that Nikias was in favour of the Spartan peace offer, contrary to Kleon who urged the Athenians – and eventually persuaded them – to reject it (4.22.2). Then we have a fragment of

6. Cf. Cornford 1907, 125 and Hornblower, *CT* II 170 (Thucydides ‘was unwilling to dwell on Kleon’s victory in the debate’). Most scholars, based on 4.21.2, 27.2, 5.14.2, believe that Thucydides favoured the acceptance of the Spartan proposals: Adcock 1927, 233–4; J. H. Finley 1942, 194–5; de Romilly 1963, 172–7 (references are to the English translation of the 1947 original); Woodhead 1960, 312; Westlake 1968, 68–9 and n. 1; Kagan 1974, 232; Rawlings 1981, 230; Rhodes 1998, 220. Yet this does not necessarily mean that Thucydides was convinced by the Spartan arguments, as Gemmell, *HCT* III 460, Westlake 1968, 67, and Connor 1984, 113 n. 10, point out. It may be worth noting also that 5.14.2 (μετεμέλοντό τε ὅτι μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πυλῶι καλῶς παρασχὸν οὐ ξυνέβησαν: ‘they regretted not having come to terms [sc. with the Spartans] when a good opportunity arose after the events at Pylos’), may well be an *a posteriori* assessment and, in any case, it reflects the Athenian feelings and mood in 421, not in 425. At all events, Marshall’s view (1984, 20, 28 and 32) that ‘Thucydides really wishes Sparta had won, and regards the Athenian victory [sc. at Pylos-Sphakteria] as aischron’ is extreme and totally groundless. On the other hand, Rawlings 1981, 224 aptly and cogently compares the Athenian regrets of 5.14.2 above with those in Diod. 13.53.1–3 (Ἀθηναῖοι … κακῶς βουλευσάμενοι μετενόησαν… – the reference is to the Kyzikos events of 410), where Kleophon substitutes for Kleon.

7. Cf. also Plut. *Vit. Nic.* 7.2: ἀπεώσαντο δὲ Κλέωνος ἑναυτωθέντος οὐχ ἠκιστα διὰ Νικίαν ἐχθρὸς γάρ ὄν αὐτοῦ, καὶ προθύμως ὀργῶν συμπράττοντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἔπεισε τὸν δήμον ἀπουγρίσασθαι τὰς σπονδὰς (the Athenians ‘repulsed [the Spartan embassy] because Kleon, chiefly on account of Nikias, spoke against it; for Nikias was his political en-
Philochorus suggesting that the assembly was divided over Kleon’s negative recommendation, but the supporters of war prevailed in the end. Philochorus’ fragment in its entirety is somewhat muddled, as Westlake (1968, 69 n. 2) and Hornblower (CT II 177) note, but it cannot be ignored. Aristophanes’ Peace, produced in 421, might refer to this ambivalent assembly meeting, and the ancient scholiast here seems to agree with Philochorus’ information.

Jacoby’s remark (FGrHist, dritter Teil, b, Supplement, v. II, 1954, 407) on 328 F128 that 4.21.2 only seemingly conveys the impression that the mood of the assembly was uniform (cf. also Hornblower, CT II 177) and that ‘The report as a whole shows that opinions were divided, and Kleon was obliged to speak twice’ are not very cogent. Kleon did indeed speak twice, yet not at this but in the following assembly (4.27–8) and only after he was somehow compelled to accept the command; not because opinions were divided. Flower (1992, 42–5, 49, 56–7) argues that the unclarity over the situation is due to the fact that Thucydides failed to record the assembly that had discussed Demosthenes’ request for reinforcements and had voted the Pylos campaign to Nikias. Hornblower (CT II 170) adopts Flower’s suggestion, but Gom-
me’s explanation (HCT III 468) at 4.28.3 renders it unnecessary: ‘Nikias, as strategos, would have good claim to their command’ (sc. of the reinforcements that might be sent), and so no special assembly was needed for that; cf. also Classen & Steup 1900, 62. Philochorus’ fragment suggests then that, despite his persuasiveness, Kleon’s victory was not so easy as Thucydides allows us to suppose; and note further that neither in the Mytilenean debate was Kleon definitively persuasive (3.49.1).

Be that as it may, after the rejection of the Spartan peace proposals, the war was resumed but a stalemate ensued concerning the situation at Pylos. The Athenian blockade of Sphakteria proved not entirely successful, while the besiegers themselves were also harassed by the scantiness of food and water in an uninhabited and rather barren place. Upon realizing the distress of their army and in view of the winter (which would naturally make things worse), the Athenians regretted having rejected the Spartan peace offer (4.27.2: καὶ μετεμέλοντο τὰς σπονδὰς οὐ δεξάμενοι), and Kleon could easily figure out that it was he whom they were mostly blaming for their current predicament. So, when a new assembly met to discuss the situation, he first denied that the conditions in the Athenian camp were so distressful as reported; but, challenged to go and see things for himself, he dismissed this mission as a waste of time and proposed instead that they should immediately send out reinforcements, land on Sphakteria and capture the Spartans there. It was an easy matter, he added, pointing at Nikias, and something that our generals should have already done, if they

10. As they also repented for a similar reason at 4.41.3–4 and 5.14.2. Thucydides disagreed and criticized his compatriots for all these rejections of peace, which he regarded as a major strategic blunder (see esp. 5.14.2), according to Olson 1998, xxvi and 112. See also de Romilly 1963, 177, 186–7, where she argues that Thucydides gradually changed his views and became more of a pacifist, whereas he initially approved of Pericles’ imperialistic policies and his firm opposition to Sparta. But see also n. 6.

11. So also Grote 1872, 247 (all references are to volume 5).
were real men, and, in any case, this was what he himself would have done, had he been in their place.\textsuperscript{12}

Some critics have overinterpreted, if not misinterpreted, Thucydides in this passage, in my opinion. Hornblower (\textit{CT} II 186), for instance, commenting that Kleon perceived that the Athenian discontent was being directed against him (since it was he who had thwarted the acceptance of the Spartan peace proposals), adopts the observations of Mabel Lang (1995) on Thucydides’ technique to ascribe motives through the use of participles, and regards the use of the participles \textit{γνοὺς}, \textit{ὁρῶν}, \textit{ὡρμημένους} below as evidence of Thucydides’ arbitrary attribution of motives, and by extension as evidence of his bias against Kleon.\textsuperscript{13}

\section*{Footnotes}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{12} 4.27.5: καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσήμαινεν, ἐχθρὸς ὡν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν, ράδιον εἶναι παρασκευῆ, εἰ ἄνδρες εἰεν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, πλεύσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ, καὶ αὐτός γ’ ἀν, εἰ ἦρξε, ποιῆσαι τοῦτο. For a similar appeal to manliness, cf. 3.14.2, and see also n. 52.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Hornblower, \textit{CT} II 185: ‘One of Th.’s least objective sections’. Cf. also Lewis 1992, 417 (‘redolent of bias and dislike’), and Westlake 1968, 70 (Thucydides purposely expatiates on the Pylos episode because it affords ‘the opportunity of underlining the personal failings of Cleon’; cf. also ibid. 75). Yet Grote 1872, 246–8 and Gomme, \textit{HCT} III 468 (on 4.27.4) see no bias against Kleon on the part of Thucydides here (and justly so).  
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
they were now somewhat more inclined to send an expedition, that
... if they themselves thought the reports to be true, to send a fleet
and fetch the men. (trans. Smith [Loeb], slightly modified)

But ‘the idea of Kleon confiding his thoughts and plans to Thucy-
dides seems absurd’, Lang (1995, 50) argues; Thucydides could not
know what Kleon had in mind, and so by writing ‘\textit{Κλέων ὁρῶν}’
and ‘\textit{Κλέων γνοὺς}’, he arbitrarily ascribes concrete motives to him.
Almost thirty years earlier Westlake (1968, 72) also remarked that
Thucydides ‘tacitly claims to see into the mind of Cleon and to know
precisely why he acted as he did at each stage of the [Pylos] debate’.
And Woodhead (1960, 313), one of the most eminent admirers of
Kleon, had made the same diagnosis even earlier.\textsuperscript{14} To my mind,
however, the situation is so clear that no psychologist or Sherlock
is required here to perceive the self-evident; for it was absolutely
natural and expected that Kleon should have felt (\textit{γνοὺς}) the tide of
opinion moving against him, after the news of the many sufferings of
the Athenian army at Pylos had reached Athens.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, Kleon’s first,
almost instinctive, reaction was to deny the veracity of the report,
then, challenged to go and inspect the situation himself, he realized
(\textit{ὁρῶν}) that the report might be true after all and so he refused to go,
while seeing (\textit{ὁρῶν}) also that the Athenians were inclined to send
an expedition anyhow (\textit{ὡρμημένους ... στρατεύειν}),\textsuperscript{16} he urged them
to do this right away, just as he had inflamed their belligerent mood
one month or so earlier when the Spartan embassy had pleaded for

\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, Dover 1973, 31 and Kagan 2009, 133.
\textsuperscript{15} See also Lewis 1992, 417.
\textsuperscript{16} Why were the Athenians now inclined to send an expedition? Apparent-
ly because, contrary to Kleon’s (probably) sham protests (see below and n. 59),
they believed the messengers’ reports from Pylos (4.27.3: \textit{οὐ τἀληθῆ ἔφη} [sc.
Kleon] \textit{λέγειν καὶ ἔξαγγέλλοντας. παραινοοῦντων δὲ τῶν ἀφιμένων, ἐι
μὴ σφίσι πιστεύουσι, κατασκόπους τινὰς πέμψαι...}), who in all likelihood
must also have requested reinforcements; see below pp. 133–4.
Almost anyone present in this assembly could deduce all this, regardless of his feelings or opinion about Kleon; logical deductions, after all, are legitimate and do not necessarily indicate prejudice,\textsuperscript{18} and if Thucydides was present in that assembly, as is very probable that he was,\textsuperscript{19} he was an eyewitness to Kleon’s reactions and the successive shifting of his position and simply described them; he did not need to discover and attribute motives, because Kleon’s intentions and corresponding behaviour unfolded in broad daylight and were therefore public and visible to all. As Westlake (1968, 73) remarks, Thucydides ‘may well be perfectly right in his interpretation of each move by Cleon throughout this episode; the available evidence certainly does not provide adequate grounds for believing that any of his interpretations must be wrong’, regardless of the fact that one could also argue for different interpretations, as Westlake himself does in the sequel.\textsuperscript{20} 

\textit{Pace}, therefore, the opinion of scholars who defend Kleon and find fault with Thucydides here, I think that Gomme’s reading (\textit{HCT III} ...
468) of the same passage is more trenchant and right on the mark: ‘There was no question’, he notes (on 4.27.4), ‘of Kleon’s leading the people or opposing them; he observed which way the wind was blowing before making his proposal’.\footnote{21}

The foregoing observations are not intended to question the usefulness of Lang’s study; for participial motivation is indeed a feature of Thucydides’ narrative technique, as Lang (1995, 53) has convincingly established. Yet the motivation of an action, whether emerging from mere observation or from elementary reasoning, is often fairly obvious and does not necessarily presuppose direct factual knowledge or a reading of the doer’s mindset, as Lang (1995, 50–1) seems to postulate. If either of the latter was inescapably required, passing judgements would become almost impossible in many cases; and insofar as there are cases where the motives of individuals are entirely obvious or may legitimately be inferred from their recorded actions or from the situation in which they were involved or from subsequent developments, as Westlake convincingly argues elsewhere,\footnote{22} I cannot see why Kleon’s motives on the episode above may not belong to one of the aforesaid cases.

\footnote{21. Cf. also Marshall 1984, 21. That Kleon’s proposal was ‘eminently sensible’, as Gomme adds, is a completely different matter, of course.}

\footnote{22. For motives deducible from recorded actions, see Westlake 1989, 201, 205, 210; deducible from the context or pertinent situations, see ibid. 201, 204, 222 n. 24; deducible from subsequent developments, see Westlake 1947, 28 with n. 1; cf. also Thuc. 4.79.2 and 83.1, 6. Elsewhere, Westlake 1962, 283–4 maintains that Thucydides does not as a rule ‘give information about the motives and feelings of individuals based upon mere surmise or even upon inference from his knowledge of their character’ (with the exception of Kleon and Nikias though; see Westlake 1980, 333 n. 3 and 1968, 69–85, esp. 83 and 93–6). He must be right in most cases, but since the sources of Thucydides’ information are not always verifiable, the possibility that some of his judgements may rely on mere surmise or inference from knowledge of the character of the personage concerned cannot be ruled out; see also Westlake 1989, 201, 207f., Dover 1973, 31 and also the following note.}
Another source for discerning motives and intentions is good information: with reference to the moderate terms which Brasidas offered to the people of Amphipolis, for example (4.105.2, 108.2), Westlake (1962, 283) believes that they were moderate because the Spartan commander had heard about Thucydides’ mining interests in the area and feared that his arrival with ships from Thasos would stiffen the will of the Amphipolitans to resist (4.105.1); this, Westlake argues, must be ‘an authentic report of what Brasidas thought’, as our historian was ‘remarkably well-informed about the motives and feelings of Brasidas on many occasions’ (see Westlake 1962, 284 n. 2; cf. id. 1980, 334). Yet it is not at all certain that this information was derived directly from Brasidas (Westlake 1980, 333 n. 3 and 339: ‘Direct contact between Thucydides and Brasidas seems unlikely’; cf. also id. 1989, 205; apparently a change of mind later, id. 1968, 148), whom Thucydides may have met and questioned while in exile (so Adcock 1927, 243 and Proctor in Westlake 1989, 205 n. 14). True, Thucydides never inquired of Kleon about his motives and intentions, as he might have done with Brasidas, but why, if his own judgement and percipience as an eyewitness at that crucial assembly of 425 were not enough, could he not have been informed about them through Demosthenes (a close collaborator of Kleon and one of Thucydides’ sources, see below p. 133) or some other friend or supporter of Kleon?

However – to return to the second Pylos debate – no decision has as yet been taken and Kleon, during the same assembly meeting, faces a second and far more important challenge. At first, he was asked, as we saw, to go and check for himself if the reports from Pylos were true, but this challenge he smartly eluded by riding the desire of the multitude to send an expedition; yet now that Nikias, whom he had practically called a coward (see n. 12), offers to resign his command and urges him, along with the crowd of Kleon’s own supporters, we may guess, to take any force he wanted, sail to Pylos, and try to do better himself, Kleon could not evade any longer, despite his initial
refusal.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, not only does he accept the command, but he also promises, apparently to everyone’s astonishment, that, within the following twenty days he will either capture and bring the Spartan garrison of Sphakteria to Athens alive or slay them all on the spot; and this without taking a single Athenian soldier with him, but only some other light troops that happened to be in Athens and 400 archers from other places (4.28.4).\textsuperscript{24} This brings us to our title passage (4.28.5): Kleon’s frivolous promise (κουφολογία), so unnecessarily specific,\textsuperscript{25} made the Athenians laugh, but the sound-minded (σοφόροι) among them took pleasure in the thought that they would profit from either eventuality: they would either get rid of Kleon, which was what they rather expected, or Kleon would indeed manage to capture the Spartans of Sphakteria for them.

\textsuperscript{23} 4.28.2–4: τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἰόμενος αὐτὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἀφιέναι, ἑτοῖμος ἦν, γυνὸς δὲ τῷ ὄντι παραδοσεῖοντα ἀνεχώρει καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνον στρατηγεῖν… 28.3: οἱ δὲ, …δορό καὶ ἐνθάμενος τόν Κλέων ὑπέφευρε τόν πλοῦν καὶ εξανεχώρει τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκελεύοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδίδοναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβόων πλεῖν. 28.4: ὡστε οὐκ ἔχων ὑπὸ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐτί ἐξαπαλλαγῇ, ύφίσταται τὸν πλοῦν.

\textsuperscript{24} See below n. 60 and p. 133.

\textsuperscript{25} Κουφολογία is light or empty or thoughtless talk (‘levitas verborum’, according to Bétant’s Lexicon; ‘propos étourdis’, according to de Romilly 1967, 21), a consistent manifestation of Kleon’s vanity (κουφότης) in general (see Plutarch’s example of it at Vit. Nic. 7.6–7). On the braggadocio and irresponsibility of his promise, see Lewis 1992, 418 and Rhodes 1998, 227. Thucydides calls it mad (μανιώδης) at 4.39.3, and Gomme, HCT III 479 rightly explains that the promise was mad not because it was most improbable to be fulfilled per se, but to be fulfilled within a fixed time-limit in the midst of military operations. Cf. also the ancient scholiast ad loc (Hude 1927, 249): μανιώδης· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος προπετῆς ἀπόφασις. For Grote (1872, 260–1), however, Kleon’s promise was not at all presumptuous, but, on the contrary, ‘a reasonable and even a modest anticipation of the future’. Similarly, Kagan 1974, 244; cf. also 247 n. 99. As for the 20-day time-limit, it was not tight, according to Wilson 1979, 124-25, and, as Vlachos 1970, 130 put it, ‘une fois l’opération engagée, elle ne pouvait être que très rapidement menée et c’est sur cette donnée que table, fort justement, Cléon’. 
George Grote (1872, 251) was furious with the sôphrones of our passage and established a school by proclaiming their conduct to be treacherous. Because, as he puts it, ‘Of all the parties here concerned, those whose conduct is the most unpardonably disgraceful are, Nikias and his oligarchical supporters; who force a political enemy into the supreme command against his own strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail so as to compromise the lives of many soldiers and the destinies of the state on an important emergency—but satisfying themselves with the idea that they shall bring him to disgrace and ruin’. This approach, which has largely been adopted by most modern scholars, is in my view another case of over-interpretation of what Thucydides actually says, no matter if one agrees or disagrees with the historian’s opinion here. Firstly, we ought to observe that the Athenian assembly was not comprised only of the sôphrones, namely Nikias’ oligarchical supporters, according to Grote; Kleon’s supporters were also there, of course, and most probably outnumbered the sôphrones; yet their own responsibility and share in the decision taken is not criticized by the denouncers of the latter. The argument that Kleon’s supporters believed that their leader would succeed does not necessarily mean that his opponents considered the feasibility of

26. But for this strenuous protest see also below n. 59.
27. See also Grote 1872, 250: ‘… while his political adversaries (Nikias among them) are deplorably timid, ignorant and reckless of the public interest; seeking only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party-opportunity for ruining him’. Cf. also Dover 1973, 37; Westlake 1968, 70 speaks more generally of ‘the irresponsibility of the Athenian assembly’, not only of the sôphrones.
28. According to Plut. Vit. Nic. 2.2, Nikias was primarily supported by the rich and notable as an opposing force to Kleon’s repulsive brazenness (υπὸ τῶν πλουσίων καὶ γνωρίμων ἀντίταγμα… Κλέωνος βδελυρίαν καὶ τόλμαν), but held in some repute already since Pericles’ time (ἡν μὲν ἐν τινὶ λόγῳ καὶ Περικλέους ζῶντος), and was well-liked by the common people too, who supported his ambitions (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν δήμου εἴχεν εὔνους καὶ συμφιλισμούμενον).
the operation impossible, irrespective of how they assessed Kleon’s chances. Graves (1884, 168), for instance, remarks that these Athenians, the sôphrones, ‘may have considered the enterprise feasible, but were not unwilling that its risks should fall upon Kleon, while they knew that Demosthenes would be at hand to advise and direct’; and certainly, we may add, the destinies of Athens were hardly compromised on this occasion, as Grote’s exaggerated rhetoric wants us to believe. After all, Grote himself (1872, 260) argues that this operation, given the enormous military inequality between the two armies, must have been fairly easy and that failure would imply ‘an idea not only of superhuman power in the Lacedaemonian hoplites, but a disgraceful incapacity on the part of Demosthenes and the assailants’. But if so, neither the lives of many soldiers nor the destinies of the state would actually be compromised, as the outcome of the operation bore out after all.29 Further, there is nothing in Thucydides suggesting that the conduct of Nikias and his oligarchical supporters, the sôphrones of our passage, is unpardonably disgraceful, and nowhere in Thucydides is Nikias charged with cowardice. But Grote and those who agree with him all of a sudden choose to part company with Thucydides at this juncture and to follow instead Plutarch’s account, an author who writes five centuries later and whose historical acumen and judgement, incidentally, they hardly admire otherwise. In any case, Plutarch alone writes that Nikias resigned his command to Kleon out of cowardice and regards this act as disgraceful and detrimental to the interests of Athens.30 Yet, no other ancient source supports this assessment.

29. Cf. 4.38.5: Ἀθηναίων δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ διεφθάρησαν (see HCT III 478). For the relative easiness of the operation and perfect feasibility of Demosthenes’ plan and Kleon’s promise, see also Kagan 1974, 244–7 and n. 99 there (cf. n. 25). However, even recently Tompkins 2017, 106, discussing our title passage, wonders ‘how … could “prudent” men hope for disaster’.

30. Plut. Vit. Nik. 8.2: Οὗ γὰρ ἀσπίδος ρίψις, ἀλλ’ αἰσχῶν τι καὶ χείρον ἐδόκει τὸ δειλία τὴν στρατηγίαν ἀποβαλεῖν ἐκουσίως… 8.5: καὶ
and, more importantly, we do know – and we cannot overlook this fact – that in the *Life of Nikias*, Plutarch the biographer has his own axe to grind, and that his *Nikias* must be read along with his pair, *Crassus*, if we want a thorough and trustworthy evaluation of the two men; and these are factors that may offer another explanation of Plutarch’s attitude toward Nikias, as I have discussed in detail elsewhere.\(^3^1\) Besides, given that some years later Nikias offers to resign also his Sicily command, a far more important assignment,\(^3^2\) and this despite his supposed disgrace in the Pylos affair, allows perhaps the suspicion at least that what Plutarch considered to be disgraceful five centuries after the Pylos episode – and *a fortiori* what modern times regard as such – might not coincide after all with the pertinent viewpoint of most people in the Classical era. For, as we shall see below, Nikias was not at all disgraced on account of his resigning the Pylos command. Conclusion: Plutarch’s evidence here cannot, I believe, annul or thrust aside that of Thucydides.

However, what the historian says in our title passage (4.28.5) does indeed give rise to several queries and is open to various explanations:

\[\text{τὴν πόλιν ἔβλαψεν οὐ μικρά τῷ Κλέωνι τοσοῦτον προσγενέσθαι δόξης ἐάσας καὶ δυνάμεως…}\]

(‘Nikias was thought not merely to have cast away his shield, but to have done something far more disgraceful and base in voluntarily throwing up his command out of cowardice … and besides, he wrought no little harm to the city in allowing Kleon to acquire such a high reputation and political power…’, trans. Perrin [Loeb] with slight modifications); cf. also *Comp. Nik.-Cr.* 3.1, 3, 5.

\(^3^1\) Cf. Nikolaidis 1988, esp. 331–3.

\(^3^2\) Cf. 6.23.3: \(\text{ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε ξυμπάσῃ πόλει βεβαιότατα ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς στρατευσομένοις σωτήρια. εἰ δὲ τῷ ἄλλω δοκεῖ, παρίημι αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν}\) (‘For these precautions I regard as not only surest for the whole state but also as safeguards for us who are to go on the expedition. But if it seem otherwise to anyone, I yield the command to him’ – trans. Smith [Loeb]). *Pace* Rhodes 1998, 227, his reference to 7.15.1 as a similar case is unfortunate; Nikias does not actually resign his command there, but only asks the Athenians to replace him because he is sick and cannot perform his duties.
interpretations. What is, for instance, the ultimate meaning of ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι in that context? Did the sôphrones expect Kleon to get killed or simply to fail in carrying the operation through? If he only failed, why would they necessarily get rid of him? More importantly, on what grounds did they believe that Kleon had more chances of being killed or failing than of succeeding? I shall discuss these questions in turn, but first I will try to address, opening a parenthesis at this point, another crucial question: who were these sôphrones?

Despite the etymological transparency of the term σώφρων (σῶς, sound + φρήν, mind), Thucydides’ use of the words sôfrón and sôphrosynê is very complex because, following the practice of the Sophists, he too played with several possible meanings or shades of meaning according to the context.\textsuperscript{33} It has even been argued that the contrast between Athens and Sparta, one of the major themes in his History, often takes the form of a contrast between rival conceptions of sôphrosynê.\textsuperscript{34} Extreme though this view may initially sound, it is very well-documented. Sôphrosynê in its primary sense, arising from the etymology of the word (i.e. sound-mindedness),\textsuperscript{35} is a Spartan quality \textit{par excellence};\textsuperscript{36} and so are such qualities as orderliness (εὐταξία), propriety or decorum (εὔκοσμον, κοσμιότης, αἰδώς), quiet or peacefulness (ἡσυχία), abstention from politics (ἀπραγμοσύνη), slowness in action and procrastination (βραδυτής, μέλλησις) out of concern for safety (ἀσφάλεια), and so forth, as natural consequences of sound-mindedness or prudence.\textsuperscript{37} The Spartans themselves regard the quality of sôphrosynê

\textsuperscript{33} See Georgiadou 1988, 140, 142, Gomme, \textit{HCT} II 301, and more generally North 1966, 100–16.
\textsuperscript{34} Cf. North 1966, 100–1.
\textsuperscript{35} According to Bétant’s Thucydidean Lexicon (1843–7), the two primary connotations of sôphrosynê are sapientia and prudentia (the other two moderatio and modestia).
\textsuperscript{36} Cf. 1.84.2–3. Also 1.79.2, North 1966, 102–4, Edmunds 1975, 74 and 79.
\textsuperscript{37} See, for instance, 1.32.4–5, 69.4–5, 70.4, 8, 71.1–4, 84.1–3, 124.1–2,
as peculiarly their own (see nn. 36 and 39), their allies openly recognize this fact and appeal to it,\(^4\) and thus democratic Athens, as opposed to oligarchic Sparta, was not very keen on laying claim to this quality.\(^5\) The words sôphrôn and sôphrosynê are missing from all Pericles’ speeches (the terms metrios and metriotês are used instead),\(^6\) and Thucydides never calls Perikles sôphrôn,\(^7\) although in his celebrated portrait of him at 2.65 he describes him exactly as such.\(^8\)

\[(2.65.5) \text{ὅσον τε γὰρ χρόνον προύστη τῆς πόλεως ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ, μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο καὶ ἀσφαλῶς διεφύλαξεν αὐτήν... (65.7) ... ἠσυχάζοντάς τε... καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ μὴδὲ τῇ πόλει κινδυνεύοντας ἔφη περιέσεσθαι.}\]

For so long as he presided over the affairs of the state in time of peace he pursued a moderate policy and kept the city in safety... for he had told the Athenians that if they would maintain


38. See, e.g., 1.68.1 and 3.59.1 with Gomme’s comment (HCT II 345). See also Georgiadou 1988, 142–3, 192–3 and North 1966, 102.

39. For sôphrosynê as a Spartan and a more or less oligarchic (aristocratic) quality, see n. 36 and further 8.1.3, 24.4, 53.3, 64.5. See also North 1966, 112 (‘Sôphrôn is the operative word denoting oligarchy’); Edmunds 1975, 76 and n. 17 (‘an oligarchic slogan’), and cf. Gomme on 3.37.3 and 3.82.8 (HCT II 300 and 379); Dover 1973, 37; HCT V 159–61; Georgiadou 1988, 143–6; Hornblower, CT I 77 on 1.32.4, 124–5 on 79.2, 486 on 3.82.8; Tompkins 2017, 106; see also Balot 2017, 331–2.

40. See, for instance, 1.76.4, 77.2, 2.65.5 and cf. North 1966, 102, 104–6, and HCT V 160. See also above n. 35.

41. But in Isoc. 16.28, Perikles is praised as σωφρονέστατον, δικαιότατον καὶ σοφώτατον τῶν πολιτῶν, while Aristotle describes him as φρόνιμος (Eth. Nic. 1140b8).

42. Thus, the aforementioned concomitant qualities of sôphrosynê are also shared by the Athenians at times; cf. Georgiadou 1988, 142–3, 195–6. For Thucydides’ own views about sôphrosynê and its political significance, see North 1966, 113 (8.24.4–5, 53.3, 64.5, 97.2).
a defensive policy… and not seek to extend their sway during the war or do anything to imperil the existence of the state, they would prove superior. (trans. Smith [Loeb])

In view of the above, it is difficult, I think, to dissociate the sôphrones of our key passage from the political dimension of the term, in other words, to avoid their connection with the aristocratic principles and the oligarchy-sympathisers in Athens. Gomme (HCT III 470) and other scholars deny this and maintain that the word sôphrones here bears only its primary and generic meaning and thus simply refers to the sensible and prudent men of the assembly at large. That these sensible men might have laughed at Kleon’s frivolous promise is perfectly understandable, but why would the same persons have looked forward to his ruin, whether physical or political, if a factional or more broadly political antithesis was not also simmering? On the other hand, some critics believe that the use of the term sôphrones here is ironic, given the successful outcome of the Sphakteria enterprise and the fulfilment of Kleon’s promise. Yet, this reading is not particularly convincing either. For, if the use of sôphrones here is ironic, it must be self-ironic, because Thucydides, who calls Kleon’s promise mad, as we shall see (4.39.3), would certainly have included himself among the sôphrones of our passage.

Thucydides does occasionally make ironic remarks, he often sneers, for example, at the religiosity

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43. Cf., e.g., HCT V 160, Babut 1986, 73, Georgiadou 1988, 144, and more recently Flower 1992, 56 and Tompkins 2017, 106. However, Hornblower, CT II 188 denies the ironic dimension of the sôphrones here, rightly in my view.

44. This was Gomme’s opinion too (‘Thucydides doubtless reflected that he had been one of this group of “sensible men” at that time’, HCT III 469); see also Rhodes 1998, 227, but Gomme-Andrewes-Dover seem to disagree (see previous n.); and so does Flower 1992, 56, who dissociates Thucydides from the sôphrones above.
of the Spartans which he regards as specious, but I can find no instance where he sneers at himself.

Here the parenthesis on *sôphrosynê* in Thucydides closes and we may proceed to the other questions which our title passage engenders. In what sense did the *sôphrones* expect to get rid of Kleon? Could they really have thought it more likely that Kleon would be killed in a comparatively easy operation (see n. 29) or is what we have here simply an inadvertent expression of wishful thinking on the part of Thucydides? More on this shortly. The evidence, on the other hand, from the *Knights* of Aristophanes, produced soon after the events of Pylos and taken within the whole context of this play, appears to suggest the political rather than the physical ruin of Kleon, thus, it is perhaps safer to take ἀπαλλαγὴσεθαι in its general meaning and suppose that, if Kleon failed, as was rather expected, his disgrace would be so great, especially after his silly and somewhat boastful promise (see n. 25), that it would automatically put him out of the political arena once and

45. J. H. Finley 1942, 311–12. For another ironic remark of Thucydides (Kleon being the butt) see 5.7.3, but on the whole ‘irony is not a characteristic of the Thucydidean narrative’, as Westlake 1960, 393 with n. 34 rightly observes. On the contrary, Connor 1984, 36 n. 36 sees irony in many passages of the *History*, on the basis that the author knows that the reality eventually contradicted or conflicted with what a character had expected or affirmed or simply said on a certain occasion (see his ‘irony’ index on p. 264). But these instances are not necessarily ironical, in my view (cf. also the criticism of Hornblower, *CT* III 211 on 5.82.5); nor is 6.23.3, *pace CT* III 359, while at 3.83.8 (ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος προτιμήσει), *pace HCT* V 160, there is no irony at all (see *HCT* III 379), and if there is, it refers to the noun aristokratia, not to the adjective *sôphron* (see *CT* I 486 on 3.82.8).

46. So Thibaudet 1922, 36; de Romilly 1963, 156; Woodhead 1960, 314; Baldwin 1968, 214.

47. Cf. Ar. *Eq.* 973–6: ἥδιστον φάος ἡμέρας / ἔσται τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ / τοῖσι δεύρ᾽ ἀφικνουμένοις,/ ἢν Κλέων ἀπόληται (‘Sweetest will the bright daylight be / for both those already in town / and those who are to come / if Kleon gets lost’). But this comedy was staged in 424 while Kleon was still alive.
for all. This is how the sôphrones may have seen things, as other critics also believe.\textsuperscript{48} We cannot, however, be certain because, \emph{inter alia}, the political career of Nikias (who was discredited – if only superficially, as it seems – by Kleon’s success) did not suffer any setback: as soon as Kleon returns triumphantly with the Spartan prisoners to Athens, it is Nikias who, as elected stratêgos, pursues with yet more vigour the war against the Lacedaemonians (4.42.1). Moreover, one might also question whether Kleon’s political power was enhanced commensurably with his spectacular success. Plutarch surely maintains that it was,\textsuperscript{49} and the \textit{Clouds} of Aristophanes, so far as the evidence from a play can fully be trusted as historically accurate, suggests (581–94) that Kleon was elected stratêgos in the following year.\textsuperscript{50} However, Thucydides does not mention this, and indeed the only mention he makes of Kleon in office again is with regard to the Amphipolis expedition in 422.\textsuperscript{51} That Thucydides suppressed Kleon’s election as stratêgos in 424 – a fact that could easily be verified or disproved – due to his bias and antipathy toward him is not convincing and, in any case, Gomme (\textit{HCT} III 506, 526–7) is particularly meticulous on this matter and gives very plausible reasons why Kleon could not have been one of the ten generals in 424.

Finally, were the sôphrones justified in expecting that Kleon’s command at Pylos would probably lead to his physical or political extermination? If the able and resourceful Demosthenes, the

\textsuperscript{48} Cf. Classen & Steup 1900, vol. 4, 64. ‘indem Kleon, wenn sein Versprechen sich nicht erfüllte, jedenfalls seins politische Rolle ausgespielt haben würde’. See also Grote 1872, 251.

\textsuperscript{49} Cf. Plut. \textit{Vit. Nik.} 8.5 (above n. 30) and see also Ar. \textit{Eq.} 280, 702, 709, 766, 1404.

\textsuperscript{50} So Dover 1968, lxxxi and 174 (on l. 582), Westlake 1968, 61, Kagan 1974, 250, 260 and n. 1, Mitchell 1991, 171 and 188.

\textsuperscript{51} See also Grote’s remarks (1872, 369) to the same effect: Kleon ‘obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period’ (\textit{sc.} after his achievement at Pylos).
commander in charge of the operations there, had already unsuccess-fully attempted a landing on Sphakteria, the Athenians would perhaps have had some grounds for believing that Kleon could not fare any better. Such an attempt, however, had not taken place, according to Thucydides’ account: once the Lacedaemonian proposals for peace, after their mishap in Sphakteria, had been turned down and the envoys were sent back to Sparta (4.17–23.1), the war was resumed, but it was a trench warfare, so to speak, with no party gaining or losing anything substantial: the Spartans kept ineffec-tually assailing the Athenian fortress at Pylos, and the Athenians kept sailing around Sphakteria so that the entrapped Spartan contingent was unable to escape. Kleon, however, probably in some not-necessarily-secret collaboration with Demosthenes, as we shall see, proposes now something quite different: immediate and drastic action. He reproves the Athenians for needless dallying and urges them to invade the island and capture the Spartans. This easy business, he alleges, tauntingly pointing at Nikias, our generals should have already accomplished, if they were real men, and this was, in any case, what he himself would have done, had he been in com-mand (4.27.5).

What follows is well-known: Nikias, feeling gravely insulted by Kleon’s insinuation of cowardice, offers to relinquish the command to him so that he may try it his own way. But he does so – and this point is as a rule suppressed – only after the people of the assembly, the deme, challenged Kleon with shouts to sail to Pylos himself, since this operation seemed so easy to him.\footnote{52. For the added ‘real’ in the translation (4.27.5 in n. 12) see Rhodes 1998, 226, Kagan 2009, 132, and note that such appeals to masculinity are already known from Homer: cf. II. 5.529, 6.112 etc. See also Eur. El. 693.}

\footnote{53. See 4.28.1: ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τι ύποθορυβησάντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, ὅτι οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ, εἰ ράδιον γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται, καὶ ἄμα ὀρών αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλευεν ... τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι ἐπιχειρεῖν. Cf. Plut. Vit. Nic. 7.3: ...τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις εἰπεῖν παρέστη τί δ’ σούχι καὶ νῦν αὐτὸς σὺ
As Robert Connor (1984, 116) rightly remarks, ‘almost any Greek male would be outraged by such an insult and challenge his critic to do better’. Plutarch, however, and several modern scholars, have severely criticized Nikias’ conduct here, regarding it as tantamount to treason, since he offered the command to someone without military experience and of whose failure he was certain. But there is no evidence whatsoever that Nikias believed that Kleon would certainly fail, much though Thucydides would doubtless have included him among the sôphrones of our key passage. One might also suppose with reason that Nikias gave up the command because he wanted either to compromise Kleon by calling his bluff or, taking into account the stalemate at Sphakteria, to give him the opportunity in earnest to try his own way and do some notable service to the city. Plutarch, after all, who is so critical of Nikias in this matter, clearly allows this possibility, but several modern scholars ignore his evidence here, and Woodhead (1960, 314), for instance, affirms that Nikias believed Kleon to be incompetent. On what evidence? Plutarch does not say such a thing, for what we read in the *Comparison Nicias-Crassus* is clearly the opinion of Plutarch and not of Nikias; and Thucydides himself, despite his prejudice against Kleon, makes no negative remark about Kleon’s strategic

πλεῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας’ Upon which Nikias offered to relinquish his command for him; see n. 57.

54. Cf., for instance, Grote 1872, 251 (above) and Vlachos 1970, 106: ‘Une telle attitude frise la trahison’. For Plutarch’s evidence, see above n. 30.


57. Cf. *Comp. Nic.-Crass.* 3.5 (τῇ Κλέωνος ἀπειρίᾳ καὶ θρασύτητι... στρατηγίαν ἐμπειρίας ἀκραῖς δεομένην παραδίδοι – ‘handed over [sc. Nikias] to the inexperience and rashness of Cleon... a command requiring the utmost experience’; trans. Perrin [Loeb]), and see also *Vit. Nic.* 8.5 (n. 30).
abilities before Amphipolis. In the final analysis, what options did Nikias really have before him after Kleon’s offensive innuendoes? He must either act on his prodding and sail to Pylos himself or do what he actually did, in the belief that either Kleon was bluffing (in which case he would be ridiculed, should he refuse the command) or that his plan (Demosthenes’ plan in fact) might indeed precipitate the surrender of the Spartans. In any case, to carry out Kleon’s proposals himself would not be so honourable after he had openly been accused of cowardice, and in those circumstances, even if he were successful, part of his success would rightly be attributed to Kleon, who had recommended that course of action.

It appears, as I see things, that Thucydides’ text clearly suggests that in that assembly on the Pylos expedition, Nikias tried to disparage Kleon by calling his bluff, in other words, by demonstrating the vanity of his challenge; and it does this so clearly that it prevents us from contemplating the possibility that Kleon with his bizarre behaviour might actually have tricked Nikias into handing the Pylos command to him.

Note that Nikias did not quit his generalship, namely the office to which he had been elected; he only allowed Kleon to command this specific campaign; cf. 4.28.3: Νικίας ... ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς (so also the ancient scholiast [Hude 1927, 245: ἐξίστατο: παρεχώρει]; cf. Mitchell 1991, 188 and Flower 1992, 42). In other words, Kleon’s role in Pylos was somewhat unofficial from the military point of view, because the actual commander there was Demosthenes, even though he was not an elected stratēgos either (so Grote 1872, 369, HCT III 438, Westlake 1968, 107, Connor 1984, 108). More recently, however, the dominant view has been that Demosthenes was a general-elect in the spring of 425, bound to officially enter office in the following mid-summer (see Kagan 1974, 220; CT II 152; Rhodes 1998, 207–8). Yet if these critics are right, the somewhat scorning attitude of the other two generals towards Demosthenes (see 4.3 and cf. Westlake and Kagan above) is not easily understood and rather seems to militate against their
view. On the other hand, Strassler (1990, 111–12) argues that the generals were not that contemptuous of Demosthenes (they reassured him that they would come later to help him; see 111 n. 4), but he is least convincing.

Recently, Geoffrey Hawthorn (2014, 113) has not exactly revived the well-known theory that sees Kleon secretly collaborating with Demosthenes to this effect, but, as he puts it, Kleon ‘may have engineered the confrontation to enhance his own reputation’. Indeed, Kleon’s conduct, after he had secured the command, in combination with his promise to capture or slaughter the entrapped Spartans, leaves this possibility wide open. Gomme (HCT III 469) remarks here, ‘Kleon’s immediate demand for light-armed troops shows that he already had a good idea of what was wanted at Pylos’. I fully espouse this comment, but I would like to advance it to its logical conclusion: is it reasonable for one to imagine that Kleon, as soon as he was given the command, without having been to Pylos before, without knowing the terrain there, and with no military experience till then (as far as Thucydides allows us to know), should have demanded to take with him a specific military force (peltasts and archers), without being in


59. Similarly, Flower 1992, 55 (see next n.). See also Connor 1984, 117 and cf. Westlake 1968, 73–4, esp. 74: ‘He [sc. Kleon] may have adopted the subterfuge of pretending to be unwilling’. If so, Kleon’s ‘strenuous protest’ against accepting the Pylos command (see Grote 1872, 251, and above) was a sham.

60. Cf. also Woodhead 1960, 315; contra Flower 1992, 55: Kleon ‘is simply exploiting a crisis for his own gain, without a clear policy in mind’. Besides, Flower 1992, 45 and 47 offers a good answer (adopted also by Rhodes 1998, 227) to Kagan’s question (1974, 241) of how these light troops happened to be so conveniently in Athens at that time (‘open preparations for the implementation of Demosthenes’ plan had been underway for some time’), although one might speculate other reasons that do not necessarily presuppose some secret collaboration between Demosthenes and Kleon.
some contact and understanding with Demosthenes, the commander of the Athenian army at Pylos and the man who organized and directed all the operations there? It was Demosthenes, after all, whom he immediately chose as his fellow-commander for this enterprise, exactly because he had heard of his plans to land on Sphakteria; that much at least is recorded by Thucydides (4.29.1–2: ... τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἕνα προσελόμενος Δημοσθένη ... πυνθανόμενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν νῆσον διανοεῖσθαι).

For Gomme (HCT III 471) this information was enough and ‘there is no need to suppose any secret understanding between him [sc. Demosthenes] and Kleon’ (see also Flower, above n. 60); Gomme is probably right for another reason: as Westlake (1968, 97) remarks, Thucydides was a colleague of Demosthenes on the board of stratēgoi in 424/3, perhaps also a relative of his by marriage (97 n. 3), held him in some esteem, and used him as a principal source (see also id. 1989, 205–6); how likely is it then that Demosthenes should have concealed from Thucydides his secret collaboration with Kleon? Be that as it may, the information above that Demosthenes was thinking of invading the island did not specify the nature of the troops required. Nor do we know for sure that Demosthenes had asked for reinforcements, although Grote’s remarks (1872, 246–7 n. 1) to the contrary are well-argued; when Kleon alerts Demosthenes that he is coming with the troops he had asked for (ἔχων στρατιὰν ἣν ᾐτήσατο), we are not certain if the subject of the verb is Kleon or Demosthenes (see here HCT III 473 on 4.30.4). At 4.30.3 Thucydides tells us that Demosthenes was summoning troops from the allies in the neighbourhood (στρατιὰν τε μεταπέμπων ἐκ τῶν ἐγγὺς ξυμμάχων), which might suggest that he did not ask for reinforcements from Athens, but Woodcock (1928, 103) cogently argues that Kleon acted upon the

61. Cf. also Connor 1984, 116: ‘Would someone who has just been forced into an unwelcome command act in this way?’ Besides, let me add, Demosthenes was not at all disinclined to secret dealings and agreements, as 3.109.2 evinces.
instructions he had received from Demosthenes; so also Babut (1986, 72 with n. 39) and Flower (1992, 44–5 and 56).

Be that as it may, Kleon eventually accepted the command for the expedition to Pylos, as we saw, and even promised his compatriots that he would finish the job within twenty days; and he delivered. Thucydides, nonetheless, although he knows that Kleon’s promise was fulfilled, characterizes it as mad (4.39.3: καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καίπερ μανιώδης οὖσα ἡ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη· ἐντὸς γὰρ εἴκοσι ἡμέρας ἠγάγε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὥσπερ ύπέστη).

62 ‘No sentence throughout the whole of Thucydides astonishes me so much as that in which he stigmatises such an expectation as “insane”’, confesses Grote (1872, 260), who subsequently attributes this characterization to the historian’s prejudice against Kleon. And so do most scholars. Yet, this passage can also be read from a different perspective. To my mind, Thucydides’ statement here, much though it apparently impairs his judgement and prestige, in fact comprises one of our best testimonies of his historical scrupulousness. Of course he did dislike Kleon and was prejudiced against him, especially since he most proba-

62. Unlike the common rendering ‘insane as Cleon’s promise was’, Connor 1984, 116 n. 15 follows Schneider 1974, 21 n. 29 (‘das Versprechen, so wahnwitzig es aussah’) and makes the point that the suffix -ώδης gives the adjective a certain ambiguity (denoting as it does either fullness or similarity) which the translation should preserve: ‘although it had seemed quite crazy’. Hornblower, CT and Rhodes 1998, ad loc. adopt his translation, but, in my view, the characterization of Kleon’s promise as μανιώδης, made after its fulfilment at that, represents not the Athenians’ impression, but the historian’s fixed and unequivocal opinion; cf. also de Romilly 1963, 172 n. 2. Had Thucydides meant to say that Kleon’s promise seemed (not was) mad to the Athenians (which might well also have been the case), he would have written, I think, δόξασα in lieu of οὖσα.

63. See, for instance, Gomme, HCT III 478: ‘Thucydides’ bias is once more clear’; Woodhead 1960, 314; Westlake 1968, 75; Kagan 1974, 247 n. 99; Schneider 1974, 21 n. 29.

64. This is above everything else manifest in 5.16.1; cf. HCT III 637f.,
bly held him responsible (more or less with good reason) for his exile following his failure to recover Amphipolis. Yet what really matters, as far as historical trustworthiness is concerned, is not so much the historian’s feelings, but whether these feelings make him tell lies about Kleon, suppress his successes, or distort facts in order to present him in an unfavourable light and even slander him. Nor do Thucydides’ characterizations of Kleon as a most violent citizen (βιαιότατος at 3.36.6) and a demagogue (4.21.3) necessarily indicate bias, as Woodhead (1960, 311–12) would have us believe. No ancient source denies that Kleon was a violent demagogue, and thus, insofar as the attributes biaiotatos and demagôgos describe Kleon accurately, the historian’s duty, Gomme (1962, 112) rightly argues, is to represent him as such, regardless, I would add, of the fact that the Athenian demos apparently supported Kleon and followed his pol-

Baldwin 1968, and see notably Woodhead 1960, passim, and Kagan 1974, 247 n. 99. But as regards the narrative in the Pylos episode, I would not agree with Westlake’s verdict (1968, 75) that ‘all other considerations are subordinated to his desire to expose the unworthiness of Cleon’.

65. See 4.104.4–106.3–4 and see Marcellinus, Vita Thuc. 46; Grote 1872, 261; HCT III 585, 587; Kagan 1974, 299. Contra Pope 1988, 284, who argues that Thucydides’ hostility to Kleon cannot stem from a private reason but rather from a public and political one (Kleon’s overall standing as a public figure).

66. These successes are mostly connected with Kleon’s fatal expedition to Amphipolis, but only a few of them are confirmed or actually supported by the historian’s narrative; see below.

67. Kleon is a violent demagogue also in Diodorus (12.55.8: Κλέων ὁ δημαγωγός, ὠμός ὃν τὸν τρόπον καὶ βίαιος); cf. de Romilly 1963, 156 n. 1. Further, Kagan 1974, 156, 234 with n. 53, Rawlings 1981, 224, Westlake 1989, 207, and others argue that Thucydides’ introductions of Kleon at 3.36.6 and 4.21.3 are meant to present him in an unfavourable light, disregarding that he is also described as πιθανώτατος, a positive rather than negative characterization (see above n. 4). Connor’s estimate (1984, 85 n. 15) of these introductions of Kleon above is more balanced and more convincing. See also the following note.
When Thucydides then describes Cleon’s promise as crazy in a passage where Cleon’s prediction is juxtaposed to his own, and where Cleon’s prediction and not his own came true in the end, he at the same time shows that his antipathy and bias do not interfere with his respect for historical truth. For in all likelihood Thucydides was present, as we saw, in that notorious assembly, heard the arguments and counter-arguments set out during it, was therefore in a position to see and assess for himself the mood of the people, and accurately, more or less, took it down for us. As Westlake (1968, 72) also notes in connection with the second Pylos debate, ‘there is no reason to suspect that Thucydides has given a fictitious or distorted account of what actually happened in the course of the debate’.  

Concluding this article, I would finally like to suggest another possible explanation for Thucydides’ position in our title passage, namely, for the reaction of the sôphrones to Cleon’s promise; an explanation that is related to the well-known but insoluble problem regarding the composition of Thucydides’ work. That our historian often narrates or reflects on a certain event having in mind subsequent events or even

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68. So Kagan 2009, 161, who also shrewdly remarks that Thucydides’ account of Cleon’s career ‘represents a radical revision of contemporary opinion’. On the other hand, it is worth reminding ourselves that all ancient evidence regarding Cleon is unanimously damning: besides Aristophanes and Plutarch, see Arist. Ath. Pol. 28.3, Theopompus 115 F92-94 (Jacoby, FGrHist, zweiter Teil, B, 1962, 556), and Luc. Hist. conscr. 38; that a descendant of Cleon took pride in him ([Dem.] 40.25) barely changes the overall picture and certainly constitutes no evidence of ‘a pro-Cleon tradition after Thucydides’, as Baldwin 1968, 214 n. 24 contends.

69. See above p. 117 and nn. 18 and 19). And as Pope 1988, 284–5 more generally observes, Thucydides is not ‘guilty of manipulating [sc. the public figures] so as to give an unfavourable impression. We shall find him innocent, a reporter not a propagandist’.

the end of the whole war is beyond doubt;\(^{71}\) but how exactly and to what degree this *a posteriori* knowledge affects, perhaps sometimes unknowingly, his judgement or the shaping and flow of his narrative is a moot point. In this particular case I would suggest that, speaking as he does about Kleon and the conservative Athenians, Thucydides is anticipating or rather projecting, by way of wishful thinking perhaps, what happened three years later, namely Kleon’s failure to recover Amphipolis, his poor and superficial strategy there, and his rather inglorious death on the battlefield.\(^{72}\) The events of Pylos, at any rate, were certainly written after 422, that is to say, after the Amphipolis campaign and during the peace of Nikias; and according to some scholars, even after 404 when the whole war had been concluded.\(^{73}\)

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71. As de Romilly 1963, 188 argues, when Thucydides underlines and stresses some ideas in book 4, it is because ‘of the greater significance given to them by later events’; cf. also Rawlings 1981, 252. Some passages indicating knowledge of later events: 1.8.1; 13.3; 18.1; 119–24; 142–3; 2.65.5–13; 100.2; 4.48.5; 81.2; 108.4, 5.26; 6.15.3.

72. However, according to Diodorus 12.74, Kleon fought bravely at Amphipolis. But since all generals fight and fall with bravery in Diodorus (see Westlake 1968, 81 and n. 2), this testimony is of little or no value, given also Diodorus’ very poor account of the battle of Amphipolis (see Grote 1872, 380 n. 1 and cf. Kagan 1974, 299 n. 141). Grote 1872, 383–5 and Westlake 1968, 81–2 criticize both Kleon’s strategic incompetence in Amphipolis (cf. also Spence 1995, 423 with n. 34) and his cowardice on the battlefield, but Gomme, *HCT* III 652 and Kagan 1974, 328–30 defend him on both counts (although Gomme 1962, 117–18 speaks of ‘Kleon’s poor generalship’ at Amphipolis); perhaps with some justice, given Thucydides’ prejudice against the author of his banishment.

73. According to Gomme, *HCT* III 448–9, ‘not long after 421 B.C.’; according to Rawlings 1981, 227, ‘after 412, probably after 407’; according to others, even after 404 (see Gomme above and cf. de Romilly 1963, 188–90). E. Meyer (discussed in de Romilly 1963, esp. 187–8 nn. 2–3) believed that the whole Pylos episode was written later on the basis of 5.29.3; cf. also 4.12.3 (*ἐν τῷ τότε*), 4.48.5 (*ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τὸν*), 4.74.4. De Romilly 1963, 190–1 believes (in agreement with Meyer) that the Pylos episode was written after the Sicilian adventure, possibly between 407 and 404.
Prima facie, one should not expect any similarity between the operations at Sphakteria and Amphipolis; if for no other reason, because no island and no naval force are involved in the latter. Nevertheless, the two campaigns have been linked together through their common denominator, Kleon, by Thucydides himself. Speaking somewhat contemptuously about Kleon’s strategy in Amphipolis (5.7), the historian says that he acted in the same way as he had acted with success at Pylos and so had acquired confidence in his own wisdom, the ultimate implication being that Kleon believed that he would carry Amphipolis by force as he had done with Sphakteria, but also, one might add, with Torone which he had similarly taken by storm only a few days earlier.

Several scholars adduce this accomplishment as one more example of Thucydides’ bias against Kleon, on account of which the historian is inclined to suppress the latter’s successes (e.g., Woodhead 1960, 304–5; Gomme 1962, 115f.; Westlake 1962, 287; Baldwin 1968, 211–12; Kagan 1974, 319; Schneider 1974, 20 and n. 28). This may be true in some cases, but, as regards Torone, it is worth considering perhaps that its capture was an easy military operation, since Kleon had already been informed that Brasidas was away (5.2.3), the wall of the town was partly dismantled (4.112.2, 5.2.4; see HCT III 631), and its inhabitants too few to resist the Athenians (5.2.3: οὔτε οἱ ἐνόντες ἀξιόμαχοι εἶεν); who, moreover, would attack from land and sea, so that the Spartan force of Pasitelidas would be unable to defend the town on both fronts at the same time (5.3.1–2). Yet, in discussing Torone’s capture, some critics set aside Thucydides’ curt and composed narrative and see instead a brilliant strategy on the part of Kleon (Kagan 1974, 321), the organizer of

74. Cf. 5.7.3: καὶ ἑχρήσατο [sc. Kleon at Amphipolis] τῷ τρόπῳ ὑπερ καὶ ές την Πύλον εὐτυχήσας ἐπίστευσέ τι φρονεῖν. For the meaning of τρόπος here (plan/procedure or spirit/temper) see HCT III 639–40. According to Balot 2017, 325 n. 4, it was due to his success at Pylos that Kleon became overconfident and hence made critical mistakes at Amphipolis, where he not only lost his own life but also squandered many of his ‘exceptional soldiers’.
‘a remarkable *coup de main*’ (Woodhead 1960, 304). With all his admiration of Kleon, Grote (1872, 371) modestly speaks only of a ‘not unimportant success’; and rightly so, since Torone was not strategically that significant and this is why ‘Brasidas’ reputation is scarcely tarnished, and Kleon’s not at all whitened’ after its capture, as Gomme (1872, 632) perceptively concludes. After all, since the aim of Kleon’s expedition was primarily the recovery of Amphipolis (Pritchett 1973, 379; Spence 1995, 432), Thucydides may not have thought it necessary to dwell on all Athenian operations and territorial gains in the area; let alone the possibility (rather the certainty) that some of Kleon’s supposed successes (see mainly West & Meritt 1925 and Adcock 1927, 247–8) may actually never have been accomplished or may have taken place in other periods or occasions, or after his death (cf. *HCT* III, 636; Gomme 1962, 115 n. 2; Pritchett 1973; Mitchell 1991, 170, 179; Spence 1995, 426–9).

Yet the way Kleon conducted the operations in Amphipolis and the miscalculations that he made, so far as Thucydides’ narrative allows us to judge correctly, was lamentable – although one can hardly turn a blind eye to the historian’s prejudice against Kleon here.75 Intriguing as they are, I will omit the details of Kleon’s military plans and manoeuvring,76 but I will pause on the comments of Gomme, who drew several parallels between the events at Pylos and Amphipolis and especially between the respective narratives of Thucydides. The actual battles in particular must have been very similar and, as Gomme (1962, 120) says, ‘with a very slight alteration of language, just a shift of emphasis, a longer and more detailed account of Athenian casualties, the story of Amphipolis could have been made very like that of Sphakteria’.77 It may be just as possible then that, when

75. See above and nn. 64, 65, 72.
76. For the relevant detailed accounts see Gomme 1962, 114–20 and Hornblower, *CT* II 435–6 with further bibliography.
77. See also Woodhead 1960, 306 and cf. de Romilly 1963, 188 n. 2. On
Thucydides was writing that the sôphrones of the Athenians expected to rid themselves of Kleon during the Sphakteria operations, he had Amphipolis in mind. For indeed, as Grote (1872, 370) also remarks, the first alternative of the Athenian expectations concerning Kleon’s initiative in the Pylos affair was really the more probable at Amphipolis. In other words, Thucydides anticipated, and thus also presents the Athenian conservatives as anticipating, that Kleon, owing to his poor generalship as shown at Amphipolis three years later, would not be able to defeat the Spartans, while his frivolity and impetuousness could even expose him to mortal peril in a hand-to-hand battle, as was expected given the situation, with the most renowned Greek warriors.

References


the other hand, Rawlings 1981, 217–33 has drawn interesting parallels between Pylos and the Kyzikos campaign of 410.


79. In fact, however, that battle was not fought at close quarters; cf. 4.38.5: … ἡ γὰρ μάχη οὐ σταδαί ήν.
REVISITING THE PYLOS EPISODE

— 1942: *Thucydides*, Cambridge MA.
North, H. 1966: *Sophrosyne*, Ithaca NY.
NANNO MARINATOS

Games of Chess: Thucydides and Brasidas, Nicias and Gylippus

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how Thucydides’ historical perceptions were influenced by him having been a general of the Athenian army and having faced highly intelligent enemies, such as Brasidas. During this process, each general attempts to read his opponent’s mind and forge a counter-strategy, as happened between Thucydides and Brasidas as well as Nicias and Gylippus in Sicily. The enemy generals engage in a battle of wits, as in a game of chess. It will be argued that both Athenian generals mentioned above planned well but were both taken by surprise by their worthy opponents and lost to them.

The First Battle of Amphipolis

Thucydides was sent to Thrace as one of the elected generals for the year 424 along with his co-general Eucles, who guarded the town of Amphipolis (4.104.4). But Brasidas forestalled them and took Amphipolis arriving speedily and unexpectedly in the dead of night, while Thucydides was away patrolling the island of Thasos – half a day’s sail from the town. This was bad luck and proved to be fatal! The author writes the following:
Thucydides, the son of Olorus and the author of this history, who was then sailing around the island of Thasos, a colony of the Parians, about half a day's sail from Amphipolis... [was asked to come to the aid of the besieged Amphipolitans]. As soon as he heard the news, he set sail quickly with the seven ships that happened to be there. (4.104.4; trans. R. Warner)

What is noteworthy in this sentence is the apologetic tone of the author who claims to have acted promptly while hinting at the fact that his decision was not simple. He highlights his dilemma in the next sentence:

[Thucydides] certainly wanted to reach Amphipolis in time to prevent its surrender, but, if he failed in that object, he wished to at least secure Eion before Brasidas could get there. (4.104.5; trans. R. Warner, slightly modified; italics mine)

From the way he expresses himself, the reader guesses that Thucydides had already foreseen the possibility that he would not make it to Amphipolis in time and had considered the alternative plan of staying at the port-town of Eion and securing it. His dilemma is articulated as a μὲν - δὲ clause: ἐβούλετο φθάσαι μὲν ... εἰ δὲ μὴ. Thucydides also intimates that he had foreseen the possibility that Brasidas’ next move would be against Eion and therefore decided to stay there to defend it rather than rush to Amphipolis and possibly lose both towns. In the next sentence, we read that, when he arrived at Eion, his fears that Amphipolis was already taken were justified. He had been quite correct in his estimations:

1. The dilemma is noted by Westlake 1962, 267–87; Hornblower, CT II 334 notes that Thucydides quietly makes the point that Eion was part of his original plan and not an afterthought.
relieve it, it would have been in his [Brasidas’] hands by dawn (italics mine).²

Here, the μὲν-clause (1) presents an event that occurred, whereas the δὲ-clause (2) presents a possibility which might have occurred but did not. If the δὲ-event had materialised, Brasidas would have won 100% and Thucydides would have failed 100%. But in the next sentence (3), we learn that Brasidas did not fully succeed in his plans and that Thucydides (due to his foresight) had secured Eion.³

The author seems content that he saved Eion because, as we shall see later, the attempt on the part of Athens to retake Amphipolis under Cleon would not have been possible had Eion been in Spartan hands.

Brasidas and Thucydides: A Battle of Wits

Our next level of interpretation concerns Thucydides’ engagement with his rival, the Spartan Brasidas, whom he praises not once but several times for his moderation and justice, as well as for his military ingenuity.⁴ Since Thucydides was a general himself, his appreciation of the tactics of his opponent shows his military ethos of recognising and respecting an opponent. What is equally important is the fact that he guessed correctly the intentions of his excellent rival. Brasidas, on his part, recognized his enemy’s abilities and withdrew from Eion without wasting his time there any longer.

² See Schneider 1974, 14–20 for the dialectical opposition between Thucydides’ and Brasidas’ plans. Schneider points out that the author often knows the unarticulated plans of his characters. See also Westlake 1962, 284.

³ Hornblower, CT II 334, argues that Thucydides did not move at top speed and that his account is contradicted by 4.106.4. Kallet-Marx 1993, 175 n. 6 remarks that Eion was part of the original plan and detects elements of apologia also previously detected by Westlake 1962.

⁴ Cf. 4.81.2; 4.108.2. On Brasidas, see also Westlake 1968, 148–65; idem 1980; Burns 2012.
Conclusion: Thucydides considered himself roughly equal to Brasidas in intelligence, as if the two had played a game of chess and had proven to have equal acumen. Still, Brasidas took Amphipolis by surprise and, in this matter, Thucydides failed because he was caught unawares.

The Second Battle of Amphipolis: Cleon and Brasidas

The author presents the second siege of Amphipolis (422 BCE), with Cleon as the attacker and Brasidas as its defender, quite differently. In this episode, Brasidas reads Cleon’s mind, understands his intentions, and acts intelligently, but the reverse does not happen because Cleon, who is presented as a bad general, was unable to read the astute mind of Brasidas.

Cleon settled at Eion with 1200 select hoplites while waiting for reinforcements from Macedonia and Thrace. As soon as Brasidas got this information, he counter-camped (ἀντεκάθητο, 5.6.3) with 1500 hoplites at a small distance from Amphipolis, on the hill of Kerdy-lion. Surveying the area from the top of the hill, he made sure that no move of the enemy escaped his notice; he expected that Cleon would underestimate the number of Spartans, that he would become over-confident and that he would move closer to Amphipolis, settling outside its walls (5.6.3). Based on this estimate, Brasidas prepared a trap for Cleon, guessing correctly that he would arrive with his present force without waiting for reinforcements (τῇ παρούσῃ στρατιᾷ ἀναβήσεσθαι, 5.6.3).

Everything happened as Brasidas had foreseen. Cleon stayed restful at Eion for a while, but afterwards ‘he was compelled to do as Brasidas wished’ because his soldiers became restless.

Inactivity made the soldiers discontented, and their thoughts be-

6. Connor 1984, 129 puts it correctly that Cleon is the opposite of Brasidas.
gan to turn to the comparison between the daring and skill of Brasidas and the incompetence and weakness of their own commander, whom, they remembered, they had been unwilling enough to follow even when they left home. (5.7.2; trans. R. Warner)

At this point, the author interjects his own thoughts in the narrative:

He [Cleon] was in the same confident frame of mind that he had been in Pylos, where his success had convinced him of his intelligence. So now he had no idea that anyone would come out to fight him; he was just going up, he said, to examine the position, and the reason that he was waiting for reinforcements was not so as to have a margin of safety in case he was compelled to fight, but so as to be able to surround the city entirely and then take it by assault. (5.7.3; trans. R. Warner)

In the above passage, Thucydides does not simply relate the events but interprets the character of Cleon by ascribing intentions and thoughts to him. He certainly could not have measured the tempera-
ture of Cleon’s army (since he was not there personally), but, being a general, he guessed the mood of the soldiers; plus, he may have consulted some witnesses. Also, Thucydides could not have known Cleon’s inner thoughts, namely that Cleon hoped to meet with the same good fortune as at Pylos (5.7.2), but such an expectation fitted the personality of Cleon (as Thucydides judged him). 7

Back to Amphipolis: having reckoned that the Spartans would not confront him, Cleon camped on a hill opposite the town with the purpose of getting a view of the surroundings while waiting for reinforcements. Everything seemed so quiet, the author reports, that Cleon almost regretted not having brought siege engines to assault the town right there and then: this is how confident he was (5.7.5). Thucydides intimates that it did occur to him that Brasidas had set

7. See Nikolaidis in this volume.
a trap: he remained under the illusion that he could withdraw whenever he wished.

At this point, Brasidas entered the town with his forces (it will be remembered that he had camped on the opposite hill, the Kerdylion). Thucydides explains his thoughts: Brasidas did not wish to attack the Athenians openly because he feared that a display of the inferior state of his equipment might encourage the enemy (δεδιώς τὴν αὑτοῦ παρασκευήν). In other words, now that he had accomplished his first goal to lure the enemy to Amphipolis, Brasidas did not intend to allow Cleon to become too sure of himself, nor did he wish him to realize that the Spartan equipment was not of the same quality as the Athenian. Thucydides is here speculating about what Brasidas thought and ascribes to him understanding of the enemy’s psychology. By weighing all these possibilities, Brasidas concocted an unusual plan based on his habitual surprise tactics. He would enter the town first, and then make a sudden sortie, employing his best hoplites. Shortly after that, his second in command, Clearidas, would follow with a second sortie. The trap was set.

Next, Thucydides inserts a speech of Brasidas in which the latter explains that he perceived the Athenian mood as being one of confident unpreparedness (ἀπαράσκευοι θαρσούσι). An unexpected attack, Brasidas predicts, would totally baffle the Athenians. This, in fact, happens as expected, although not exactly.

Why not exactly? Because Brasidas’ predictions failed in one detail: he was seen by Cleon’s men sacrificing inside the town, and a slit at the bottom of the gate revealed the movement of the Spartan soldiers. Brasidas thus lost the advantage of surprise, whereas

8. See Boegehold 1979, who responds to Gomme, _HCT_ III 643: ‘Together with the contradictory hints about Brasidas’ numbers (5.2.4), the difficulties of this sentence make the whole chapter extremely puzzling’; Hornblower, _CT_ II 440–1, discusses Boegehold’s solution of Brasidas’ reasoning favourably.

9. See Nikolaidis 1990 and Nikolaidis in this volume, who follows Gomme and links the two enterprises of Pylos and Amphipolis.
Cleon, guessing correctly that a sortie was being prepared, decided to withdraw, especially since his reinforcements had not yet arrived (4.10.3). Brasidas was quick: when he realised that Cleon was beginning to withdraw, he grasped the opportunity to make his sudden attack right there and then as this was the optimal moment to assault the enemy. Everything else went as foreseen, a fact which Thucydides demonstrates by creating a correspondence between the speech (logos) of Brasidas and his actions (erga). ¹⁰ Note especially the use of similar or identical vocabulary (Table).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brasidas’ speech</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I will fall upon their centre running προσπεσοῦμαι δρόμῳ κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα (5.9.6)</td>
<td>Here he routed the Athenian centre, and now Clearidas … charged out from the Thracian gates and bore down upon them too (trans. R. Warner) κατὰ μέσον τὸ στράτευμα τρέπει (5.10.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Clearidas, you] open the gates suddenly and attack as quickly as possible. The expectation is that they will be scared. αἰφνιδίως τὰς πύλας ἀνοίξας ... ἐπεκθεῖν καὶ ἐπείγεσθαι ὡς τάχιστα ξυμεῖξαι. Ἐλπίς γὰρ μάλιστα αὐτοὺς οὕτω φοβηθῆναι (5.9.7)</td>
<td>The result was panic among the Athenians τοὺς Ἀθηναίους θορυβηθῆναι (5.10.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The narrative is arranged in such a way as to showcase the intelligence and foresight of Brasidas, since the latter’s speech was written by Thucydides *ex-post facto*. The process reveals not only the writing skills of Thucydides as a creator of structured and symmetrical narratives, but also his talent in presenting the minds of his fellow generals. Alan Boegehold put it right when he said:

Thucydides, as he writes, seems to put himself inside Brasidas, a position from which he can gauge how Brasidas would change responses as position and circumstances changed. It is such attention to detail that distinguishes the best writers.\(^{11}\)

Considering now the two battles of Amphipolis together, we note that each of them is structured around the thoughts of a pair of enemy generals engaging in a battle of wits. In the first case, the two characters are Thucydides and Brasidas; in the second, they are Brasidas and Cleon. In both battles, Brasidas wins. Yet, in the first battle, he does not get everything he wants because Thucydides had forestalled his moves at Eion. By contrast, Brasidas’ success is undisputed at Amphipolis since Cleon was not only a bad general but also an inadequate reader of Brasidas’ mind.\(^{12}\) The narrative reads as if these *stategoi* were players in a game of chess.

*Nicias’ First Siege of Syracuse*

We now move to Syracuse just after Alcibiades was recalled and responsibility for the siege rested on the shoulders of the two remaining Athenian generals, Lamachos and Nicias. Since Lamachos is rarely mentioned,\(^{13}\) we shall be concentrating on Nicias alone reviewing the progress of the siege of Syracuse before he faces his counterpart, the Spartan Gylippus.

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12. See also Nikolaidis in this volume.
13. See Pitt in this volume.
After Alcibiades departed and before winter arrived, the Athenians prepared without delay (εὐθύς, 6.63.1) for an attack on Syracuse. The inhabitants were not so afraid of them as they had gained confidence: their initial fears of being instantly attacked had not materialized (6.63.2). However, the historian comments that Syracusan confidence was misguided and criticizes it as false and superficial.

...they [the Syracusans] thought all the worse of them just as large numbers are apt to do when they feel confident and kept urging their generals to lead them forward to Catana since the Athenians would not come forward against them. (6.63.2; trans. R. Warner, adapted; italics mine)

The authorial judgment reflects the contempt Thucydides has towards the masses, as in the Pylos episode: ‘the masses tend to behave that way when they are confident’ (4.28.3). Like Cleon, the Syracusans had a confidence which was not warranted.

Their misguided confidence is contrasted with the good planning of Nicias who, like Brasidas, begins by setting a trap into which the Syracusans fall readily and thoughtlessly (ἀπερισκεπτότερον, 6.65.1). What was the trap? Assessing the enemy’s psychology of overconfidence (γιγνώσκοντες), Nicias lured the Syracusans away from their town towards Catana by serving them false information through a double agent. The city was left without serious defence which enabled Nicias and Lamachus to sail by night, arrive at Syracuse and find good camping grounds in peace and quiet (καθ’ ἡσυχίαν, 6.64.1), settling near the sanctuary of Zeus without suffering any harassment. The sudden nocturnal arrival of the Athenian generals at Syracuse reminds us of Brasidas’ arrival at Amphipolis in the middle of the night.

When the two armies finally confronted each other in battle, the Athenians won without much trouble since they were the more expe-
rienced of the two; but Nicias noticed that the Syracusan cavalry was a problem compared to the weaker Athenian cavalry. Having accomplished their initial goal, which was to score a victory and establish superiority, the Athenians departed to winter at Catana and Naxos.

Scholars have underestimated the amount of organization and foresight that went into this first operation, which was most likely due to Nicias’ masterplan.\textsuperscript{15} He, of course, had an unprecedented record of successes after Pericles’ death, which explains why he was elected general by the Athenians almost continuously for about fifteen years.\textsuperscript{16} Thucydides gives this information himself, referring to Nicias as one who had ‘done better in his military commands (\(\varepsilon\upsilon\tau\upsilon\chi\iota\varsigma\alpha\varsigma\)) than anyone else of his time’ (5.16.1).

Historians, however, have reasonably wondered why he did not follow up on his victory at Syracuse. This criticism originated in Plutarch, who writes:\textsuperscript{17}

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Of his victory, which was so noised about, he made no use whatever, but after a few days had elapsed withdrew again to Naxos, and there spent the winter, making large outlays on his vast armament, but effecting little in his negotiations with the few Sicels who thought of coming over to his side. (Plut. \textit{Vit. Nic.} 16.7; trans. B. Perrin)
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By contrast to Plutarch, Thucydides presents the decision to break the siege and winter in Catana as a reasonable one, obviously evaluating it from a general’s point of view. The author takes time to explain the motives for this decision and thus explains Nicias’ reasoning: winter was coming, and it was \textit{not} thought possible to hold camp outside Syracuse in the bad weather. As well, the Athenians

\textsuperscript{15} For severe and unjustified criticisms of Nicias, see Westlake 1941, 58; Kagan 1981, 238–9. A detailed comparison between Plutarch and Thucydides and an analysis of Plutarch’s sources is given by Pelling 1992 and 1999.

\textsuperscript{16} For the excellent military record of Nicias see West 1924, 124–46, 201–28; Geske 2005.

\textsuperscript{17} Nikolaidis 1988, 327.
did not have adequate food provisions and needed more cavalry to be sent from Athens. They also needed money and local allies if they were to conduct a long siege (6.71).

Lest there be any doubt in the readers’ minds that the first battle at Syracuse was a big success, and that the message that the Athenians had scored a major victory was spread to all of Greece, Thucydides lets his readers know about its impact through the speech of Alcibiades in Sparta:

The Syracusans … whose total force has already been defeated in one battle (πανδημεὶ ἡσσημένη) and who are at the same time blockaded by sea, will not be able to hold out against the Athenian forces now in Sicily. And if Syracuse falls, all Sicily falls with it, and Italy soon afterwards. It would not then be long before you [sc. Spartans] were confronted with the dangers which I have just told you. (6.91.3; trans. R. Warner)

The speech of Alcibiades, as rendered by Thucydides, outright contradicts Plutarch’s version that, ‘of his victory which was so noised about, he made no use whatever’ (Vit. Nic. 16.7). Obviously, Nicias had accomplished his purpose of intimidating the inhabitants of Sicily and had propagated to all of Greece that the Athenian force was formidable. This meant that the locals would be more willing to join him in the siege of Syracuse, or at least they would not side with the Syracusans.

**Nicias’ Second Siege of Syracuse**

The planning that went into the second siege of Syracuse was even more detailed than the first and began in the spring of 414/13. First, many Sicels joined the Athenians as allies and provided food and supplies, as Nicias had expected. Second, cavalry and supplies arrived from Athens. Third, money was accrued. As the winter ended, the Athenians found themselves well prepared for a long siege.
But in order to be able to execute his plan, Nicias needed to take hold of key locations around the city and build the circumvallation wall which would blockade Syracuse by land. This had to be done efficiently and rapidly and could not be accomplished without first capturing the cliff of Epipolai, a natural fortification at the east side of the city. The Syracusans themselves had thought about this danger and the author records their thoughts:

[The Syracusans] thought that, unless the Athenians could control Epipolai – the precipitous piece of ground lying directly above the city – they would find it difficult, even if victorious in battle, to build a wall to cut the city off. They therefore decided to guard the approaches to Epipolai to prevent the enemy making their way up unobserved by this route, which was, indeed, the only possible one, since the rest of the ground is high and slopes down to the city so that it is all within sight from inside. (6.96.1–2; trans. R. Warner)

This passage predisposes the reader to evaluate Nicias’ accomplishment positively, since he did exactly what the Syracusans feared: he took them by complete surprise and captured Epipolai. The Athenian fleet had arrived by night and the soldiers landed in darkness quite unobserved at a place called Leon, situated only seven stades away from Epipolai. Next, a contingent of Athenian troops climbed the steep path to Epipolai gaining the first summit by the Euryelos pass without anybody taking notice of them,\(^\text{18}\) after which they fortified the edge of the plateau called Labdanum from which the Athenians could send fire signals to Megara to communicate their needs. Next, the Athenians built a fortification at a place called Syke, naming it the ‘circle’, after which they began the building of the circumvallation wall. All of this was accomplished with remarkable speed (διὰ τάχους, 6.98.2),\(^\text{19}\) as the Syracusans themselves realised: ‘[the

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\(^{18}\) Hornblower, \textit{CT III} 525.

\(^{19}\) For the location see \textit{CT III} 527. It is not clear why Thucydides calls it
Syracusans] were amazed at the speedy pace of the building work’ (ἐκπλήξιν παρέσχον τῷ τάχει τῆς οἰκοδομίας, 6.98.2).  

The next day, the Athenians continued the circumvallation wall in the direction of Trogilus by the sea with the aim of completely blockading Syracuse by land. The besieged decided not to offer battle any longer but to concentrate on building cross-walls and, if possible, to stop the Athenian circumvallation. However, they were often attacked by Athenian soldiers suddenly (ἐξαπιναίως, 6.100.1). Nicias also ordered the destruction of the underground pipes that carried the water into the city (6.100.1), which is again reminiscent of Brasidas’ efficient tactics during the siege of Amphipolis when speed and surprise were his principal strategies.

Once the Athenian generals felt that the wall was almost finished, their fleet sailed safely into the Great Harbour. Now Syracuse was blockaded both from land and from the sea (6.101): this is how carefully the siege was designed by Nicias.

Nicias, then, was very close to taking Syracuse and even began to negotiate the capitulation of the enemy with a party inside the city:

Everything, in fact, was going as they [sc. the Athenians] hoped. The Syracusans, with no kind of help coming to them from the Peloponnese, no longer thought that they could win the war, and were beginning to discuss terms of surrender among themselves and with Nicias, who was now, after the death of Lamachus, in sole command. (6.103.4; trans. R. Warner; italics mine)

And yet, while negotiations were ongoing, the Spartan Gylippus was on his way to aid the besieged Syracusans as advised by Alcibiades.

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20. The straight-forward narrative of Julius Beloch (1914, 364) follows Thucydides closely and presents Nicias’ strategies during the siege of Syracuse in a positive light. For positive evaluations of Nicias’ strategy see Marinatos 2021a and 2021b.
The author inserts a sentence which proleptically points to the potential danger in Nicias’ project:

*Nothing was definitely settled* [i.e., as regards the negotiations about capitulation] but, as might have been expected considering their difficulties and the fact that they were now more closely besieged than ever, a number of overtures were made to Nicias, and there was still more of the same kind of discussion inside the city. Their present misfortunes also led to a suspicious attitude among themselves. (6.103; trans. R. Warner; italics mine)

That nothing was definitely settled (κύρωσις … οὐδεμία ἐγίγνετο, 6.103.4) alerts the reader’s attention to the fact that the future was still open to reversal.

We have left Gylippus sailing to aid the Syracusans. He had a very small squadron of ships which could not possibly be perceived as a fighting unit, hence Nicias, who got the information, overlooked its importance (6.104.3). Gylippus himself had no firm grip at all on the future because he had been informed (falsely as it turns out) that Syracuse was already taken (6.104). In short, while Nicias had expectations that the city would capitulate soon, Gylippus had no hopes at all of stopping the siege.  

The illusion under which both commanders find themselves is rendered by two key sentences with the word hope (ἐλπίς):

Nicias προεχῶρει ἐς ἐλπίδας (6.103.2)  
Gylippus ἐλπίδα οὐδεμίαν εἶχεν (6.104.1)

The author further stresses the role of tyche:

[Gylippus] happened to arrive (ἔτυχε) just at the time when the Athenians had just completed a double wall … except for a small section by the sea, which they were still building … Syracuse had

thus been in a very great danger indeed. (7.2.4; trans. R. Warner; italics mine).

The role of *tyche* has been accentuated by Hans-Peter Stahl, who concluded that the intertextual correspondence and verbal repetitions of the text were composed with the purpose of showing ‘the Thucydidean opposition between wish-dictated planning and bitter outcome’. However, Thucydides’ message conveys more than the role of chance by highlighting the contest of strategies between enemy generals and how these strategies may be damaged by misperceptions.

*A Game of Chess between Nicias and Gylippus*

Once the enemy appears, Nicias realises soon enough that a new phase of the war is about to begin and that the besiegers are in danger of becoming the besieged since they would be facing two enemies at once. Still, he has expectations that he will be able to defend the circumvallation wall and maintain the naval blockade. Thucydides notes Athenian valour despite the surprise which confused his soldiers, his praise being implicit in the *μὲν - δὲ* clause: on the one hand, they were caught by surprise and became disturbed, on the other, they arranged themselves for battle (αἰφνιδίως Γυλίππου καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπιόντων ἐθορυβήθησαν μὲν ... παρετάξαντο δὲ, 7.3.1). Indeed, the Athenians won a minor victory by staying close to their wall where they found shelter from the superior Syracusan cavalry (7.3). Gylippus makes another try to intercept the circumvallation wall during a nocturnal attack, but the Athenians again resist.

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23. In his criticism of Nicias, Edmunds 1975, 133 blames Nicias for choosing the wrong base of operations, but one wonders what his alternative was. Ought he not to have defended his circumvallation wall?
effectively because they perceive the movement in time, after which they take measures that this would not happen again.

There was a section of their [sc. Athenian] fortifications which was weak, and Gylippus came out by night with his army and attacked it. The Athenians, however, happened to be spending the night outside the fortifications, and, realizing what was happening, advanced to meet him. Gylippus then quickly withdrew his own force, and the Athenians built this section of the wall higher and guarded it themselves… (7.4.3; trans. R. Warner)

So far, there is attack and resistance, with Gylippus cleverly adjusting to the circumstances and perceiving that the Athenian weakness lay in insufficient horse power. It is a matter of time, the reader feels, before Gylippus and the Syracusans will manage to intercept the Athenian wall and bring the Athenian enterprise to an end. In the meantime, Nicias makes a prudent move to transport Athenian supplies to a fort at the promontory of the Plemmyrium, close to the mouth of the harbour so that access could be gained by sea (7.4.5). However, Gylippus succeeds in taking it by attacking suddenly (αἰφνιδίως) and by causing both confusion and loss of morale to the Athenians. The author comments: ‘this was the greatest and principal cause of the deterioration of the Athenian army’ (7.24.3).

The success of Gylippus has been commonly paired by scholars with Nicias’ alleged inadequacy as a general, a characterization which is primarily based on Plutarch and which takes no account of Nicias’ record of intelligent planning and constant military successes. Nor does Plutarch consider Nicias’ excellent plan of the siege of Syracuse and his aforementioned tactics of resistance to which even Gylippus admitted, ‘we have not been as knowledgeable as the

Athenians, but we have dared’ (7.67.1). It is worth looking at these counter-stratagems as they reflect a ‘game of chess’ between generals, just as in the case of Thucydides vs. Brasidas.

The Athenians resisted giving up their circumvallation wall for a long time, despite the fact that they had two enemies to face simultaneously.

The Syracusan harbour contained palisades which the locals had impaled at the bottom of the sea in order to protect their ships from Athenian assaults. Nicias sends divers to destroy the palisades; this was an enterprise of great difficulty, as the author comments, and yet it was accomplished. However, the Syracusans managed to build new ones because they had resources at their disposal (7.25.7‒8). The author sums up by saying that both sides engaged in many stratagems and anti-stratagems (ἐμηχανῶν καὶ ἀκροβολισμοῖς καὶ πείραις παντοίαις ἐχρῶντο).

Gylippus tries to gather as many allies as possible in Sicily (7.21). Nicias gets information that Sicel reinforcements are on the way and blocks their passage by mobilizing his own alliances of Sicels. Still, a Corinthian man escapes and leads the 1,500 remaining troops to Syracuse (7.32.2).

Nicias anticipates an attack of the enemy ships and to this purpose refits his damaged vessels, constructing also a stockade (ἰδὼν ... ἐλπίζω αὐτοὺς ... ἐπιχειρήσειν, 7.38.2).

Nicias realizes that the Syracusans have fortified the prows of their ships in order to cause damage to the Athenian light vessels (7.36.3): this is good planning on the part of the enemy. He therefore counters the Syracusan device by fortifying the Athenian ships in a manner that will withstand the next enemy attack (ἀντιναυπηγήσας, 7.62.2).

Even the secondary commanders in both camps engage in a contest of strategies which Thucydides renders with a specific...
word, *antitechnesis*: πολλὴ ἢ ἀντιτέχνησις τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ ὁ ἀγωνισμός πρὸς ἀλλήλους (7.70.3).

The use of the antithetical prefix *anti* reveals that Thucydides’ narrative plan for the battle between the two armies in Syracuse involved descriptions of stratagems and counter-stratagems. Going back to the battle of Amphipolis now, there are certain analogies between the two situations.

Brasidas and Gylippus both arrive unexpectedly and take their Athenian counterparts by surprise.

Thucydides and Nicias both realize soon enough the direness of their situation and employ strategies which will minimize their losses. Thucydides saves Eion while Nicias tries to buy time until reinforcements from Athens arrive (they eventually do arrive under Demosthenes).

The Spartan and Athenian generals show each other mutual respect. Thucydides praises Brasidas’ intelligence and bravery and writes a moving account of his death (5.10–11); Gylippus acknowledges the superior Athenian skills (τοὺς κρατίστους ἐνικήσαμεν, 7.7.67). After the surrender of Nicias’ contingent, Gylippus tries to save Nicias from execution, but fails (7.86.2).

What is to be concluded from this analysis? The most important deduction, I think, is that Thucydides writes not only as a historian, or political scientist, but also as a general. The parallels between Amphipolis and Syracuse show that he utilizes his insight into military strategy to structure his narrative and to assess his fellow generals regardless of whether they are Athenians or Spartans. Strategy, operation, counter-operation and foresight interest him just as much as analysis of power. His perspective as a general differs from that of a historian who judges *ex post facto* from the point of view of the success or failure of an operation. This author seems to value the planning of an enterprise and to consider it just

as important as the outcome itself. This is the main reason that he praises Pericles by emphasizing his planning rather than the ultimate outcome of the war.

Is this not obvious? Not quite. For example, Lowell Edmunds argued in his very influential book *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (1975) that the latter presents an antithesis between intelligent planning (*gnome*) and chance (*tyche*), arguing also that the characters in the work symbolize these tendencies. In the same work, he characterizes Nicias as ‘a pacifist forsaken by his people, a pietist forsaken by the gods, … an Athenian with Spartan heart’.²⁷ H. D. Westlake, a most notable ancient historian, utilized a similar approach (Edmunds relies on him) with the result that both of the above influential classical scholars ended up underestimating Nicias’ planning and *gnome*.²⁸ Quite the opposite has been argued here: even intelligent generals cannot foresee all eventualities and, for this reason, they may fail. Despite this, their good planning has value in its own right.

The most tragic example of a man who failed is Pericles himself. He had thought out everything very well and meticulously as regards the war with Sparta: the resources, the strategy of defence, the reliance on self-sufficiency (2.65.11–13). But when the plague struck Athens, an unexpected demonic phenomenon occurred, and Pericles freely admitted to the fatalism dictated by the human condition: φέρειν χρὴ τὰ δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως (2.64.2). Elsewhere, Pericles says that men’s spirits are enslaved by the sudden and the irrational (2.61.3).

As Stahl has demonstrated in his *Man’s Place in History* – a counter-thesis to Edmunds – Thucydides understood all too well the

²⁸. Edmunds 1975, 109–41, esp. 136–7 where he bases his argument on one speech in which Nicias tried to give hope to his despondent soldiers. See also Westlake 1968, 171–211.
huge effect of chance events on military planning. But this hardly stops him from praising and exalting human capacity for intelligent reasoning – Edmunds was correct in this. As Artabanus says in Herodotus’ work:

... even if things go against [the planner] and forces he cannot control bring his enterprise to nothing, he still has the satisfaction of knowing that it was not his fault. (Hdt. 7.10f; trans. de Selincourt)

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30. Schneider 1974; Marinatos 1980.
The Eclipse of the Moon, the General and the *manteis*

There must surely be something wrong with the ancient Greek *manteis*, the seers or soothsayers as they are commonly called in English. Despite the many learned comments by several classical scholars, most modern readers still feel uncomfortable with their presence in the front line of all ancient Greek armies.¹ The Greek oracles and many other forms of divination have been recognized as part of folklore or traditional religious culture, and, as such, can be rather easily accepted. But the importance attributed to soothsayers in warfare appears unbecoming to such a civilized and enlightened nation as the Greeks of the classical period, whereas modern readers of ancient Greek historical accounts find it difficult to accept that admirable generals, such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Leonidas, Pausanias, Lysander or Alexander, could have been influenced by people who consulted the liver of sacrificial goats or interpreted other natural phenomena, such as the flight of birds, thunder and earthquakes, unless they were superstitious and naïve, as Nicias has often been portrayed, and in so doing becoming the cause of some of the most astonishing disasters in history.²

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1. For a very sensible overview, see Flower 2008, 153–87.
2. Dover, *HCT* IV 429; Hornblower, *CT* III 642–3; but for a different view, see Oost 1975; Marinatos 1981b.
Ancient sources, when they refer to disagreements between general and seer, indicate that chaos would ensue if the two disagreed. In such cases, either the general or the seer would have to give way to the other in order to ensure unity in the army.\(^3\) Even Alexander the Great employed seers, and whether the credit for victory was due to him or to his seers was a matter open to dispute.\(^4\) The Athenians, as well as the Spartans, did not hesitate to grant citizenship to good \textit{manteis}, a clear indication of how respected and essential they were to the army. Herodotus, in fact, documents such cases, especially of the \textit{mantis} Teissamenos, who, along with his brother, was granted Spartan citizenship in exchange for his valuable services (Hdt. 9.33–4).

Since the uneasiness of modern readers is not likely to diminish readily, the only sensible way of coming to terms with what was going on in the minds and hearts of Greek soldiers and generals is to read carefully and, if possible, in an unbiased manner, what our sources have to say on the topic. I shall try, accordingly, to focus on one of the most spectacular and fatal interventions of a natural phenomenon in ancient Greek history, which occurred during the last phase of the Sicilian expedition.

I begin with a close reading of the relevant passage. My aim is not to understand what really happened on that ominous night of August 27, 413 BC (I very much doubt whether Thucydides was able to discover how everybody felt about the event and in exactly what way each man reacted), but we can at least attempt to discover what the historian would have his readers believe about the event – although even this is not a simple matter.

The Athenian generals, seeing that the enemy was now reinforced with another army and that their own position, so far from improving, was getting worse every day in every respect, and

\(^3\) Flower 2008, 169–72.
\(^4\) Burkert 1985, 113.
in particular was becoming increasingly difficult because of the sickness among the men, now regretted that they had not moved earlier, and, as not even Nicias was now so much against it [them], except that he opposed the idea of an open vote, they gave orders as secretly as possible for everyone to be prepared to sail out from the camp when the signal was given. When everything was ready and they were on the point of sailing, there was an eclipse of the moon, which was at the full. Most of the Athenians took this event so seriously that they now urged the generals to wait, and Nicias, who was rather over-inclined to divination and such things, said that, until they had waited for the thrice nine days recommended by the soothsayers, he would not even join in any further discussion on how the move could be made. So the Athenians, delayed by the eclipse, stayed on afterwards. (Thuc. 7.50; trans. R. Warner)

There is much in this account which is not easily understood. What I find most perplexing is the way decisions were made by the generals (along with other high-ranking officers, as we may presume). Since Nicias is presented as having successfully opposed an open vote, a procedure about which we know next to nothing, we are left with the impression that the generals must have met again privately, for how else could they have given orders for a secret retreat? If this is the case, as I feel it almost certainly is, then how did Nicias vote in the private deliberation? We are told that even Nicias was not so much against the departure any longer, which means he did not oppose the other generals as forcefully as before, although he absolutely insisted on a secret departure, as is made very clear by the historian.

In short, nowhere does Thucydides indicate that Nicias was in

5. On Nicias’ secret thoughts in the open meeting, see Hornblower, CT III 635.
6. Οὐδὲ ὁ Νικίας ἔτι ὁμοίως ἐνηντιοῦτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μὴ φανερῶς γε ἄξιον ψηφίζεσθαι, προείπον ως ἐδύναντο ἀδηλότατα ἔκπλουν ἐκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πᾶσι, καὶ παρασκευάσασθαι ὅταν τις σημάνῃ (7.50.3).
favour of departure: it was a compromise. One might even be tempted to suggest that he abstained from the vote altogether, although this is unlikely.

In any case, Thucydides makes it perfectly clear that Nicias was not enthusiastic about the idea of an immediate departure because he had reasons for staying.\(^7\) Nicias is actually presented as hesitant: ‘he still could not make up his mind what course to take’ (7.48).

Although Nicias was well aware of the difficulties the men were facing, the military defeats and the widespread sickness in the camp, he had two reasons that made him oppose the idea of an immediate departure. The first was that he had persistent intelligence – accurate private sources, according to Thucydides – about the situation inside Syracuse: it was becoming worse than their own because of the prolonged siege. And, furthermore, there was a considerable party that favoured the Athenians and wanted to betray their city.\(^8\) Obviously, this information could not be disclosed publicly – and it would, therefore, be very interesting to know how Thucydides was able to find out what was in Nicias’ mind (7.48–9).

The second reason that made him oppose the retreat was equally important and was clearly and explicitly proclaimed publicly. In his view, such a serious decision should be made by the Athenian assembly back home, not by the generals in the field. For even though most of the soldiers were crying out loudly about their desperate position, as soon as they got to Athens, they would entirely change their tune and would say that the generals had been bribed to betray them and

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7. Hornblower, *CT* III 639: ‘Harsh ancient and modern judgements on Nikias and his superstition tend to overlook Thuc’s strong suggestions that Nikias had perfectly rational reasons for staying, reasons which for sound motives he was keeping back’.

8. See Hornblower, *CT* III 634–9. Nicias’ dependence on inside information is confirmed by Polyaeus, *Strat.* 1.43, who also asserts that three hundred Syracusean slaves had defected and joined the Athenians. For the fifth column, see Piccirilli 1997, 6–8.
return. Knowing the Athenian character as he did, rather than be put
to death on a disgraceful charge and by an unjust verdict, Nicias
preferred to take his chances and, if it should come to it, to meet his
own death at the hands of the enemy (7.48). But when Gylippus and
Sicanus appeared, reinforcing the Syracusans, Nicias found it very
difficult to keep on opposing the other generals as strongly as he had
been doing until then.9

It was exactly at this point that the eclipse occurred. As the
men who were until then eager to leave started urging the generals
to wait, he reverted to his original position. He cancelled all prepa-
lations for departure and went as far as declaring that he would
not even join in any further discussion on how the move could be
made. The issue would be raised neither in public meetings, nor in
private deliberations of the generals for twenty-seven days.10 This
would evidently give him time to see how things were developing
inside Syracuse, as well as to inform the Athenians back home and
to receive their response. Thus, as we can surmise by reading Thu-
cydides’ account, if Nicias was wrong, he was wrong in his calcu-
lations and in his strategic insight, not because he was superstitious
and naïve, and certainly not because he was astounded by a natural
phenomenon.11

But there is obviously more to be said regarding the eclipse.
First, the soldiers insisted on staying because they took the event
very seriously and it lowered their morale. This was all that Thucy-
dides felt it was necessary to say. Taking the eclipse seriously does
not necessarily imply superstition, nor does it imply that the Athe-
nians had no idea about the nature of the phenomenon, as Diodorus

9. For his proclaimed reasons in public, see Hornblower, CT III 368.
10. The delay should be for just three days, according to Diodorus
(13.12.6); twenty-nine days, according to Plutarch (Vit. Nic. 23.9).
Siculus and Plutarch would have us believe. Eclipses of the moon are not rare and have been recorded since time immemorial. They occur from two to five times every year, and half of them are visible from each hemisphere. Taking a well-known natural phenomenon very seriously is common in human history, even in our own times.

Thucydides, who was obviously well-informed about such incidents and records them as a matter of course, took them seriously himself. In the introduction to his History, he gives an overall account of the unprecedented sufferings of Greece. Besides the capture and devastation of cities, the exiles and the loss of lives, he observed that wide areas were affected by violent earthquakes, that more frequent eclipses of the sun were recorded than ever before, that droughts were followed by famine, and that there was a plague as well. Such comments are clearly based upon the common understanding that there is a general sympathetic interface between the natural world and human society. All those calamities, according to Thucydides, had fallen together upon the Greeks after the outbreak of the war (1.23).

It was, therefore, only natural that the Athenian soldiers, who had been suffering defeats and illness during the expedition, took the eclipse very seriously as a bad omen and urged the generals to wait. But they would obviously follow the generals’ orders.

This is the point at which the soothsayers make their very brief and indirect appearance in Thucydides’ narrative. Nicias is presented as declaring that he would follow their advice and would keep the army in Sicily for twenty-seven more days. Unfortunately, no details are given, but very interestingly we are informed about the opinion of several soothsayers rather than just one, as was normal.

The presence of several soothsayers in a great expedition can be taken for granted. Armies would commonly be divided into

sections, and each section needed at least one soothsayer. And besides, some of them were occasionally killed and would have to be replaced. But even at the most crucial moments, generals are usually reported to have consulted a single one among them, one with whom they had a close and regular collaboration. Generals and seers normally appear in pairs in ancient Greek literature. According to Plutarch’s sources, Nicias’ soothsayer, Stilbides, had just died, but he should have been replaced by someone else.\footnote{14. Plut. *Vit. Nic.* 23.7.} The general seems instead to have consulted all the remaining soothsayers together. And since it was very unlikely for several soothsayers to interpret a sign in exactly the same way, the general was conveniently given the opportunity to choose which advice he preferred. And he clearly chose the most extreme advice that served his purpose the best. I suggest that Thucydides presents Nicias as acting according to his own personal understanding of the situation. So why did he need the soothsayers?\footnote{15. Connor 1984, 194 notes the difficult position of Nicias, but Dover, *HCT* IV 429, is severe: ‘Thucydides’ criticism of Nikias is not that he was more superstitious than the men whom he commanded but that as an educated man in a responsible position he should have paid less attention to seers’.

Thucydides seems to have thought that they had something of importance to contribute. By appealing openly to the soothsayers, Nicias made his opinion even more authoritative than it was before. Under the circumstances, the other generals realised that they could not challenge him as they had been doing until then. The situation was so delicate that Nicias’ firm declaration had to be respected without further discussion. The secret orders that had been given regarding the departure were obviously cancelled. And so, by publicly invoking the interpretation of the soothsayers, Nicias had silenced the other generals and avoided any further meeting.

Thucydides adds, of course, that Nicias was himself rather
over-inclined to ‘divination’ and such things and suggests that the
eclipse helped him make up his own mind. This is a perfectly hu-
man and understandable reaction. At a very critical moment, when a
major decision must be made, even a very trivial incident may help,
including the throwing of dice. Having made up his mind, Nicias
turned to the soothsayers for support and made use of the most suit-
able advice that was available. Although he had obviously listened
very carefully to what the soothsayers had to say, it is actually very
unlikely that he made up his mind solely on the basis of their utter-
ances. Thucydides does not say that Nicias was accustomed to taking
the opinions of soothsayers seriously. What he says is that the gener-
al took the interpretation of divine signs very seriously. To make this
clear he uses a rather rare and neutral term, theiasmos (which only
appears once in his whole work, although cognate words do appear),
commonly but rather erroneously translated as divination and even
more erroneously translated as superstition.\footnote{A related word is used in 8.1.1 and 7.75.4, see Hornblower, CT III 709 with discussion.}

Thucydides had given a similar account of Nicias’ behaviour earli-
er. Several years before the Sicilian expedition, he presents the general
as being strongly opposed by Alcibiades, who had almost convinced
the Athenian assembly to make an alliance with Argos. However, just
before a decision was ratified, an earthquake occurred, and the assem-
bly was adjourned. In the meeting held the following day, Nicias was
given the opportunity to start all over again and to insist that his strat-
egy was preferable (5.45.4). Alcibiades won but Nicias was trying to
save the situation and asked for permission to go to Sparta and soften
the blow the Spartans received by the Athenian decision to forge an
alliance with Argos. In this case the soothsayers were not so much as
mentioned, for the assembly was easily suspended. A natural phenom-
emon had spoken in his favour when all seemed almost lost. The divine
sign supported him rather than Alcibiades.
To sum up: according to Thucydides, even in this most spectacular and ultimately fatal intervention of a natural phenomenon during a very delicate military situation, decisions were made by a general according to his understanding of the overall balance of power. The significance of the soothsayers and their contribution to decision-making in the battlefield was secondary — but not altogether negligible. Although Thucydides was very reluctant to report much that had to do with religion, he did not feel that the presence of the soothsayers could be totally overlooked. Their opinion, as the case we have examined here demonstrates, could be and actually was used by the general not only while he was commanding the soldiers, but even when he was addressing his fellow generals in public.

The soothsayers, of course, inhabited the same world as the generals. They knew perfectly well the objective circumstances, the prospects and the dangers, and even more so the mentality of the soldiers, as well as that of their military leaders. Their aim was victory and the safety of the soldiers, not serving the gods or an independent religious institution. And they were chosen very carefully in advance by the political and military authorities. An eccentric or unreliable soothsayer would have been excluded without hesitation. The close and amicable cooperation of soothsayers with their general can, therefore, be taken for granted.

Having said all this, I feel that I have not made any significant progress in answering my original question. The presence of soothsayers in ancient Greek warfare is something that does not make perfect sense in our own, modern understanding. For even Thucydides in at least one other case presents a general as contributing on an equal basis with a soothsayer to the benefit of an army and a whole city (3.20). Not to mention Herodotus, who gives them far greater credit than any other classical source (Hdt. 9.34–48).

But perhaps there was actually nothing really wrong with the

manteis themselves. Perhaps the problem rests in our own inability to understand the mentality of the ancient Greeks – and in particular their attitude to what we consider to be religious matters. The available evidence suggests that what we call religion was to them part of an indivisible and unified universe. So, the sun and the moon were not altogether separated from human society and the human soul. But this understanding raises altogether different questions.

References

Naming Strategies in the Sicilian Expedition: 
Characters under the Spotlight and Actors in the Wings

Introduction

The dramatic qualities of Thucydides’ narrative of the Sicilian Expedition are undeniable. Books six and seven are often considered a fully worked-up section of the History, a set-piece that deploys a significant armament of narratological techniques, influenced to some degree both by Athenian tragedy and Homer, performance literature that Thucydides had no doubt been steeped in from an early age. I wish in this paper to explore one aspect of the narrative’s construction: the naming and non-naming of actors in the text and how this is employed to focus the reader’s attention onto certain characters and away from others. I use the word ‘actors’ deliberately here as I hope

1. This paper began as an essay for Simon Hornblower’s London MA class on books 6 and 7 of Thucydides in 2003; I am most grateful to him for that unforgettable introduction to the mind and workings of our great historian. These pages would have – perhaps should have – stayed in a drawer had not Nanno Marinatos revived my interest in matters Thucydidean, and indeed offered much support since; I warmly thank her as well as David Braund for detailed comments on the paper.

to demonstrate that Thucydides’ choice to name an individual, or not, and how that is presented can usefully be understood through a dramatic lens, with lead characters front of stage and hosts of chorus members and extras pushed aside.

Thucydides’ omissions have long been objects of study. There are several groups of people and institutions that he actively suppresses, such as the Council of 500 and other cogs in the Athenian democratic machinery, something particularly noticeable in books six and seven. Thucydides’ choices in naming characters were no doubt multifaceted. The inclusion of a name, particularly with additional information such as patronyms, demotics or ethnics, clearly adds a truth effect to the narrative. This is the historian recording names from decrees and military reports and preserving the details, perhaps simply to demonstrate knowledge or research, but also to assert the authority of that knowledge. Single names without further elaborations may occur due to an inability to ascertain particulars, but they may also slightly reduce the attention given to a protagonist disliked by the author, or they may simply be the result of fame rendering further elaboration unnecessary. The reasons for omissions of personal names are more difficult to pin down. Thucydides could not be expected to know the names of all the people he includes in the History, but we can prove with certainty that he suppressed a large number of names of which he was well aware. And so we must ask what such choices tell us not only about the construction of his History, but also how naming strategies might be used to ascertain more about the mind of Thucydides and his personal opinions about characters.

What I hope to show in this paper is that these naming strategies were not only central to Thucydides’ portrayal of the Sicilian episode, but they should also be central to our understanding of what he himself thought about the main protagonists. In order to identify and

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3. For Thucydides’ omissions of the Council, see CT III 23–31.
analyse these strategies, the main body of what follows will concentrate on a close reading of the text of books six and seven, pointing out when and in what form we are presented with personal names. This should shed some light onto how on a micro-level the naming or non-naming of individuals or even groups produces a set of focalising effects, either by how characters are introduced and removed or how others are cloaked by veils of anonymity. These devices concentrate our gaze on those whom Thucydides has most interest in our observing; they also silence those we might easily fail to notice as the narrative glides on past them, the wool pulled over our eyes.

To decode Thucydides’ naming practices, it seems appropriate to take them in the order in which they appear. A number of the effects are cumulative and need to be observed as the narrative progresses and the focus and intensity of such techniques increase, especially, as we shall see, around the figure that above all others is most highlighted by this narratological strategy – Nikias, son of Nikeratos.

**Prelude to the sending of the fleet**

The debates and preparations leading up to the expedition to Sicily are presented with some prominent omissions of speeches, arguments and personae, as well as meetings of the Council and Assembly, silenced or summarily dealt with by Thucydides. In the winter of 416/5, anonymous envoys from Egesta are in Athens putting forward arguments for military assistance ‘constantly repeated in their assemblies’ alongside unnamed (Athenian?) individuals. In order to clarify certain issues, the Athenians send their own anonymous envoys to Egesta (6.6.2–3). The absence of any named individuals involved in the action lends a cursory tone to the proceedings that does not allow the reader to dwell upon questions of how the politics worked on the ground in Athens leading to this Egestan diplomatic success. The Egestans are not given shape through identification, and their words
are presented only indirectly. The anonymity of the cast cloaks them in deception, and likely (as so often with non-naming in Thucydides) indicates contempt on the author’s part – they are of course later found to have deceived the Athenians in these negotiations.

In the summer of 415 both sets of envoys return and present their reports, Council meetings are suppressed (CT III 316), and the assembly votes to appoint three generals to command the force. In this instance the total absence of names up until now sharpens the contrast when Thucydides introduces these generals with due pomp, giving their full patronymics: ‘Alcibiades son of Klinias, Nikias son of Nikeratos, and Lamachos son of Xenophanes’ (6.8.2). While Thucydides’ use of patronymics is difficult to classify, they here provide quite formal introductions to men we have already met before in the History. Hornblower suggests that this reflects the language of the official decree and aims to stress the importance of the information conveyed (CT III 318). The list certainly stands out from the surrounding text and marks a formal and solemn start to the enterprise proper, but it also acts as a roll call for three characters, the inclusion and omission of whose names during the ensuing expedition will play an important role in focusing our attention onto their natures, strategies and failures.

That there is a sustained oratorical focus on Nikias in books six and seven comes as no surprise. From his entry onto the stage of the Sicilian story Nikias is given two direct speeches (the only such occurrence in Thucydides) during the so-called Redetrias, allowing us to concentrate on the two opposing positions and characters of Nikias and Alcibiades at this important juncture.\(^4\) Lamachos alone of the elected expedition leaders is not given voice during these debates – a plot device that will almost define his role in the forthcoming tragedy.

Nikias mentions no one by name in either of his speeches here,

\(^4\) Gribble 2006, 449: ‘a division in speech and focalization that will be typical of the whole narrative of the Sicilian campaign’.
instead only alluding to groups and individuals, a form of indirect assault on those of whom he disapproves that lends weight and dignity to his oratory, a restraint that is in complete contrast with Alcibiades’ naming of his opponent. Nikias claims that the treaty with Sparta has become nominal owing to ‘certain individuals’ (ἄνδρες), Athenian and Spartan (6.10.2), and he must have Alcibiades in mind amongst them. Resources should be spent at home and not on behalf of ‘these exiles whose interest it is to lie as well as they can’ (ὑπὲρ ἀνδρῶν φυγάδων, 6.12.1); these are exiles from Leontini we are to imagine present somewhere in the Assembly. Alcibiades and his friends are certainly to be understood by ‘if there be any man here, overjoyed at being chosen to command’ (6.12.2), and ‘when I see such persons now sitting here are the side of that same individual and summoned by him, alarm seizes me’ (οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνδρὶ παρακελευστοὺς καθημένους φοβοῦμαι, 6.13.1). Nikias then exhorts the older men to keep these younger citizens in check, and he calls to the unnamed prytanis of the meeting not to be afraid of putting the matter once again to the vote. We may read some theatricality into Nikias pointing out such men; the reader can visualise the gestures he makes towards Alcibiades, those huddled around him, the prytanis. There is drama here and audience reaction, an actor in full flight.

We get a sense of how much is left unrecorded of the meeting in what follows:5

ο μὲν Νικίας τοιαῦτα εἶπε, τῶν δὲ Ἀθηναίων παριόντες οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι στρατεύειν παρῄνουν καὶ τὰ ἐψηφισμένα μὴ λύειν, οἱ δὲ τινες καὶ ἀντέλεγον. ἐνῆγε δὲ προθυμότατα τὴν στρατείαν Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου, βουλόμενος τῷ τε Νικίᾳ ἐναντιοῦσθαι. (6.15.1–2)

Such were the words of Nikias. Most of the Athenians who came forward spoke in favour of the expedition and of not annulling what

5. For the selectivity of Thucydides’ reportage of speeches here, see CT III 337–8; Rood 1998, 137.
had been voted, *although some* spoke on the other side. By far the keenest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades son of Clinias, who wished to oppose Nikias’. (trans. Crawley/Strassler, adapted)\(^6\)

The personal names leap out from the backdrop of anonymity, focusing what was no doubt a long and involved set of proceedings onto just these two opponents. In contrast to Nikias’ careful avoidance of directly naming his rival, Alcibiades immediately accuses Nikias of having attacked him (6.16.1). Naming and non-naming are here used as a device to show the maturity and gravitas of the older Nikias versus the brash, younger Alcibiades, rushing to counterattack. The covering up of Lamachos continues with Alcibiades calling on the Athenians to avail themselves of the services of ‘us both’ (6.17.1).

Thucydides then allows us a glimpse at further unrecorded speeches of the Egestans and exiles from Leontini through a gap in the curtain (6.19.1), and Nikias takes to the podium once more. There are murmurs of uncertainty among the crowd until:

\[
καὶ τέλος παρελθών τις τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ παρακαλέσας τὸν Νικίαν οὐκ ἔφη χρῆναι προφασίζεσθαι οὐδὲ διαμέλλειν. \quad (6.25.1)
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At last *one of the Athenians* came forward and called upon Nikias and told him that he ought not to make excuses or put them off.

His name – Demostratos – is supplied by Plutarch,\(^7\) but was omitted (if indeed it was known to Thucydides) lest he take focus from Nikias and Alcibiades and we are left with anything other than ‘the primary memory of an oratorical duel between two big hitters’ (*CT* III 365). It is also possible that Thucydides did not wish to name any other Athenians who had eagerly pressed for the expedition, whether

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6. Translations are from R. B. Strassler’s revision of Crawley: *The Landmark Thucydides*, NY 1996; adaptations are noted and italics my own.

from a desire to protect them or so as not to dilute the blame for persuading the *demos* away from Alcibiades.

***The Herms and the Mysteries***

Thucydides’ portrayal of the investigations surrounding the mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries contains perhaps the most well-known series of naming omissions in the whole *History* and presents several possible reasons for naming and not naming. Not one single person is named during Thucydides’ telling of these notorious events except Alcibiades, upon whom the spotlight shines intensely. Why are so many accusers, witnesses, defendants and victims not named during this infamous episode of Athenian history? Many of the details were knowable, not just from Andocides’ speech *On the Mysteries*, delivered c. 400 BC, but from numerous public documents held in the state archives as well as inscriptions posted around the city, such as the so-called Attic stelai, not to mention the oral tradition of such a notorious scandal. Let us look at how Thucydides presents the sequence of events and the protagonists:

> μηνύεται οὖν ἀπὸ μετοίκων τέ τινων καὶ ἀκολούθων περὶ μὲν τῶν Ἑρμῶν οὐδὲν, ἄλλων δὲ ἀγαλμάτων περικοπαί τινες πρότερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρων μετὰ παιδιᾶς καὶ οἴνου γεγενημέναι, καὶ τὰ μυστήρια ἅμα ὡς ποιεῖται ἐν οἰκίαις ἐφ’ ὕβρει: ὃν καὶ τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐπῃτιῶντο. καὶ αὐτὰ ὑπολαμβάνοντες οἱ μάλιστα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδη ἀχθόμενοι ἀχτόνιος εἰς ὑστέρων ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου βεβαιῶς προεστάναι, καὶ νομίσαντες, εἰ αὐτὸν ἐξελάσσειν, πρῶτοι ἀν ἕναι. (6.28)

Information was accordingly given by some resident aliens and body servants, not about the Hermae but of some previous mutilations of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken
frolic, and of mock celebrations of the Mysteries, alleged to have taken place in private houses. When Alcibiades was implicated in this charge, it was taken up by those who could least endure him, because he stood in the way of their obtaining the undisturbed leadership of The People, and who thought that if he were once removed the first place would be theirs.

Alcibiades denies the charges, but his enemies (οἱ δ᾽ ἐχθροί) feared that he would have the army’s support and put forward other orators (ἄλλους ῥήτορας, 6.29.3) who said he should be allowed to sail now rather than to wait for prosecutions. That the shadowy figures were indeed known to Thucydides he himself tells us: the demagogue Androcles was one of those conspiring against Alcibiades (8.65.2). Hornblower (CT III 378) sees Thucydides as keeping these people ‘contemptuously anonymous’ here, and there is certainly a discernible dislike of those men in the language employed. Alcibiades is a victim here of just the sort of dangerous, plotting politicians that Thucydides believed were the principal cause of Athens’ downfall and his own exile. He wishes to draw attention both to the dangers of factionalism but also to what a controversial individual Alcibiades was. The non-naming works to create an atmosphere of back-room dealings and corruption by keeping these groups cloaked and hooded. We will return to the affair below.

And so the fleet is prepared and Thucydides produces a great vista of the harbour with crowds of extras loading the ships and families waving their menfolk goodbye. We naturally would not expect names amid such crowd scenes, and indeed only Pericles and Hagnon are mentioned in a comparison of fleet sizes.

In Sicily

We next cut to Syracuse, where news of the armada had been received, and an assembly is called with what by now is an anticipated presen-
tation of a limited number of speakers, while others are alluded to off-stage. There is a sense of expectation that Thucydides so brilliantly creates in the build up to important speeches, and we are given a formal introduction to Hermocrates – a figure who will represent and focalise the opposition to the Athenians for the remaining expedition – with his patronymic (already given at 4.58 and so perhaps unnecessary for the reader, but not for the part it here plays):

ἀλλὰ καὶ γενομένης ἐκκλησίας ἐλέχθησαν τοιοίδε λόγοι ἀπὸ τε ἄλλων, τῶν μὲν πιστευόντων τὰ περὶ τῆς στρατείας τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τῶν δὲ τὰ ἐναντία λεγόντων, καὶ Ἐρμοκράτης ὁ Ἕρμωνος παρελθὼν αὐτοῖς. (6.32.3)

… an assembly was held in which speeches, as will be seen, were delivered by different orators, believing or contradicting the report of the Athenian expedition; among whom Hermocrates son of Hermon came forward.

Hermocrates continues to keep the other speakers anonymous (‘I shall perhaps be no better believed than others’, 6.33.1), and also only alludes to his opponent (‘their most experienced general’, 6.34.6), mirroring the naming strategies of Nikias’ first speech of the Redetrias. Athenagoras next comes forward, but is not introduced with a patronymic (surely knowable?); his speech consists of allusions to individuals or groups of politicians who remain vague:

καὶ ἐνθένδε ἄνδρες οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα λογοποιοῦσιν. οὐς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἐπίσταμαι ἤτοι λόγοις γε τοιούτῳ καὶ ἐτούτῳ κακουργοτέροις ἔργοις βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ υμετέρον πλῆθος αὐτοῦς τῆς πόλεως ἄρχειν. (6.38.1)

…while persons here invent stories that neither are true nor ever will be. Nor is this the first time that I see these persons, when they cannot resort to deeds, trying by such stories and by others even more abominable to frighten The People and themselves take over the government.
This is followed by ‘one of the generals’ (6.41), who spoke up and prevented further discussion. His authority in closing down the discussion – and this scene – is magnified by his anonymity (CT III 416), and also keeps our attention on the two principal named speakers, again mirroring the non-named speaker at the end of the Redetrias.

Meanwhile, at Corcyra, the Athenian generals divide the fleet into three squadrons and assign themselves to their command by lot (6.42); a similar procedure will follow after the removal of Alcibiades (6.62.1), when the army is distributed under two commanders. This is the first occurrence of one of the great symphonic themes running through the Sicilian expedition: the gradual isolation of Nikias, chiming out the motif three-two-one, as one by one the generals leave the stage until Nikias is left alone before reinforcements arrive under Demosthenes, and beyond that as those two generals and their sections of the army in their turn are separated and isolated.

The generals learn at Rhegium that the promised sums of money from the Egestans have not materialised:

καὶ τῷ μὲν Νικίᾳ προσδεχομένῳ ἦν τὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἐγεσταίων, τοῖν δὲ ἐτέρου καὶ ἀλογώτερα. (6.46.2)

If Nikias was prepared for the news from Egesta, his two colleagues were taken completely by surprise.

The reader is of course aware who the other two generals are, but only Nikias is signalled by name, perhaps emphasising his correct appraisal of the Egestans back in Athens. All three are named when they debate what action is to be taken, in the order Nikias-Alcibiades-Lamachos – with a relatively large number of lines spoken by Lamachos, the last time we will hear his name until his death. Alcibiades sails away in a failed attempt to negotiate an alliance with Messina (named here to point out a failure?).
καὶ εὐθὺς � exchanging sixty ships out of the whole fleet and coasted along to Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament behind them at Rhegium with one of their number.

But which general, and why not name him, as Alcibiades was just above? Dover is surely right in assuming Thucydides must have known, although his suggestion that ‘he felt that this was the proper way in which to refer to a command in which nothing happened’ (HCT IV 316) is perhaps less relevant to the decision of omission than Thucydides’ narrative need to cut Lamachos out as much as possible. (It could not, incidentally, have been Alcibiades, who travels to Catana, and I doubt Thucydides would miss an opportunity to name Nikias, unless there is perhaps a suppression here of his illness, being left behind to convalesce – a subject Thucydides does not wish to introduce quite yet.)

Having sailed to Catana, the Athenian armament is not permitted to enter the city, but their two generals are invited to speak to the assembly and ‘while Alcibiades was speaking and the citizens were intent on the assembly, the soldiers broke down a badly walled-up postern gate’ (6.51.1). Only Alcibiades is thus named as taking part in the action, and it is part of a deceit, which may be relevant in pointing out the sort of tactics we should expect from this character (although surely the historical Nikias too agreed to the deception).

Alcibiades recalled to Athens

Arriving back at Catana following some reconnaissance and diplomatic missions, the Athenians receive the news of Alcibiades’ recall,
and the non-naming strategies we met around the Herms and the Mysteries investigations are once again brought to bear on their continuation:

καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν Σαλαμινίαν ναῦν ἐκ τῶν Αθηνῶν ἰκουσαν ἐπί τε Ἀλκιβιάδην ὡς κελεύσοντας ἀποπλεῖν ἐς ἀπολογίαν ὧν ἡ πόλις ἐνεκάλει, καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν τῶν μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ μεμημενέων περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ὡς ἀσεβοῦτων, τῶν δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν Ἑρμῶν. (6.53)

There they found the ship Salaminia come from Athens for Alcibiades, with orders for him to sail home to answer the charges which the state brought against him, and for certain others of the soldiers who with him were accused of sacrilege in the matter of the Mysteries, and others of the Herms. (trans. Crawley/Strassler, adapted)

καὶ οὐ δοκιμάζοντες τοὺς μηνυτάς … διὰ πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πίστιν χρηστοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν ξυλλαμβάνοντες κατέδουν. (6.53.2)

… instead of testing the informers … arresting and imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of rascals.

ὡν ἐνθυμούμενος ὁ δήμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων … χαλεπὸς ἦν τότε καὶ ὑπόπτης ἐς τοὺς περὶ τῶν μυστικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν λαβόντας … πολλοὶ τε καὶ αξιόλογοι ἄνθρωποι ἤδη ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ ἦσαν … ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται εἰς τῶν δεδεμένων, ὡστε ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι, ὑπὸ τῶν τῶν Ἑρμῶν πολλοί τε καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλα ἄνθρωπον καὶ κατ’ ἄλλων μηνυοντο τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν: ὁ δὲ δήμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων … τὸν μὲν μηνυμένον εὐθὺς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ ὅσον μὴ κατηγορηθῇ ἐλυσαν, τὸν δὲ καταιτιαθέντας κρίσεις ποιήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν, ὡσοὶ ἐξουσιάζοντο, τῶν δὲ διαφυγόντων θάνατον καταγνόντες ἐπανείπον ἀργύριον τῷ ἀποκτείναντι. (6.60)

The Athenian people grew uneasy and suspicious of the persons charged in the affair of the Mysteries … many persons of considerable status had already been thrown into prison … until at last
one of those in custody, thought to be the most guilty of all, was induced by a fellow prisoner to give information … He accordingly made a confession implicating himself and others in the affair of the Hermae; and the Athenian people … at once let go the informer and all the rest whom he had not denounced, and bringing the accused to trial, executed as many as were apprehended, and condemned to death such as had fled and set a price upon their heads.

Public feeling was against Alcibiades, Thucydides tells us, due to those same unnamed enemies (τῶν ἐχθρῶν, 6.61.1) that had plagued him before the expedition. Further anonymous friends of his at Argos had also been implicated in a plan to attack the Argive demos (61.3), and so the Athenians decided to bring him to trial, sending the ship Salaminia for him and ‘the others’ (61.4) who had been informed against. This group around Alcibiades is kept firmly at the periphery of our vision: they are with him when his ship let slip the Salaminia (where they are ‘co-accused’, οἱ ξυνδιαβεβλημένοι, and ‘those around him’, τοὺς μετ’ αὐτοῦ, 6.61.6–7), and sentences of death are handed down upon them in absentia.

The affair of the Herms and the Mysteries is the most striking example of Thucydides’ non-naming: not one single person is named other than Alcibiades among the many in Athens working against him, those accused with him in Sicily, those who had escaped from Athens, the imprisoned (one of those in custody was of course Andocides), those who finally confessed, and those executed. Thucydides cannot have been contemptuous of all those implicated (some are described as ‘the best citizens’), and perhaps in certain cases his non-naming is a kindness to avoid tarnishing reputations further. But the overriding narrative principle seems to be that no one was allowed to dilute the focus of this most traumatic of Athenian religious crises away from Alcibiades. And for the readers of Thucydides’ ver-

8. Pelling 2000, 255–6 n. 4 notes that Thucydides non-naming of Andocides may be from contempt, the narrative sympathy being with the accused.
sion there could be no one else to blame or remember. It is a white-washing of the events and personalities, and considering the effort Thucydides expends on correcting his predecessors and Athenian collective memory over the tyrannicides affair, he does little here to set down a record that future generations would have found useful or impartial. For the Athenians who lived through the period, and for the succeeding generations, the facts were knowable: we have the benefit of a contemporary literary source in Andocides’ *On the Mysteries*; how much more written and oral information must have been available at the time? The historian’s desire to seek out and sift through the facts of his chosen subject is dealt a serious blow in this narrative, and one wonders why this non-naming was worth such sacrifice. Alcibiades at all costs was to bear the brunt of suspicion and guilt before he flees to Sparta and causes so much harm to the Athenians. Anonymity and individual focus are here employed as brutal weapons against a figure for whom Thucydides cannot conceal his anger and contempt.

*Continued Athenian operations in Sicily*

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοί ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ, δύο μέρη ποιήσαντες τοῦ στρατεύματος καὶ λαχὼν ἑκάτερος. (6.62)

The Athenian generals left in Sicily now divided the armament into two parts, and each taking one by lot, sailed with the whole.

And so, from three generals to two (cf. 6.42). Why not tell us which general took each section of the force?\(^9\) I suggest that Thucydides is

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9. Hornblower, *CT* III 461 suggests that the suppression of Lamachos’ name for the second half of book six has the effect of heightening the shock of his death; it certainly does, but I think the principal reason is to get him out of our line of sight towards Nikias.
not allowing Lamachos to share the stage with Nikias, a fact particularly noticeable now that only two generals have command. Thucydides has to go to considerable effort to achieve the erasing of Lamachos from the script: it is the ‘Athenian generals’ (οἱ στρατηγοὶ, twice at 6.64.1) who devise a plan to draw out the Syracuseans to Catana.

They sent to Syracuse a man devoted to them, and by the Syracusan generals thought to be no less in their interest; he was a native of Catana, and said he came from persons in that place, whose names the Syracusan generals were acquainted with, and whom they knew to be among the members of their party still left in the city.

The Syracusan generals believed the man, who is unnamed, despite his evident importance to the story and his familiarity with senior figures on both sides of the war. It is ironic (so CT III 467) that the ruse revolves around the deployment of personal names which are not offered to the reader. These shadowy fifth-column elements, as later with Nikias’ informants inside Syracuse, remain just that, shadows.

Outside Syracuse, the Athenians prepare for battle, and one general steps forward to address the troops, Nikias (6.67.3), after which ‘Nikias at once led on the army’ (6.69.1). The reader could be forgiven for assuming he is now in sole command; the actions or even presence of Lamachos are studiously avoided.

Following an initial Athenian victory, the Syracuseans hold an assembly and Hermocrates is again introduced with his patronymic before his speech (6.72.1). Presumably there were further speakers who are suppressed in order to emphasise the main characters in the drama, continuing the focus on two opponents, Hermocrates and Ni-
kias. Although the assembly vote Hermocrates to command alongside Heraclides son of Lysimachos and Sicanus son of Excecestes (6.73), only Hermocrates is named again when the board are mentioned: at 6.96.3 they are reduced to οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἑρμοκράτη στρατηγοί, and at 6.99.2 we hear that the Syracusans were 'guided by their generals, and above all by Hermocrates'.\(^\text{10}\) (No doubt the triad of generals was a historical reality, but it also sets up a neat parallel with the original three Athenian commanders.)

An Athenian contingent sail for Messana in the hope that it would be betrayed to them, but their plans are scuppered by the intrigues of Alcibiades, who – as we might expect – stands out in this passage of many unnamed players:

\[\text{καὶ ἃ μὲν ἐπράσσετο οὐκ ἐγένετο: Ἀλκιβιάδης γὰρ ὅτ᾽ ἀπῄει ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἤδη μετάπεμπτος, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι φεύξοιτο, μηνύει τοῖς τῶν Συρακοσίων φίλοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ ἡμείδὼς τὸ μέλλον: οἱ δὲ τούς τε ἄνδρας διέφθειραν πρότερον. (6.74)\]

The intrigue, however, came to nothing, for Alcibiades, who had known the secret when he left his command upon the summons from home, foreseeing that he would be outlawed, gave information about the plot to the friends of the Syracusans in Messana, who had at once put to death its authors.

On learning that the Athenians are sending envoys to Camarina, the Syracusans do likewise:

\[\text{ἀφικομένων οὖν ἐκ μὲν Συρακουσῶν Ἑρμοκράτους καὶ ἄλλων ἐς τὴν Καμάριναν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων Εὐφήμου μεθ᾽ ἑτέρων, ὁ Ἑρμοκράτης ξυλλόγου γενομένου τῶν Καμαριναίων βουλό-μενος προδιαβάλλειν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔλεγε τοιάδε. (6.75.4)\]

\(^{10}\) Heraclides is not mentioned by name again (Heraclides at 6.103 should be a homonymous general, see CT III, ad loc.); Sicanus is likely a general later in the war, and is named at 7.46, 7.50, 7.70.
Hermocrates, with some others, accordingly arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians; and an assembly of the Camarinaeans having been convened, Hermocrates spoke as follows, in the hope of prejudicing them against the Athenians.

As with the Redetrias and other paired speeches, it is naturally convenient to concentrate on two speakers, but note here that both Hermocrates and Euphemos are accompanied by ‘others’, the sorts of extras we meet throughout the narrative huddled around named figures. One wonders why they are mentioned at all: would it seem too implausible if they were removed completely and the protagonist left alone to enter foreign cities or flee across the seas? Their presence may lend credulity to the proceedings without their being named diverting our view away from the leading men.

We meet Alcibiades again at Sparta, with his still-unnamed fellow fugitives (Ἀλκιβιάδης μετὰ τῶν ξυμφυγάδων, 6.88.9), giving a speech that alludes to his unidentified enemies over the Pylos episode and those who plotted his banishment (Androcles was thought particularly guilty of the later charge, see CT III 513). He mentions the ‘remaining generals’ (ὑπόλοιποι στρατηγοί, 6.91.1) without distinguishing them, after which the Spartans give command of the Syracusans to Gylippos son of Cleandridas (6.93.2), Thucydides appropriately giving the full name of this man who will become the focus of opposition to Nikias and the Athenians for the rest of the Sicilian expedition.

One of the more curious incidents of Thucydidean naming tactics occurs as the Syracusans prepare to control Epipolai, selecting a force of six hundred hoplites under the command of one Diomilos, an exile from Andros (ὧν ἦρχε Διόμιλος φυγὰς ἐξ Ἀνδροῦ, 6.96.3). We might anticipate the introduction of such a figure with name and brief biographical material to signify his critical role in the forthcoming narrative, but the Syracusans are defeated and Diomilos is killed
along with three hundred others just a few sentences later (6.97.4). Why would he be brought on and immediately dispatched, without any prior mention, and with no known part to play in the story other than to fail at first recorded command? His role may simply have been known to Thucydides, and he adds the information out of a desire to record, adding credulity by knowing the names of minor characters; perhaps he can also be named since that does not interfere with the focus on any major individual in the surrounding narrative. Notice, however, as with Lamachos below, his naming gives a sense that he dies ‘alone’ while simultaneously being surrounded by a large group of fallen compatriots; their addition around a named figure is poignant.

In a surprise attack, the Athenians take the Syracusan counter-wall with three hundred hand-picked men running to the wall and the rest of the army advancing in two divisions:

\[\text{ἡ μὲν μετὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, εἰ ἐπιβοη-θοῖεν, ἔχωρουν, ἡ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ σταύρωμα τὸ παρὰ τὴν πυλίδα. (6.100.1)}\]

... one with _one of the generals_ to the city in case of a sortie, the other _with the other general_ to the stockade by the postern gate.

Why not name them? We know who they are, and Thucydides must have been aware of which general led each division. We are again not allowed a glimpse of Lamachos until his last fatal entry; the tension therefore mounts until he is finally named in his death scene in the following chapter:

\[\text{ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Λάμαχος παρεβοήθει ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐωνύμου τοῦ ἑαυτῶν μετὰ τοξοτῶν τε οὐ πολλῶν καὶ τοὺς Ἀργείους παραλαβὼν, καὶ ἔπιδιαβᾶς τάφρον τινὰ καὶ μονωθεὶς μετ’ ὀλίγων τῶν ἐξυνδιαβάντων ἀποθνῄσκει αὐτὸς τε καὶ πέντε ἢ ἕξ τῶν μετ’ αὐτοῦ. (6.101.6)}\]

Seeing this [one tribe in panic], Lamachos came to their aid from the Athenian left with a few archers and with the Argives, and
crossing a ditch, was left alone with a few that had crossed with him, and was killed with five or six of his men.

And now two generals become one. Not only does Lamachos – like Demosthenes – fail to receive any obituary, the narrative briskly moves on without further comment. It is interesting here that Lamachos’ death, although among other Athenians (see above for Diomilos), is described in terms of being ‘alone’, something that may resonate here with the increased intensity of the theme of Nikias’ growing isolation, partly due to his sickness, kept back until now: he successfully defends the Circle, having been left there through illness (ἔτυχε γὰρ ἐν σύντομω δι’ ἀσθένειαν ὑπολειμμένος, 6.102.2). The Athenians set up a trophy and retrieve the body of Lamachos (6.103.1), the prohibition on whose name is now lifted post mortem.

The Syracusans come close to proposing terms of surrender to Nikias, ‘who after the death of Lamachos was left sole commander’ (οὗτος γὰρ δὴ μόνος εἶχε Λαμάχου τεθνεῶτος τὴν ἀρχήν, 6.103.3). The ‘alone’ motif continues, and can perhaps also be detected a few chapters later: ‘while Nikias did not lead on the Athenians but lay still by his own wall’ (καὶ ὁ Νικίας οὐκ ἐπῆγε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ’ ἦσύχαζε πρὸς τῷ ἑαυτῶν τείχει, 7.3.3). (We will not be allowed to see the supporting commanders who lead such sorties until later in the narrative.)

The Syracusans had become suspicious of their generals, who were deposed and another three elected in their stead: Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias (6.103.4). As we have seen, only Hermocrates was named when the first triad subsequently appeared after their initial introduction. Now the new board is given without patronymics, possibly a less formal presentation to diminish their role and high-

11. Hornblower 2011, 82: ‘the death of Lamachos comes as a shock… Its stark specificity is I suggest highlighted by the indeterminacy which follows, “five or six others were killed with him”’.

light the relative importance of Hermocrates, or it may simply be due to incompleteness in the historian’s notes (so _CT_ III 533).

From this point onwards, Nikias is named a great deal in the narrative, as is his newly arrived opponent, Gylippos; their frequent identifications give a sense of a two-person game as we look into their thoughts and actions.

Nikias decides to write a letter to the Athenians to set down what has happened and what is needed in Sicily. It is sent by unnamed emissaries (7.8.3) who, as well as delivering the letter, engage in exchanging messages and answering questions. We would like to know what else was in this package of news and where these proceedings took place, but Thucydides shrouds the democratic machinery. Nikias mentions ‘your generals’ (7.15.1) but does not single out Lamachos, the news of whose death may well have been dealt with in earlier correspondence, but narratologically it continues his suppression (see _CT_ III 560, 567). Only Gylippos is named (twice, at 11.2 and 12.1), continuing the focus on the two opposing generals. The Athenians refuse to accept Nikias’ resignation, vote him two colleagues as generals, and for the time being they promote Menander and Euthydemos, two officers already in the field, to fill their places so that Nikias ‘might not be left alone in his sickness to bear the whole weight of affairs’ (ὅπως μή μόνος ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ ταλαιπωροίη, 7.16.1). In contrast to these ‘promoted’ generals in Sicily, the two annual _strategoi_ appointed to join Nikias are listed with patronymics, signifying their more prominent roles: Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes, and Erymedon son of Thucles.

Thucydides’ naming strategy for Demosthenes and Erymedon differs from that used for the original board of three generals in that they are frequently named together as performing actions on their way to Sicily (cf. 7.33.3; 35.1). Until their arrival, and with Nikias ill, the movements of the two armies are habitually described by the opposition ‘Gylippos’ versus ‘the Athenians’ (e.g., 37.2), maintaining the suppression of the interim commanders (and indeed any other
NAMING STRATEGIES IN THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION

Athenian officers). When the generals are finally brought together, we are given the thoughts of Demosthenes only, that he felt Nikias had not followed up on his initial success. When in his turn Demosthenes fails, Nikias will again be allowed a voice, a damning authoritative comment against Demosthenes’ tactics and assessment of Nikias.\(^{12}\)

The ensuing battle narrative continues the themes of Nikias’ illness and isolation:

> αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ πρώτου ὑπνοῦ καὶ Εὐρυμέδων καὶ Μένανδρος ἀναλαβὼν τὴν πᾶσαν στρατιὰν ἔχωρει πρὸς τὰς Επιπολάς, Νικίας δὲ ἐν τοῖς τείχεσιν ύπελέλειπτο. (7.43.1–2)

[Demosthenes] after the first watch set out with Eurymedon and Menander and the whole army for Epipolai, Nikias being left behind in the lines.

Following the disaster at Epipolai ‘the Athenian generals consulted’ (7.47.1), but only Demosthenes and Nikias are allowed to voice their opinions. Eurymedon simply ‘agreed’ (49.3) with Demosthenes, but his time was up, and in the following naval battle he is killed off in short order (7.52) and – as with Lamachos before him – the narrative glides on. Thucydides allows Nikias two speeches to rally his disheartened troops, the first rousing the trierarchs to action:

> ὁ δὲ Νικίας ὑπὸ τῶν παρόντων ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ ὁρῶν οἷος ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ ὡς ἐγγὺς ἤδη [ἦν] … αὖθις τῶν τριηράρχων ἐνα ἐκαστὸν ἀνεκάλει, πατρόθεν τε ἐπονομάζων καὶ αὐτοὺς ὀνομαστὶ καὶ φυλήν, ἀξιῶν τὸ τε καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν … ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Μένανδρος καὶ Εὐθύδημος (οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐπέβησαν). (7.69.2–4)

Meanwhile Nikias, appalled by the state of affairs, realizing the greatness and the nearness of the danger … again called on

\(^{12}\) Diod. 13.2.3 and Plut. \emph{Vit. Nic.} 21 mention a conference with Nikias, here passed over, see \emph{CT III} 621–2.
the captains one by one, addressing each by his father’s name 
and by his own, and by that of his tribe … while Demosthenes, 
Menander, and Euthydemus, who took the command on board, 
put out.

We earlier saw knowledge of personal names being used as part of a 
ruse; here Nikias employs them in a very positive and emotive way 
to exhort the trierarchs by name, patronymic and tribal affiliation (cf. 
70.8, where the generals on both sides call out to their captains by 
name). Menandros and Euthydemos are named here for the last time, 
their fates left uncommented upon.

As matters deteriorate for the Athenians, Nikias gives his second 
exhortation to the army at 7.76–7, while Demosthenes is allowed no 
corollary: he ‘did as much for his part of the army, addressing them 
in words very similar’ (καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης οὐδὲν ἦσσον τοῖς καθ’ 
ἔαυτὸν τοιαύτα τε καὶ παραπλήσια λέγων). Similar, but unrecord-
ed. The other commanders remain in the wings. The focus through-
out the Athenians’ disasters is resolutely on these two generals, the 
3-2-1 theme enjoying a resurgence with the second set of three re-
duced to two, and Nikias and Demosthenes are now often mentioned 
together (e.g., 7.78.2, 80.1, 80.4) until in retreat their divisions are 
separated, with Nikias ahead, and Demosthenes harassed by the Syr-
acusans to the rear, until both divisions are captured and led to their 
miserable fates in the stone quarries.

Νικίαν δὲ καὶ Δημοσθένη ἀκοντος τοῦ Γυλίππου ἀπέσφαξαν … 
ξυνέβαιεν δὲ τὸν μὲν πολεμιώτατον αὐτοῖς εἶναι, Δημοσθένη, 
διὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ Πύλω, τὸν δὲ διὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδείοτα-
τον: τοὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Νικί-
ας προυθυμήθη, σπουδᾶς πείσας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ποιήσασθαι, 
ὡστε ἀφεθῆναι … καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιαύτη ἢ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τούτων 
αἵτια ἐτεθνήκει, ἤκιστα δὴ ἄξιος ὡς τῶν γε ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ Ἑλλήνων 
ἐς τούτο δυστυχίας ἀφικέσθαι διὰ τὴν πάσαν ἐς ἀρετήν νεομι-
σμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν. (7.86.2–5)
... but Nikias and Demosthenes were butchered, against the will of Gylippus... One of them, as it happened, Demosthenes, was one of her greatest enemies, on account of the affair of the island and of Pylos; while the other, Nikias, was for the same reasons one of her greatest friends, owing to his exertions to procure the release of the prisoners... This or the like was the cause of the death of a man who, of all the Hellenes in my time, least deserved such a fate, seeing that the whole course of his life had been regulated with strict attention to virtue.

Demosthenes – like Lamachos and Eurymedon before him – falls from the stage without further comment, something of a surprise considering that he was a man Thucydides clearly admired in other parts of his work. But the focus remains on Nikias, with a moving obituary for the end of this man for whom Thucydides evidently felt great admiration and pity.

Conclusions

We have seen that the choice to name an individual in Thucydides’ narrative can be to highlight or suppress, it can focus attention on characters and bring them to centre stage or it can cloak them in deceit and lay the blame of many onto one. Groups can remain anonymous out of authorial contempt (Egestan envoys) or in order to bring a named individual into sharper focus (Alcibiades and those involved in the Mysteries and the Herms scandals). The omission of names in the text can also create a crescendo effect before the introduction of important figures, heralded with their patronymics for greater effect (e.g., the announcement of the initial three Athenian generals sent to Sicily). There is a natural tendency also to focus on two opposing characters, whether in debate or in the field of battle, which requires the suppression of other figures without necessarily any negative authorial intention. The use of names by the actors
themselves is instructive: both Nikias and Hermocrates studiously avoid naming their opponents in speeches in order to highlight their oratorical skills and maturity, and, in the case of Nikias, to contrast with the brash behaviour of Alcibiades, who is too quick to name his rival. Nikias also employs his knowledge of personal names to exhort his troops in battle, and in doing so highlights his own talents as a commander.

On a deeper narratological level, Thucydides uses names across wide expanses of the text to drive home certain overarching points. We have seen the symphonic way in which Nikias’ isolation is brought out as the Athenian generals are reduced from three to two to one, and again when the second set of generals arrive (albeit within the necessities of historical actuality). This is a masterpiece of dramatic writing, the technique sustained and emotionally effective, as we watch Nikias, pitifully ill, bearing the brunt of the disaster with fewer and fewer officers for support. The cost of such strategies to historical accuracy may well be high: the suppression of Lamachos could easily be misinterpreted as authorial contempt, for which there is little evidence. The absence of well-known Athenians from the Mysteries affair also poses uncomfortable questions of how far Thucydides is willing to distort the story in order to concentrate an attack.

I hope to have shown that one primary function of Thucydides’ naming and non-naming strategies in books six and seven aims to focus our attention on Nikias, not merely to underline his pivotal role in Sicily – that is obvious as the only general who served throughout the whole campaign – but to shape the narrative around him as much as historical reality would allow. The theme of the gradual isolation of Nikias is brought out by the moments he is named, by those who are or are not named alongside him, and by how his fellow generals fall out of the script one by one. We cannot also help noticing the emotional force that such devices lend to Nikias’ tragic role as a good man whose words and deeds were the best he could offer under
impossible circumstances. That these strategies so often operate in favour of Nikias is, I believe, a serious rebuttal against those – following Plutarch – who blame him for the disaster.\textsuperscript{13} Thucydides has his tragic hero, and he played his part.

\textit{References}


\textsuperscript{13} On appraisals of Nikias tainted by Plutarch, see Nikolaidis 1988, Piccirilli 1997, Marinatos 2021a; on rebutting claims that Thucydides is critical of Nikias for his reliance on divination, see now Marinatos 2021b.
Lichas: A Mini-Biography*

The Scenario

Almost 40 years ago there was one of those flurries of scholarship that seem to affect or afflict ancient Greek historical scholarship whenever a seemingly brand-new piece of authentically ancient evidence is added to the usually rather jejune mix of source-material thitherto extant and available for (re)assessing a personage or event considered to be of some considerable stature or significance. The flurry in question was occasioned by the publication – in a French journal of impeccably high academic credentials – of an inscribed archon-list, datable epigraphically to c. 360 BC, from the island-state of Thasos.

The joint authors of the publication were themselves scholars of the highest repute, with a long association and familiarity with the antiquities of that northern Aegean island. So, when they proposed that the archon listed as ‘Liches son of Arkesileos’ (as written in the Ionic alphabet) was none other than the Spartan Lichas son of Arkesila(o)s (to give him back his original Doric spelling) who featured very prominently in the second half of Thucydides’s magisterial History of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, many scholars took

* I am most grateful to the Editors for their kind invitation to contribute this essay, which expands considerably on the brief remarks in Cartledge & Debnar 2006.
notice. Some even accepted the identification. To which I felt moved to respond, negatively.¹

I advanced several reasons for my cautious negativity. One was the matter of date. The Thasian archon Liches would have held eponymous office in the early 390s, yet Thucydides’s Lichas was already a *geron* (‘old man’ and/or a member of the Spartan Gerousia – minimum age 60) in 420 BC (for the context, see below). Another reason was that the homonymy between the Spartan Lichas Arkesilaou and the (presumptively) Thasian Liches Arkesileos could be accounted for by the same sort of family connection that explains for instance the Spartan called Perikleidas who was father of Athenaios, or the appearance in both Sparta and Athens of an ‘Alcibiades’, without the need to postulate identity (see further below). A third reason was contextual. Why would Thasos want to appoint a Spartan to their top honorific office? Or rather this particular – very elderly – Spartan at this particular time, when the Spartans were throwing their imperial weight around in Asia Minor, and when Thasos was both democratically governed and very pro-Athenian?² Sadly – or not – we must take back from our Lichas this extra lease of life that had seemingly, tantalisingly, been bestowed upon him by our distinguished French colleagues.

Yet there are plenty of other reasons why one should still want to place our Lichas in some sort of limelight, even apart from the eternal fame guaranteed him by Thucydides. He was clearly from the Spartan top drawer, the socioeconomic and political elite. He indulged in a pastime that seems to have been much more than just a pastime for wealthy and powerful Spartiates – *hippotrophia*: the

¹. Pouilloux & Salviat 1983; with my rejoinder Cartledge 1984 (noticed by Marincola 2001, 63 n. 11). The publication came just in time to secure a mention in Poralla/Bradford 1985, 183 (addendum to Poralla 1913, 492). For the text, see now SEG 33-702 (J. Pouilloux, *Recherches ... Thasos* I no. 29 Col. II line 17).

breeding, rearing and training of racehorses for show, that is, for agonistic competition in many arenas, including the greatest, most glory-bringing arena of all. And, not least, as a politician-diplomat Lichas featured centrally in one of the most – depending on viewpoint – opportunistic or shameful diplomatic dealings in the entire Classical period of Hellenic history.

**Family/Birth/Name**

A Lichas had featured in a myth affecting a hero-god for whom the Spartans had a special reverence, Heracles. But not in a good way: for it was that Lichas who brought to Heracles the fatal gift of the poison-drenched ‘shirt of Nessos’ from his madly jealous wife Deianeira. So it was probably not in honour of that mythical Lichas that a Spartan father some time in or around the 570s BC bestowed that possibly rather ill-omened nomenclature on his son, the only other Spartan on record to have been so named apart from ‘our’ Lichas.

The mid-sixth century, historical Spartan Lichas (Poralla/Bradford 491) was featured in another kind of myth, a charter-myth recorded by none other than the father of history, Herodotus (1.67–8). For it was he who was credited with having the wit to solve an oracular riddle and thereby enabled to ‘recover’ the bones of ‘Orestes’ and bring them back from Arcadian Tegea for ceremonial re-burial in Sparta – the occasion and excuse for the historical Dorian Spartans to claim to be heirs to the political legacy of Achaean Orestes’ father Agamemnon, ‘king of men’ and, more to the point, great king of Homer’s Mycenae ‘rich in gold’ and brother-in-law of Helen of Sparta and Troy.³

Why was Lichas in Tegea in the first place, and what was he doing there? Herodotus tells us that it was in his official capacity as one

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of the members of the Spartan elite Board of Agathoergoi – literally ‘Good-Workers’. Having failed to defeat – and indeed to helotise – the Tegeans through battle and conquest, the Spartans had resorted instead to a diplomatic offensive, aiming to make of the Tegeans their subordinate allies and employing for the purpose the Agathoergoi. This Board of five was drawn annually from the select royal bodyguard of 300, from among those in their final year of a potentially ten-year term of service (from age 20 to 29). Membership of this elite force was by election, and it was deemed hugely honorific, which confirms what we would otherwise have guessed, namely that this Lichas was from one of Sparta’s top families, one of those whom Thucydides elsewhere (5.15.1) dubs ‘leading’. Almost certainly, therefore, this sixth-century Lichas – born not far short of a century before our Lichas – was some kind of paternal ancestor of his.

Our Lichas’s father too had been given one of those speaking Spartan names that immediately conjure up a wealth of social (indeed regal) and diplomatic associations: Arkesilaos, or ‘sufficient unto the laos/people’.

He would have been born probably towards the end of the sixth century, when Arkesilas IV was occupying what passed for a throne at Sparta’s ‘grand-daughter’ city of Cyrene in north Africa. We know that later, in the fifth century, the famous or notorious Lysander’s lesser brother Libys (‘the Libyan’) was so named because his noble ‘Heraclid’ father’s family enjoyed a xenia (ritualised guest-friendship) relationship with a leading Cyrenean

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family. So it’s possible that the father of the Spartan Arkesila(os) did likewise.\(^5\)

However, it was for one particular achievement that Arkesilaos achieved universal Hellenic fame: *hippotrophia*. He bred, raised and trained a stable of racing chariot-horses so successfully that he not only raced them on the grandest Hellenic stage of all, the quadrennial Olympic Games, but actually won the supreme, blue-riband equestrian contest there – the *tethrippos* or four-horse chariot-race – twice running, probably in the 440s. So great was his fame as a hippotroph indeed that Critias, the Athenian ultra-oligarch (leader of the so-called Thirty Tyrants, 404–3) and author of two works on the Spartan polity and way of life, singled him out for special mention. As – more predictably – did the second-century AD travel-writer Pausanias in the sixth book of his *Description of Greece* (6.2.1–2).

Arkesilaos, it must be added, was by no means alone among members of the Spartan elite in dedicating himself to this most expensive and most glory-bringing of all ancient Greek sports – far from it, as Stephen Hodkinson has masterfully demonstrated.\(^6\) Indeed, it is our Lichas’s exploits in precisely the same line that bring out the full, international political nuances of the practice, as we shall soon see. But it is worth pausing here to point out that the full meaning of his and his compatriots’ success on the spectacularly international stage can be even better appreciated when it is set against the record of those Spartans who chose – or for lack of means were compelled – to compete only locally, that is,

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5. Herman 1987, 20–1 actually takes our Lichas son of Arkesila(os) as his illustration of how names can cross from one city to another via *xenia*, but 21 n. 38 firmly rejects the Pouilloux/Salviat identification. Catling 2010 is devoted to an exploration of onomastic links between specifically Ephesians and Spartans, but his opening pages (195–8) have a much wider relevance. For Libys, see Cartledge 1987/2000, Index *s.v*. For Lysander, see the end of this article.

within the extended confines of the territory of the Spartan polis of Lakedaimon. Here the name to conjure with is that of Damonon in the late fifth century: so proud was he of his achievements both on the running track and in the hippodrome that he broke his native ‘laconic’ taboo on wordiness to have them inscribed at inordinate length on a marble stele topped by a relief depicting a four-horse racing chariot. This substantial monument he had erected as an offering to city patron goddess Athena Poliakhos within whose precinct atop the acropolis of Sparta it was unearthed at the start of the last century.7

Lichas: life and career

Apart from mentions in two second-century AD works – the Life of Cimon by Plutarch (as emended) and Pausanias’s Periegesis – the life and career of our Lichas are attested only by some eight passages in the second half of what remains of Thucydides’s History, and by two in Xenophon, one in his continuation of Thucydides, the other in a philosophical treatise. But what passages they are! Diplomatic dynamite in at least two of them! The Spartans had a long tradition of expertise or at least cunning in interstate relations, but, as with so many other aspects of Sparta’s polity and society, that expertise came bound up with some un-Hellenic peculiarities – of the sort that led their enemies to accuse them of precisely that, un-Hellenic behaviour, in contravention of all the normal agreed rules and protocol of inter-polis conduct. One such peculiarity was that, whereas it was the universal Hellenic rule for a foreign state to appoint its own diplomatic representative or representatives from among the citizens of another state, Sparta appointed a foreign state’s diplomatic representative(s) from among its own citizens. More precisely, it was one

7. See now Christesen 2019, whose readings supersede all previous.
of the several powerful prerogatives of the two Spartan co-kings to appoint a foreign state’s proxenoi.  

The formal title of the office betrays its origins in the purely private and personal relationship of xenia between elite members of two quite separate and possibly even foreign (non-Greek) states or communities that had existed from as early as ‘Homeric’ times. A xenos could be either just a foreigner, any foreigner whether Greek or non-Greek, or a very special foreigner, one with whom you or a direct ancestor had entered into a semi-formal relationship of ritualised guest-friendship (xenia). But again, according to Herodotus (9.11, 9.55), the Spartans were unique among all Greeks in not distinguishing between foreigners who were Greek and foreigners who were not: the latter normally were labelled barbaroi, but the Spartans called all non-Spartan foreigners xenoi, and indeed allegedly practised periodic xenelasiai, expulsions of xenoi.

The pro- in proxenoi (and proxenia) meant ‘substitute’: they were citizens who in an official capacity fulfilled the equivalent functions of mutual assistance of private xenoi but did so on behalf of the community as a whole. Unsurprisingly, the sort of Spartan citizens who were deemed by kings to be the most suitable to serve as proxenoi were those who already enjoyed personal and private xenia relationships; and what could be more useful than if a citizen were to be appointed a proxenos of the state with a citizen or citizens of which he already had relationship(s) of private xenia? That, in my view explains how and why Lichas came to be appointed – I assume by king Agis II (who came to the Eurypontid throne in 427/6) or by his father Archidamos II (r. –427/6) – proxenos of the Argives, unless of course he had inherited the proxenia from his father.

The much later (c. 100 AD) biographer Plutarch fleshes out this

9. Herman 1987 is an exemplary discussion of this vital institution.
10. On proxeny and its political uses, see also Gerolymatos 2019.
conjecture more than somewhat. In his *Life* of the Athenian Cimon, a contemporary of our Lichas, he learnedly quotes from what he calls an ‘elegy’ composed by the Athenian ultra-oligarch Critias, a relative of the great Plato and who from 404 to 403 presided over the vicious collective dictatorship later nicknamed the Thirty Tyrants. Critias was a huge fan of Sparta, one of the earliest of the Athenian pro-Spartan ‘lakonizers’ to commit their views to writing. In the passage quoted Critias is said to pray for ‘the wealth of the Scopadae [a leading Thessalian family], the generosity of Cimon, and the victories of Arcesilaus of Lacedaemon’ – those of Lichas’s father mentioned above. But Plutarch immediately seeks to enhance Cimon’s simply massive generosity by devaluing and diminishing that shown by Arkesilaos’s son Lichas, as follows: ‘And yet we know that Lichas the Spartiate became famous among the Hellenes for no other reason except that he entertained foreign visitors at the Gymnopaidiai’ – an annual religious festival, whereas Cimon threw open his home and estates to some or all of his fellow-citizens on a permanent basis. How did Plutarch know about Lichas’s – surely politically motivated – generosity? Because he had read about it in another work of Xenophon, his philosophical treatise *Memoirs of Socrates* (1.2.61).

Within the Peloponnese this Argive *proxenia* was undoubtedly the most sensitive diplomatic appointment of all for a Spartan king to make, since for centuries Sparta and Argos had been at loggerheads, and more than once (notably the ‘Battle of the Champions’, c. 545 BC) at daggers drawn. When Sparta and Athens agreed – for once – to put forward a united front of resistance to the grand Persian invasion of 480 BC, Argos had very conspicuously stayed neutral or, as Herodotus was not alone in seeing it, in effect ‘medized’, that is, taken the Persians’ side. However, it would be simplistic to speak of Lichas being the diplomatic representative at Sparta of all Argives alike and equally. Argos, like many Greek cities during the great Atheno-Peloponnesian War (cf. Thuc. 3.82.1), seesawed between adopting forms of oligarchy (pro-Spartan) and forms of de-
mocracy (pro-Athenian). So, when Thucydides relates, in his first mention of Lichas (5.22.2), that he and a certain otherwise unknown and unmentioned Ampelidas had failed some time before 422/1 in their diplomatic mission to persuade the Argives to renew the 30-year treaty that the two states had sworn in 451, we should infer that the anti-Spartan, pro-Athenian tendency were then in the ascendancy at Argos. It also would be not unreasonable to suppose that Lichas’s personal xenos or xenoi at Argos, if any, belonged to the pro-Spartan, oligarchically-minded minority.

Lichas next appears in – or rather breaks violently into – Thucydides’s narrative in the context of the Olympic Games of summer (August) 420 BC. As already noted, Lichas’s father had been a two-time Olumpionikes, or Olympic victor, in the tethrippos or four-horse chariot race. That was probably six or seven Olympiads back, when there was no ban on Spartans entering the Games in any event, athletic or equestrian. But by 420 the diplomatic situation had changed, drastically. Although the city that hosted the Games, Elis, was a longstanding ally of Sparta, indeed Sparta was Elis’s hege-mon (leader) within the Peloponnesian League alliance, in 420 the Peloponnesian War was technically suspended, and Elis was then so angry with Sparta (over a territorial border issue) that not only did it soon join an anti-Spartan military-political coalition (below) but it also exploited its position as Games host to exclude formally all Spartan competitors.11

No Spartan was more discountenanced, or outraged, by this disrespectful and dishonourable exclusion than our Lichas, who plotted

11. ‘Baedeker’ Pausanias, second-century AD travel writer, says that Lichas entered his chariot under the name of ‘Thebes’, but the name of the federal state was ‘the Boeotians’, of which Thebes was the preponderant city: Cartledge 2021. Hornblower 2000 is probably right to argue that the exclusion applied only to the Games of 420 BC, which makes it more likely that it was nearer 420 than 400 that Lichas ‘set up his (portrait?) statue (eikona) at Olympia’ (Paus. 6.2.3).
to see how he could evade the ban and make the greatest (un)diplo-
matic capital out of flouting it. Another of Sparta’s crucial allies in
420 was Boeotia in central Greece, a moderately oligarchic federal
state and the near-neighbour and perennial enemy of Athens. When
other allies of Sparta such as Elis (and even Corinth) defected, Thu-
cydides relates that the Boeotians did not, because the ruling oli-
garchs felt that the Spartans would favour them and their regime
precisely because they were oligarchs (Thuc. 5.31); they would have
known, that is, that the Spartans always tended to support oligarchic
governments abroad (Thuc. 1.19). It was probably no coincidence,
either, that Aristomenidas (or Aristomelidas), the actual or future fa-
ther-in-law of future Spartan king Agesilaos II (then aged about 25),
a half-brother of Agis II, was a or the proxenos of the Boeotians. So,
who more convenient for Lichas to cosy up to than the Boeotians?
Which he did by persuading them to allow him to enter his own per-
sonal four-horse chariot at the Olympics under the Boeotian flag, as
it were, as if it were the official ‘Boeotian’ state chariot.

All turned out just as Lichas had hoped. His chariot won – and
when the moment came for the victor’s olive-wreath to be bestowed
by the Eleian authorities, up he popped to claim ‘his’ rightful prize
by insolently crowning his own charioteer. Consternation predict-
ably reigned. But the Eleian judges were a match for the occasion
– and for Lichas. Using the power conferred upon them by the sacro-
sanctity of the religious festival, they ordered that Lichas be beaten
or even flogged. Thucydides says ‘beaten’, but Xenophon, one of
his continuators, says ‘whipped’ (Xen. Hell. 3.2.21). Ordinarily, in
secular Greek life, a free citizen’s body was inviolable, and so such
corporal punishment could be inflicted legally or lawfully only upon
a slave. Religious space and time were, however, different, and nor-
mal, everyday rules did not always apply. All the same, one can only
suppose that Lichas bore thereafter not just the physical scars from
the lashing or beating but the inner spiritual scars from his deep pub-
lic humiliation.
Xenophon, moreover, who is describing the full *casus belli* that the Spartans later mounted against Elis in 402, adds one further, intriguing detail to Thucydides’s account of the 420 Olympics *affaire*. In a participial apposition – and I take the force of the verb to be concessive – he writes that the Eleians flogged Lichas *andra geronta*, ‘even though he was (a) geron man’. That could mean ‘even though he was an old man’, a simple matter of Lichas’s years, but *aner* with a qualifier is far more likely to designate an adult male holding a particular status or title or office. And when the *aner* in question is a Spartiate, as here, and the author is one who as here had intimate personal knowledge of Sparta, having actually lived there for some time, Xenophon’s readership would surely rightly have taken *andra geronta* to mean a member of the Gerousia or Senate of Sparta. This peculiar political institution, or so I have argued, was a key cog in the city’s decision-making machine. Apart from the two kings, who were members *ex officio* and regardless of their age, the other 28 members had to be over 60, had to be elected (by shouting), and were elected for life. Patronage and especially royal patronage were therefore crucial for a successful candidature, and Lichas it seems to me ticked all the relevant boxes, as a client of the Eurypontid royal house.\(^\text{12}\)

Two years later, in the winter of 418/7, Lichas reappears: ‘There now arrived at Argos Lichas son of Arcesilaus, who was a representative [proxenos] of the Argives’ (Thuc. 5.76.3, trans. J. Mynott). Sparta had just recently defeated Argos, then part of an anti-Spartan coalition, at the major battle of Mantinea, and though Argos was still formally a democracy, the influence of the pro-Spartan oligarchs was now such that they were able to persuade a majority of Argive citizens to abandon their hostility to the Spartans and agree the terms of a new treaty with them – terms of which Lichas was the bearer.

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\(^{12}\) On election to the Gerousia, and on patronage at Sparta, see Cartledge 1987/2000, 121–5, 139–59.
There follows in Thucydides (5.77) the text of this treaty, in full. But Sparta wanted more from Argos, specifically renunciation of its existing alliance with Mantinea, Elis and Athens as a preliminary to making a full formal treaty of alliance with Sparta. This too Lichas (by implication) achieved, and again Thucydides quite exceptionally sets out the text of this alliance treaty in full (5.79).

One not inconsiderable detail provided rather *sotto voce* is that none other than Alcibiades was in Argos at the same time as Lichas, unsuccessfully arguing the case against doing as the Argives were in fact persuaded to do. I mention this because it has a bearing on the question of Thucydides’s sources. Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides never mentions an individual source by name, so it is strictly inferential guesswork to claim a particular individual as his source for anything. But the case for Alcibiades having been one of them, especially for material in what we call Book 8, seems overwhelmingly convincing.\(^\text{13}\) Along the same lines it has been quite plausibly argued that another of his sources was our Lichas. To quote not just one but two treaty texts in Book 5, and to quote no fewer than three in Book 8 (below), in both cases treaties with which Lichas was intimately involved, seems too much of a coincidence.\(^\text{14}\)

Lichas pitches up next in Thucydides Book 8 (39.2, 43.3–4, 52, 84.5, 87.1) some half-dozen years later, not in the Peloponnese this time but in the resumed War’s main Aegean theatre. Athens, after its largely self-inflicted Sicilian disaster (415–413), was on the back foot, but, if Sparta were actually to defeat the Athenians decisively and definitively, they would have to do so at sea; and to build a navy capable of achieving that result required the sort of ready cash only the Persians could consistently supply. Hence the Spartans’ very risky diplomatic turn to Persia, and hence the first two draft treaties – again set out in full by Thucydides (8.18 and

\(^{13}\) Brunt 1952.  
\(^{14}\) Lane Fox 2010.
37) – that had been agreed in principle with the relevant Persian parties. Until, that is, Lichas came on the scene. In what would surely have been a full-blown speech in oratio recta, had Book 8 of Thucydides contained any such, Lichas summarily denounced the existing drafts as giving the Persians way too much power and control, amounting even to enforced slavery for Greece, and peremptorily told ‘them’ – the negotiating Spartans and Persians – ‘to make a new and better treaty’ (8.43.3–4, cf. 52). As was indeed done – and at 8.58 Thucydides yet again provides a full text, including for the first time a proper diplomatic preamble ‘In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius… etc etc’.

As a direct consequence of swearing this treaty Sparta – to cut a longer story laconically short – from 411 on received the necessary Persian funds, thanks to which in 404 they did indeed defeat Athens after a final, decisive victory at sea (at Aegospotamoi in the Hellespont). Lichas is namechecked just twice more by Thucydides. On the first occasion, he is shown to be angry with Athens’s revolted allies of Miletus for not accepting that under the terms of the Spartano-Persian accords they were bound to show to the Persian Great King and his functionaries ‘a degree of necessary servitude’ (8.84.5) – that sounds like ipsissima verba to me, as relayed directly perhaps from Lichas to Thucydides. The last and final mention has him accompanying in 411 the chief Persian functionary of all, Tissaphernes satrap (provincial viceroy) of Lydia, on a deeply mysterious mission bound for Aspendos on the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia (8.87.1).

There Thucydides leaves him (and his account of the War itself breaks off in mid-sentence just over a score of chapters later); and, as Lichas was not mentioned in Xenophon’s history of the final seven years of the War or in any other of the continuations of Thucydides, so far as we know, the most plausible inference is that he, being already at least 60 in 420, simply died – unless we are to

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15. On Persians in Thucydides, see the excellent essay Munson 2012.
believe in a Thasian resurrection, as I myself cannot. Plutarch, a
good judge, wrote several Spartan Lives, but for the second half of
the fifth century his choice fell on the no doubt even more effectual,
and certainly even less scrupled, Lysander, victor of Aegospotami,
not on Lichas.\footnote{Lysander (Poralla/Bradford 1913/1985, 504) has had his biographical
due, perhaps more than his due, in modern scholarship, e.g., Rahe 1977; Bommelaer 1981; and Cartledge 1987/2000, Index s.v.}
It was an understandable but also a regrettable choice.\footnote{Brasidas (Poralla/Bradford 1913/1985, 177), another fifth-century
contemporary – and seemingly also untypical – Spartan did not attract a Life
from Plutarch, but has attracted Jon Edward Martin: Shades of Artemis: A novel of ancient Greece and the Spartan Brasidas (Baltimore, 2004). However,
the fictional Spartan ‘Lichas’ in ancient historian V. D. Hanson’s 2011 novel,
The End of Sparta, has nothing to do with our Lichas beyond his (possibly borrowed) name.}

References

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Aeschylus pointedly describes the barter of bodies that occurs in war:

Ares who barters bodies like gold
And who holds the balance on a battle of the spear
Sends from Ilium
To friends the heavy, burnt,
Sorely lamented dust
Of ashes instead of men,
Loading it into easily stored urns.

Why should the living make an accounting of those expended in war,
And feel pain for their malignant misfortune?

War as a locus of the cold expenditure of bodies is a topos that continues in later Greek literature and in Thucydides, but the historian
presents an arguably more rationalized version of how the exchange works for the state. He also gives a novel presentation of the body divorced from its conventional spirit, psychê. And he introduces significant athletic metaphors for the ideal attitude of the warrior and the citizen.

Thucydidean sôma is a broad term that occurs 37 times and semantically includes notions of corpse, life, body, private welfare and wealth, and personal selfhood as it related to the polis or oikos.¹ This wide semantic field thus offers productive connections not previously studied together, between the body and its relation to reciprocity, between self-interest and civic duty, and between Periclean and later forms of sômata.² In its most fundamental sense, sôma is literally the human body or human life that can stand as symbolic of many values, often a bare resource for an ‘economic’ quid pro quo in war to be ‘expended’ like other supplies on behalf of the state (cf. analiskein used as ‘kill’ in Thuc. 2.41.2; cf. also in Soph. OT 1174 and Aesch. Sept. 815, Ag. 570). The private body at times represented the greatest self-sacrifice for military victory (1.70.6; 1.85.1; 2.42.4) or the self-sustaining, highly motivated farmer-warrior of the Peloponnese (1.21.3; 1.141.5).

The present study reviews Thucydides’ uses of sôma and psychê in ways strikingly different from his contemporaries, and the use of sôma terms in the Epitaphios, notably the imagery of the athletic body for the character of the Athenian citizen. After a brief review of the use of the term in select contemporary or earlier authors, it examines sôma in Periclean rhetoric, in the narrative of the Plague, and in the characterizations of Nicias and Alcibiades.

To put Thucydidean usage in context, sôma is found only five

¹. This study has benefitted from both Bétant 1969 and online searches of the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae to establish word counts and meanings in various contexts.
². See van Wees 1998 generally on reciprocity.
times in the *Iliad* and three times in the *Odyssey*, all in reference to corpses. We note especially *Iliad* 23.169 regarding the corpses of twelve Trojan youths sacrificed on the pyre of Patroclus. The origins of athletic festivals from funeral games honoring or in compensation for the deaths of fallen heroes is widely recognized.\(^3\) There is, we will see, a kind of ‘somatic calculation’ based on funeral games which is a model for the agonistic imagery in the Epitaphios in Thucydides. *Sôma* appears five times in Pindar’s victory odes, as in Homer mostly referring to dead bodies in myth and legend (*Ol*. 9.34, *Nem*. 3.47, *Nem*. 9.23). One exception refers to the ‘bodies’ of the four living opponents defeated in wrestling by the victor, though the term may imply their virtual death in shameful defeat emphasized in the ode (*Pyth*. 8.82, 444 BCE). *Sôma* occurs three times in Hellanicus (*c*. 480–395 BCE), all in one fragment where it denotes the ‘people’ of Troy (or their ‘lives’) which Aeneas tried to save during the final sack, in effect rescuing them from becoming corpses.\(^4\) *Sôma* is found 44 times in Herodotus, which is about the same ratio of frequency as in Thucydides, but Herodotean reference is virtually always to the literal physical corpus, living or dead. Another sharp narrative difference between Thucydides and Herodotus and Homer is, as Bosworth has noted, that Thucydides did not ‘dwell on the details or commemorate heroic deaths’, as those earlier authors regularly did, since ‘war and death were a collective experience and it was the fate of the collective rather than the individual that Thucydides considered important’.\(^5\) The notable exception to this is the description of the heroic death of Brasidas that fits the Homeric paradigm and is used to contrast the Spartan general with the unheroic Cleon.\(^6\) Xenophon later carries on the Homeric-Herodotean

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praise of individual warriors. The term sôma in Xenophon’s Hellenica most often refers to the fitness of soldiers, but interestingly Xenophon sometimes pairs sôma with psychological elements like gnômê, megalopsychta, and hédonê.

Sôma and Psychê

To better contextualize Thucydidean sôma, we compare his uses of the term psychê to those of Herodotus and Pindar. This term is often taken as a counterpoint or complement to sôma, though the meanings of the two often overlap, and both are used more flexibly until they become more technical in later philosophical writing. The two words often denote the ‘life’ or ‘life-giving spirit’ of individuals in usage from Homer on. Herodotus’ twenty uses of psychê can be divided mainly into the meaning ‘life’ (spared, taken or lost) and that of ‘spirit’, ‘courage’, or ‘heart’. Thucydides in contrast uses psychê only three times, twice meaning ‘life’ and once ‘courage’. The two

7. E.g., the detailed description of the battlefield deaths of Cyrus the Younger at Cunaxa (Xen. An. 1.8.24–29; see Bassett 1999, 473–4), of Thrasyboulus in the Piraeus (Hell. 2.4.18–19) and of Epaminondas at Mantinea (Hell. 7.5.18–25).

8. Hell. 3.4.20: sômata linked with gnômai; to prepare their bodies for the conflict; Agesilaus leading men vs. Tissaphernes; Hell. 6.1.9: Thessalians have good bodies and high spirits; Hell. 6.1.16: Jason has control over hêdonai peri sôma.


instances meaning ‘life’ are located in the more dramatic, ‘Herodotean’ stories of individuals threatened with death, one being an indirect quote of Themistocles that uses both sôma and psychê synonymously (Thuc. 1.137.1), the other an expression of Phrynichus fearing for his safety. The one Thucydidean instance of psychê meaning ‘courage’ occurs in the Epitaphios just preceding the mention of the self-sufficient sôma of the Athenians (2.40.3):

κράτιστοι δ᾽ ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν δικαίως κριθεῖν οἱ τά τε δεινὰ καὶ ήδέα σαφέστατα γιγνώσκοντες καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μὴ ἀποτρεπό-μενοι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων.

Rightly would they be judged strongest in courage who recognize both dangers and pleasures with utmost clarity and are on neither count deterred from risks. (trans. Lattimore)

The Athenians, then, in the idealized view of Thucydidies’ Pericles, combine strength of spirit with individual self-sufficiency, psychê and sôma resonating with traditional martial courage and progressive democratic independence.

Herodotus, however, uses the term psychê much more frequently than does Thucydides, and the Herodotean patterns of use are significant in two ways in their contrast to Thucydides’ practice. First, Herodotus favours the more traditional, Homeric use of psychê for the life of a person over Thucydidies’ preference for sôma, a tendency which is consistent with Thucydides’ aversion to reporting ‘heroic’ or individual deaths at any length. Secondly, it is remarkable that Thucydides does not use psychê meaning ‘courage’ or ‘spirit’ more frequently, at least in speeches, since the term is commonly used by Herodotus and later historians to describe the emotional disposition of combatants. Herodotus uses it in that sense pointedly in

11 Lendon 1999, 290–5 illustrates the importance of psychê as a military factor in the narratives of Xenophon and Polybius, encompassing a range of feelings in soldiers from tharsos, ‘confidence’ to phobos, ‘fear’.
three passages to characterize masculine courage (5.124.1; 7.153.2) or hybristic aggression (7.16.2). The one time that Thucydides does evoke strength in psychê is, as noted above, of the Athenians in the Epitaphios just before mention of the complementary, self-sufficient sôma (‘personal self’) of the citizens. Here alone the historian (or Pericles himself) evokes the sense of psychê found in Herodotus, a use also evidenced earlier in Pindar’s odes where psychê denotes courage in battle or in athletic contests (Pyth. 1.48, 470 BCE; Nem. 9.39, 474 BCE; Isthm. 4.53, 474/3 BCE; respectively for Hieron and Chromius in chariot victories, and Melissus in pankration). The Pindaric phrase describing warriors as ‘able in hand and heart’ (χερσὶ καὶ ψυχᾷ δυνατοί, Nem. 9.39) to turn away the enemy distinguishes martial abilities in body and spirit. The one describing an athlete as ‘short in form but unbending in spirit’ (μορφὰν βραχύς, ψυχὰν δ᾽ ἄκαμπτος, Isthm. 4.53) also distinguishes body and spirit. Both of these latter Pindaric uses notably parallel Pericles’ description of the Athenians as ‘strongest in spirit’ (κράτιστοι δ᾽ ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν, 2.40.3). Thucydides’ Pericles thus echoes the terms for courageous spirit associated with both athletic and military contests.

This brief survey regarding sôma and its frequent complement, psychê, finds first that Homer uses simpler life-and-death meanings of sôma, yet invests death with the honour or disgrace of the heroic individual. Thucydides eschews these traditional heroic valuations and instead amplifies two aspects of sômata. He emphasizes a kind of ‘somatic calculus’, a collective accounting of deaths in narratives of death in major battles, and he highlights the warriors’ crucial contributions, or lack of them, to social well-being in ways that resemble the contributions of athletic competitors. Secondly, Thucydides is

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12. Pindar uses psychê 17 times in all the odes, some meaning simply life (e.g., Ol. 8.39, Pyth. 3.101, 4.159, 11.21, Nem. 1.47, 8.44, Isthm. 1.68), but some reflecting the self as seat of emotions, not always in battle (Ol. 2.70.3, Pyth. 1.48, 3.41, 3.61, 4.122).
highly sparing in his use of *psychê*, and then only from the overt perspectives, or ‘focalization’, of historical agents rather than from direct authorial comment. The historian employs many other specific and nuanced terms for fear and courage without subscribing to the traditional general term *psychê* for the seat of emotional expression.

Thucydides originated a more sophisticated use of the term *sôma* in historiography, notably in its relation to the mind, reason and emotions. He also focused significantly not on the individual lives lost and the drama of the battle, but rather the collective losses with no or few names mentioned in the deaths of many, like those at Sphacteria, Mycalessus, and the harbour at Syracuse. For instance, the historian narrates the political tensions at Syracuse in discussions leading to Nicias’ execution, but he omits any mention of his possible suicide to avoid dishonour, as is noted by Plutarch. Thucydides says simply that ‘the Syracusans executed him’.¹³ Even more striking is the omission of any account of the death of Pericles, a death scene which Plutarch narrates in a vivid passage reminiscent of the death of Socrates.¹⁴ Thucydides’ strict exclusion of the traditional narratives of the deaths of individuals seems, as we will see, to be in line with the views of his Pericles in the Epitaphios, and notably at odds with the high self-valuation of Alcibiades.

We turn now to the programmatic importance of *sôma* in Pericles’ Epitaphios, the Plague narrative, and references to Nicias and Alcibiades at the beginning of Book 6 and to Alcibiades in Book 8. The metaphoric use conveys a more generic sense of how the *sôma*, both as body and individual person, should and should not be presented in service of the collective good.

¹³. Thuc. 7.86.2–5; Plut. *Vit. Nic.* 28.4. Plutarch cites the often unreliable and melodramatic Timaeus as source of the suicide story and notes that the historian Philistus (c. 430–356) agreed with Thucydides.

¹⁴. Plut. *Vit. Per.* 38, reminiscent of scenes in Plato’s *Phaedo*. Thucydides, in his ‘obituary’ for Pericles, more typically focuses on the general achievements and consequences of that leader’s policies (Thuc. 2.65).
The Periclean Body: Self-sufficiency and Reciprocity

Pericles’ Epitaphios sets up an ideal image of the Athenian body/person with his famous declaration:

Ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδευ-σιν εἰναι καὶ καθ’ ἐκαστον δοκεῖν ἀν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ’ Ἦμων ἐπί πλείστ’ ἀν εἰδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστ’ ἀν εὐτρα-πέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐτάρκες παρέχεσθαι. (2.41.1)

In sum, I say that the whole city is an education for Hellas, and that individually the same man among us would seem to me to present his sôma as self-sufficient flexibly, in the most diverse types of activities and with exceptional favour.

The assertion of self-sufficiency is clearly intertextual with Herodotus’ account of Solon’s advice to Croesus:

τὰ πάντα μὲν νῦν ταῦτα συλλαβεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἐόντα ἀδύνατον ἐστί, ὡσπερ χωρῇ οὐδεμία καταρκέει πάντα ἑωυτῇ παρέχουσα, ἄλλα ἄλλο μὲν ἔχει ἕτερον δὲ ἑπιδέεται: ἢ δὲ ἀν τὰ πλείστα ἔχει, αὐτὴ ἀρίστη. ὡς δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπον σῶμα ἐν οὐδὲν αὐτάρκες ἐστί: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει, ἄλλου δὲ ἐνδεές ἐστι. (Hdt. 1.32.8)

Of course it is impossible for one who is human to have all good things together, just as there is no country that is sufficient of itself to provide all good things for itself; but it has one thing and not another, and the country that has the most is best. So no single sôma of a human is self-sufficient; it has one thing and lacks another.

The claim of a self-sufficient Athenian sôma is, in my view, likely to be authentically Periclean, alongside other unique images in the speech. The corresponding section in Herodotus may convey a view popularly associated with Solon, not invented by Herodotus, but probably known to Pericles and Thucydides.15

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15. Raaflaub 2004, 184–9 and 339 n. 97 suggests that Herodotus’ pas-
It is at least clear that Thucydides felt that the *sôma autarkes* expression faithfully reflected a Periclean ideal of self-sufficiency and that it overtly challenges the dictum of Herodotus’ Solon. We note two points to contextualize Pericles’ expression. First, it is the personal freedom of Athenian democracy under Pericles which allows individuals to go beyond the Solonian paradigm. Second and more immediately, Pericles is contrasting Athenian culture with the more regimented social scene at Sparta (especially in 2.39). We note finally that the Thucydidean Pericles’ use of the verb ‘to present one’s *sôma* as self-sufficient’ differs significantly from the Herodotean Solon’s simple ‘no *sôma* of a human is self-sufficient’, in short, a case of self-representation in Thucydides, where Athenians’ active agency is crucial, instead of the essentialist human dictum in Herodotus (albeit voiced by an Athenian).

Two more instances of *sômata* in the Epitaphios amplify the Periclean image of the Athenian person/body. First in 2.42.4:

> τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν τοῦ λόγου ἔφυγον, τὸ δ᾽ ἔργον τῷ σώματι ὑπέμειναν καὶ δι᾽ ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχη ἅμα ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν. (2.42.4)

… [those who died in battle] fled disgrace in word and stood up to the deed with their body/life (*sôma*) and through the fortune of the briefest instant, at the height of their glory (*doxa*) rather than their fear, they departed. (trans. Rusten, adapted)

Personal *sôma*, then, was the means to achieve collective fame. The body specifically resisted giving way to fear. Emotion is a force within the body that an individual can choose to resist or yield to;

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*sage* (1.32) in which Solon denies the self-sufficient state or individual ‘most likely refutes Pericles’ extravagant claim [at 2.36.3 re: the most self-sufficient polis]... just as Thucydides seems to refer to Herodotus [in Thuc. 2.41.1 re: the self-sufficient individual]’. See Moles 1996. Bosworth 2000, 16 calls the speech ‘a potent distillation of the speech Pericles actually delivered’.
each person controls the body/self by his own psychological agency, as the fallen Athenians have demonstrated.

The other occurrence in the Epitaphios echoes the importance of sacrifice of the sôma as a reciprocal action to ensure the power of the polis:

...ἀλλὰ [χρὴ] μᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένου καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν υἱὼν μεγάλη δόξη εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τολμῶντες καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυνόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ὅταν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶ

This famous and dense passage lays out a complex, three-way dynamic involving those who have died in war, those who survive them, and the city. Surviving citizens are urged to gaze in awe at the power of the city and become its ‘lovers’, a metaphor which Monoson has argued depicts a reciprocal relationship—I would rather say...
there is an element of reciprocity, but that the emphasis here is on the intensity of emotional commitment required by those staking their lives.\textsuperscript{16} Pericles then tells the audience to ascribe the greatness of the city to the men by whose actions it was acquired, men whose \textit{aretē} is offered as their finest contribution, their \textit{kalliston eranon}, here using the metaphor of a term for free contributions to charity, a club, or a financial venture.\textsuperscript{17} Again the emphasis is on the reciprocity of the contribution of the fallen which is to inspire the survivors. In sum, the comments in 2.43 expand the notion of self-sufficiency of the \textit{sōma} expressed earlier in 2.41, where it is again directly related to the power of the city and to the personal agency of the individual.

Pericles’ words recall those of the Corinthians in Book 1 where they characterize the Athenians as ones willing to expend their bodies, and the ones who maintain an independence of thought, the self-sufficiency described earlier in the speech:

\begin{quote}

\begin{greek}
\text{ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ δὲ γνώμη οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς. (1.70.6)}
\end{greek}
\end{quote}

And as for their bodies, they use them in the service of the commonwealth as if they belonged to another; but they use their mind very much their own, when they would serve the state.

The resonance with this earlier passage suggests a consistency in this characterization of Athenians and their view of an independence of self freely serving the polis, as seen by other states and as well as by themselves.

In the famous last sentences of the Epitaphios, Pericles strikingly invokes the metaphor of the athlete to describe the fallen warriors:

\begin{quote}

\begin{greek}
\text{16. Monoson 1994.}
\end{greek}
\end{quote}
This has been delivered by me in words, as suitably as I could according to the custom, and regarding actions, these men have been honoured in burial now, and from this time the city will rear their sons at public expense until they are of age, conferring on both the dead and their survivors a beneficial crown for such contests as these. For it is for those for whom the greatest prize for aretê is laid down that men act as the best citizens. And now, after each of you has made full lament for his own, depart.

The athletic terms *stephanon*, *agônôn*, and *athla*, ‘crown’, ‘games’ and ‘prizes’, unquestionably associate the fallen warriors and their families with the image of the victorious athlete.\(^{18}\) Also the final exhortation *apite*, ‘depart’, is exactly the imperative used by the umpire in announcing the start of each footrace.\(^{19}\) As in athletic victories, those active in the contest, their family and their fellow citizens share in the glory and the prize for aretê, at once meaning ‘excellence’ and ‘good service’. Rearing of the sons of the dead at public expense recalls the boon of lifetime meals given to Athenian Olympic victors, also at public expense. The exhortation to depart implies that the living are the ones to ‘run the race’ henceforth, to take up the challenge. Greek gymnic athletics (track and field and combat sports) were all practiced intensively with the ‘naked’ (*gymnos*) body in public display. Athletes required flexibility and grace in performance. Participants competed individually, not in teams, in almost all events at re-

gional agonistic festivals (with a few local exceptions), but a victory earned both personal, familial, and civic kudos. All of which makes the analogy between the Athenian citizen, warrior, and athlete most fitting for this speech.

Pericles’ third speech restates the theme of how Athens obtained its ‘greatest power’ (dunamin megistén) through the sacrifice of its citizens’ sômata:

δὲ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν ἔχουσαν ἐν ἀπασίν ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὸ ταῖς ἔμμαθαις μὴ εἴκειν, πλείστα δὲ σώματα καὶ πόνους ἀνηλώκεναι πολέμῳ, καὶ δύναμιν μεγίστην δὴ μέχρι τούδε κεκτημένην, ἢς ἐς ἄδιδον τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις, ἣν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδώμεν ποτε (πάντα γὰρ πέρασκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι), ἵνα καὶ ταλείπεται, Ἑλλήνων τε ὅτι Ἑλλήνες πλείστων δὴ ἤρξαμεν, καὶ πολέμωι μεγίστοις ἀντέσχομεν πρὸς τε ἐξύμπαντας καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστους, πόλιν τε τοῖς πάσιν εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μεγίστην ἀκησαμεν. (2.64.3)

Know that Athens has the greatest renown among all men because of not yielding to misfortune but expending the most lives and labour in warfare, and has certainly acquired the greatest power known up to this time, memory of which will be left behind forever by posterity, even if in the present we give way at some time (for it is in the nature of all things to be diminished too), that we as Hellenes ruled over the most Hellenes, sustained the greatest wars against them both all together and separately, and lived in a city that was in all ways the best provided for and greatest.

Especially noteworthy here is the phrase ‘expending the most sômata’, using the verb analiskein (anêlôkenai), thus employing the economic metaphor mentioned earlier, also found in Aeschylus and Sophocles. The high costs have purchased the greatest dunamis (‘power’, ‘empire’) for the polis, with an emphasis more on the collective achievement here, as in the Epitaphios. But here the expression characterizes the reciprocity more as a commodity exchange than a gift, as it was in Pericles’ earlier speech.
Expenditure of the body is of course in line with the values of the athlete, and we can note here also Pericles’ exhortation in his first speech to the Athenian farmers that they are more prepared to go to war relying on their bodies rather than their resources (σώμασί τε ἑτοιμότεροι οἱ σύτουργοι τῶν ἄνθρωπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, 1.141.5); he repeats the encouragement in the same speech a bit later, saying ‘don’t lament over houses and land, but over lives’ (τήν τε ὀλόφυρσιν μὴ οἰκιῶν καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων, 1.143.5). In Thucydides’ terms, adequate sôma and chrêmata are crucial but finite resources for war, as Lisa Kallet has convincingly shown, but the Periclean Epitaphios elevates sôma above chrêmata, essential as that also is.

In sum, the Periclean sôma makes a stark assertion that goes beyond the fundamental Thucydidean view of the body as a commodity, and beyond the view of the impossibility of self-sufficiency in a civic context enunciated by Herodotus’ Solon. Pericles’ self-sufficient sôma inhabits the most self-sufficient polis (polin ... autarke-statên, 2.36.3), and freely donates its actions and thoughts to ensure the power and lasting fame of the city. The citizen body is closely analogized to that of the athlete, whose fame redounds to his city, his family and himself. Even when Pericles’ third speech emphasizes the commodification of the body, it is in terms of a beneficent sacrifice again to ensure the power of the state. It is crucial to observe that this ideal is that of Pericles, and that the historian later describes the challenges to and non-observance of a self-sufficient Athenian sôma.

The Body and the Plague

The vulnerability of the body is most apparent in the account of the Plague following the Epitaphios. Sômata are, not surprisingly, men-

tioned quite frequently, five times, in the description of the Plague. Here *sôma* refers strictly to the physical corpus, and how it was affected by the disease, but in contexts that describe differing individual reactions.

The clearly clinical meanings describe physical appearance, how the body held out when the Plague was at its height, and how the illness proceeded through the body (2.49.5, 2.49.6, and 2.49.7). Of those perishing in the Plague, some who considered their bodies/lives (*sômata*) and wealth ephemeral acted without restraint or attention to law.

\[\text{ὡς ταξεῖας τάς ἐπαυρέσεις καὶ πρὸς τὸ τερπνὸν ἥξιον ποιεῖσθαι, ἐφήμερα τά τε σῶματα καὶ τά χρήματα ὁμοίως ἡγοῦμεν. (2.53.2)}\]

As they reflected that their lives and riches were alike transitory, they resolved to make their enjoyments quick and oriented to pleasure.

The ephemerality of the body and wealth is an axiom, tersely expressed in a line attributed to Aesop:

\[\text{ὑπερόρα τοίνυν καὶ χρημάτων καὶ σώματος, ἀθανάτου δὲ πράγματος ἐπιμελοῦ, τῆς ψυχῆς.} \]

Disdain therefore both money and the body, but cultivate the thing which is immortal, namely the soul.

As mentioned earlier, Thucydides, unlike Aesop and others, omits mention of the *psychê* as the human element offsetting the ephemeral factors. It presumes a hierarchy to which the historian seems not to subscribe.

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21. *Aesop, Fabulae Theophylacti Simocatta* 1.24. *Sômata kai chrêmata* may have become an idiomatic phrase at least by the Roman period, as is suggested by its extensive use by Plutarch (a total of 35 times per *TLG* search).
The most noteworthy Thucydidean ἱδρυμα passage in the Plague narrative conveys the body’s vulnerability:


σῶμα τε αὐτάρκες ὂν οὐδὲν διεφάνη πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰσχύος πέρι ἢ ἀσθενείας, ἀλλὰ πάντα ξυνήρει καὶ τὰ πάση διαίτη θεραπευό-μενα. (2.51.3)

No individual person/body (sôma) appeared to be self-sufficient against [the plague] either with regard to strong or weak constitutions, but all perished even when cared for with every regimen.

There is of course keen irony in the juxtaposition of this with the Epitaphios’ formulation of the self-sufficient sôma in 2.41. I see this not as the historian’s implicit critique of a Periclean vision, or an indictment of Periclean ὕβρις, but a narrative refinement on how the fortunes of nature can thwart reason and ideals.22 The Plague narrative proceeds to illustrate how individuals can still freely exhibit degrees of ethical restraint in harsh circumstances, a virtue of strength shared with the athletic body.23 During the epidemic, some who practiced a ‘sense of duty’ (aretê)24 showed no regard for themselves and visited the sick.

εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ’θέλοιεν δεδιότες ἀλλήλοις προσιέναι, ἀπώλλυντο ἐρῆμοι, … εἴτε προσίοιεν, διεφθέροντο, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀρετῆς τι μεταποιούμενοι. (2.51.5)

On the one hand, if they were afraid to visit each other, they perished from neglect; … on the other, if they would visit, they died, those who especially laid claim to a sense of duty.

22. Allison 1983, 15 n. 3 notes the ‘self-sufficient body’ parallel phrase, but concludes (23) that although the historian does not side with the popular condemnation of Pericles, the echoes of one passage in the other ‘convey the underlying sense that a commander, however good his ἡγιασμός, inevitably must bear some blame for a disaster… even if it is only for having put people in the wrong place at the wrong time’.


24. HCT II ad 2.51.5.
Here the historian clearly admires the exercise of a courageous *aretê*, a self-sacrifice to benefit others, one which exceeds the more common reactions of fear, despair, or greed. In this respect, the Plague narrative resonates with the Epitaphios in its admiration of *aretê* (2.43.1)

*The Bodies of Nicias and Alcibiades*

In the debate over the Sicilian expedition, Nicias also displays *aretê*, asserting that he fears less for his *sôma* than others do, but diplomatically adds that those who do have some concern for their *sôma* and property are still good citizens.25 The concession cleverly implies that a man of courage and principle such as himself could still be a model for those giving less priority to the state.

καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου καὶ ἧσσον ἔτέρων 
περὶ τῷ ἐμαυτοῦ σώματι ὀρρωδῶ, νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθόν 
πολίτην εἶναι ὃς ἄν καὶ τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προ-

And yet I myself derive honour from such actions [not going to Sicily] and am less fearful than others for my own *sôma* [body, person], although I think that he who takes some forethought for his *sôma* and property is just as good a citizen. (trans. Lattimore, adapted)

While those who ‘take some forethought’ or ‘provide’ (*ti...pro-

25. Kallet 2009, 112 argues that Nicias’ sentiment here is a ‘wholesale re-
configuration’ of the Periclean norm in which the polis takes priority over the family/oikos: ‘such attitudes … turned the [Periclean] ideal on its head’. See the similar argument in Kallet 2001, 32–3.
terests *and* those of the state; the qualification ‘some forethought’ or ‘some consideration’ indicates that the attention of fellow citizens is not entirely self-centred. Nicias’ rhetoric should be seen as a shrewd concession to the prevailing current sentiment of the citizens, and not necessarily his own sincere change of values. Pericles spoke directly against the citizens (*anteipein*, 2.65.8); Nicias was less confrontational. His complex rhetoric is laden with concessive clauses and subordination, revealing a more self-reflective character (here juxtaposed to that of Alcibiades).26 As was the case with exceptional individual Athenians mentioned in the Epitaphios and during the Plague, Nicias displayed an ability to overcome fear that defines a degree of devotion recalling that of the ideal soldier or citizen acting above and beyond his own concerns.

In contrast, Thucydides introduces the next speaker in the debate, Alcibiades, with an unusually direct comment:

> ὢν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀστῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζοσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἔχρητο ἐς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας: ὁπερ καὶ καθείλεν ὑστερον τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν οὐχ ἥκιστα. φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν διάιταν καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὰν καθ’ ἐν ἐκαστοῦ ἐν ὑπὸ γίγνοιτο ἐπρασσεν, ὦς τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμοῦντι πολέμιοι καθέστασαν, καὶ δημοσία κράτιστα διαθέντι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἰδίᾳ ἐκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἐσφῆλαν τὴν πόλιν. (6.15.3–4)

For he was held in such esteem among the citizens that he indulged in expenditures beyond his actual resources, both for horse breeding and for other luxuries; and to a great extent it was this which destroyed the Athenian city. The masses frightened by the magnitude of his licentiousness with regard to his own *sôma* in his lifestyle and of his aims in absolutely everything he did, whatever

it was, developed hostility toward him as an aspiring tyrant, and while he as a public person managed the war with utmost skill, they as private individuals detested him for his habits, and by entrusting matters to others they ruined the city in short order.
(trans. Lattimore, adapted)

It is not directly Alcibiades’ personal behaviour, but the suspicion of the *demos* regarding it and his possibly tyrannical character which Thucydides says ultimately harms the city.\(^{27}\) Alcibiades managed the war publicly with supreme skill, but his transgressive indulgence of his *sôma* stands in direct contrast to that of Nicias’ selfless devotion of his *sôma* to the polis. Thucydides’ characterization of Alcibiades is ambivalent: his lack of self-control handicapped his ability to retain public support, but the people are also at fault for not giving greater importance to his skill as a general.\(^{28}\)

In his speech, Alcibiades mentions first how his horse breeding served Athens well when he entered a record seven chariots in the 416 BCE Olympics, won the prize and also came in second and fourth. From which he boasts,

\[\text{oí γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεί τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας…}\]

\((6.16.2)\)

The Hellenes believed our city to be even greater than its real power because of my magnificence in their viewing [of the event] at Olympia…

\(^{27}\) Kallet 2001, 80–1 rightly notes that Alcibiades’ sexual abnormality, excessive spending, and self-centred lifestyle in 6.15 reflect the character of actual tyrants described in the Archaeology who ‘provided only to increase their own interests with regard to their *sôma* and their private household’ (1.17). See also Saxonhouse 1988.

\(^{28}\) Meyer 2008, 22–3. For fuller analyses of Alcibiades’ *paranomia*, including readings of it in the light of other sources, literary and archaeological, see Wohl 2002, 124–70 and Shapiro 2009.
As Lisa Kallet has argued, Alcibiades exemplifies an extreme case of private over public interests, inverting the Periclean priority for the citizen body, but in his speech he pushes back against public criticism of his raising horses by claiming public benefit. The effect is to promote the appearance of power of the city even beyond its reality, an overstatement that Alcibiades himself admits. But the display of success in chariot racing is also an inversion of the image of the athletic body promoted in the Epitaphios. It is a contest that is not self-sufficient and does not display the personal flexibility, grace, or aretē of gymnic athletics.

Euripides wrote a victory hymn for Alcibiades’ Olympic victory, the last known epinician ode, done 40 years after the last ode of Pindar. It was an archaizing effort that recalls Pindar’s and Bacchylides’ most famous patrons – Hieron and Theron, the tyrants of Sicily.29 The victory took place ‘without toil’ (aponoêti) in the words of the poem, enshrining its elite nature (Eur. frs. 755, 756 PMG).30 Isocrates offers a political motive for Alcibiades’ pursuit of hippic contests:

… οὐδενὸς ἀφυέστερος οὐδ’ ἀρρωστότερος τῷ σώματι γενόμενος τοὺς μὲν γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας ύπερείδεν, εἰδὼς ἐνίους τῶν ἀθλητῶν καὶ κακῶς γεγονότας καὶ μικρὰς πόλεις οἰκούντας καὶ ταπεινῶς πεπαιδευμένους, ἵπποτροφεῖν δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας, ὃ τῶν εὐδαιμονεστάτων ἔργον ἔστι, φαῦλος δὲ οὐδεὶς ἂν ποιήσει, οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πώποτε νικήσαντας ύπερεβάλετο. (Isoc. Or. 16.33 = Team of Horses 32–5)

… though in no way untalented and weaker in his body, he held gymnic athletic contests in contempt since he knew that some of the athletes were lowborn and from small city states and poorly educated. Therefore he tried his hand at hippotrophy, work of the wealthiest and not possible for a poor man, and he surpassed not only his competitors, but all previous winners. (trans. Miller)31

In sum, Alcibiades relished the elitist status of chariot racing; he embodied the opposite of the civic-minded citizen described by Pericles and epitomized by Nicias. Alcibiades’ hippic ambitions contrast with the aims of the self-sufficient and personally courageous gymnic athlete who is the subject of the metaphor for the ideal citizen in the Epitaphios. Alcibiades’ emulation of Sicilian tyrants makes the anxiety of the demos understandable. And yet, in the end, Alcibiades persuaded the people; their collective passion for the expedition won out over their disdain for his lifestyle (6.24).

Later, in Book 8, after Alcibiades had escaped trial in Athens and was avoiding a death penalty at Sparta, he became an adviser to the Persian satrap Tissaphernes. His advice to reduce the pay to the Peloponnesian navy is given this rationale:

[he cut their pay] so as to prevent some sailors who behaved with *hybris* in their prosperity from keeping their *sôma* in worse condition by spending on the sort of things that would lead to their weakness, others from deserting their ships…

There is clearly irony in the reasoning, delivered by a man who himself is known to have behaved outrageously toward his *sôma*. As Nick Fisher says in a discussion of the *hybris* of generals and soldiers, the concern here ‘is that of disobedience and ill-discipline, which may be shown either in debauchery, drunken violence or desertion’.32 Thucydides’ passage also reinforces the notion that the body is not only the locus of appetites, but can also be the vehicle for control of them, either by external constraint or the exercise of self-control.

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32. Fischer 1992, 126, quoted in *CT* III, *ad loc.*
Concluding Thoughts

We have come far from the ideal of the Epitaphios describing the self-sufficient, flexible, and indeed athletic sôma of the Athenian citizen freely performing public service, through the trials of the bodies in the Plague that both challenge and reinforce those values, the self-sacrificing sôma of Nicias, and the transgressive sôma of Alcibiades. First some points of summary, then brief comments on three further issues related to the body of this paper.

A. General Points:

1. Thucydides’ use of sômata goes beyond the more static uses of the term in Homer, Herodotus and others; and the reference in Iliad 23 recalls in a funerary context a kind of reciprocity or accounting of lives expended for civic benefit.

2. From a strategic perspective the body is a locus of exchange comparable to wealth, sometimes more commodified, sometimes in a more liberally reciprocal gift-mode.

3. While Herodotus, Xenophon, and later historians often use psychê in the sense of one definition in the LSJ, ‘the conscious self or personality as centre of emotions, desires, and affections’, Thucydides does not. He strikingly avoids using psychê, as a term for ‘spirit’, the one exception being in the Epitaphios (2.40.3), where, in view of its uniqueness, it may be an authentic Periclean expression to evoke the image of heroic warriors.

4. Thucydides avoids narratives of the deaths of heroic individuals. He instead uses sôma consistently in reference to collective self-sacrifice which, alongside wealth or money (chrêmata), is expendable to bolster the power and the long-term reputation of the polis. The idea is most strongly expressed in Pericles’ Epitaphios and in his third speech, but it occurs elsewhere throughout the narrative, in the earlier discussion of ‘expending’ (anal-iskein) the body.
5. But alongside Thucydides’ aversion to the heroic, as is revealed in his body language, there is his consistent and complementary metaphor of athletic contests as events analogous to warfare. Again, this is strongest in the Epitaphios, but also salient by contrast in the images of Alcibiades, the self-indulgent citizen who transgressed normal bodily values and indulges instead in non-athletic contests of chariot racing, in a quasi-tyrannical manner. What makes the athletic body an especially apt image is that the gymnic, and not the hippic, competitor expends personal courage and intense physical effort for his \textit{polis}, his family, and himself, in that order of priority.

6. The Thucydidean Pericles’ assertion of the self-sufficient Athenian body challenges the formula of Herodotus’ Solon denying such independence, and it is in turn seemingly countered in Thucydides’ own text by the denial of self-sufficiency in the face of the Plague. Yet Thucydides allows a measure of human benevolence or a ‘sense of service’, \textit{aretê}, and arguably a degree of self-sufficiency, to those who act compassionately toward plague victims.

7. Both the Epitaphios and the Plague therefore describe a vital \textit{sôma} which acts courageously to ensure the legacy of both the state and of themselves.

8. The contrast between Nicias and Alcibiades in relation to their \textit{sômata} replays the dynamic described earlier by Pericles and the Plague. Alcibiades in particular stands out as an image of the non-athletic body yielding to the baser personal drives of the body. In these valences, the historian implicitly challenges readers to see their \textit{sômata}, in our terms bodies, persons and individuality, as resources enabling individuals to choose either the service of civic ideals, or self-preservation and aggrandizement. To act in what the Thucydidean Pericles implies is the ideal manner requires great strength of both \textit{psychê} and of \textit{gnômê}, comparable to that of a victorious Olympic athlete.
B. Thucydidean Psychology:

We turn briefly to what is not properly a concluding point, but the related, broader matter of Thucydidean ‘psychology’ (for want of a better term, this being too evocative of modern scientific views). In short, this is an issue too complex to resolve here, and one previously discussed by others looking at numerous terms for emotions and reasons: gnômê and orgê, erôs and elpis. But it is important to note here, in view of the relation of these psychological forces to the sôma, a connection not, to my knowledge, taken up by other studies or commentaries. Absent a full exposition, I can merely offer my impression, namely that when sôma denotes more than the purely physical body, when it conveys the whole self and the person, then the emotions and reason are considered elements included within the sôma. So Euripides, for instance, uses the expression of ‘a great mind in a poor man’s body’ (γνώμην τε μεγάλην ἐν πένητι σώματι, El. 372). Taken together, the body/self/person and its related thoughts and feelings comprise what Thucydides called anthrôpeia physis, human nature.

C. The Worthiness of a Cause for Expending Bodies:

In the quotation from Aeschylus’ Agamemnon at the beginning of this paper, the chorus laments the young men lost in war in terms of Ares’ exchange. That passage goes on to disparage in particular...
the feeble reason for which the men were lost, namely the recovery of Helen:

...φθονερὸν δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἄλγος ἑρ-πεῖ προδίκοις Ἀτρείδαις. (Ag. 450-1)

...a resentful grief creeps secretly against the avenging sons of Atreus.

Pericles’ Epitaphios may share with the chorus the conventional Greek view that deaths in battle are exchanged for victory in a cause, but the Periclean ideal elevates the losses by aligning them with what would be, in his likely view, the nobler cause of Athenian power and fame. Whether or not Thucydides himself subscribed to the view of his Pericles on the role of sôma can be argued either way. It is the view here, based on the above study, that the self-sufficiency of the athletic body/person may be temporarily thwarted by events like the Plague, but that does not upset the validity of the ideals that the leading general presents to the citizens, namely the image of a state worth dying for, and the need for individuals to sacrifice themselves willingly for it.

D. The Material Legacy of Thucydidean Sômata:

Archaeological discoveries in Athens in recent years have made vivid Thucydides’ narration of sômata, specifically the discovery of the state burial grounds or dêmosion sêma for fallen soldiers, near where the Epitaphios took place, and, not far away, in 1994 the uncovering of a mass grave of over 150 bodies evidently from the period of the Plague.34 Both were within a mile of each other.

and the human remains in both date to the time of the events in Thucydides’ narrative, a poignant reminder that those somata were not merely rhetorical and that many are still buried in Athens, some honourably as fallen soldiers, some in more improvised graves required by a horrible epidemic.

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Mikrogiannakis, E. 2004: ‘The last word of Pericles’ Epitaphios as athletic-political signal’, *Nikephoros* 17, 135–7.
My contribution to this volume on Thucydides concerns building activity on the Athenian Acropolis during the war between Athens and Sparta. I have tried to give prominence to recent discoveries and relate them to Thucydides’ *History*. This is a challenging endeavour, given that Thucydides provides very little direct evidence concerning construction in general, and in particular of building works on the Acropolis.

What makes this presentation particularly useful and, I daresay, necessary, is the volume and quality of new information that has arisen from discoveries on the Acropolis over the last four decades. This information was brought to light during the studies carried out for the restoration of the Acropolis monuments since the late 1970s. The data concerning the architecture, archaeology and history of the Acropolis has been enriched by the discovery of details that were inaccessible to older generations of scholars. One more reason that makes the presentation of this information imperative, is the fact that a considerable amount of scholarship continues to be produced without references to these new data, thus perpetuating out-dated views based on poorer evidence that have dominated the relevant scholar-

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ship. Study of this recently acquired information from the fields of architectural/archaeological research, in conjunction with new finds in artistic or literary production in the same period, and the events described by Thucydides, shows that many older views should be reconsidered and challenged or, even, abolished altogether and replaced by sounder ones, based on the newest concrete data.

I will limit myself to presenting information from my own studies on the Acropolis, particularly at the Propylaia and the surrounding area from the late 1970s onwards, that were closely related to the project to restore this monument. This new evidence shows that the older narrative concerning building activity at the west end of the Acropolis and, furthermore, concerning Mnesikles’ presence on the site during the last decades of the fifth century, has to be revised. I support this conclusion with corroborating evidence from Athens and Attica, showing that, despite restrictions in manpower and finances resulting from the ongoing war, the Athenians did not give up launching important new building projects.\(^1\) Due to the restrictions of this publication, the presentation and analysis of the facts and discussion of former scholarship will be compact and selective.

1. Introduction

At this point, I must stress that Mnesikles had originally planned an architectural complex consisting of five units on two levels (Fig. 1), in communication both with the outside and the interior of the sanctuary by means of stairways and terraces on several levels.\(^2\) From

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2. Dinsmoor 1975, 204–5, figs 75–6; Dinsmoor and Dinsmoor Jr. 2004, 13–57 (with corresponding figs 3,1–9,1), pls 1–2, 3 above, 8; the latter book should be read with caution, in conjunction with Tanoulas 2008.
this whole architectural landscape, only the central building, the northwest wing and part of the southwest wing were ever erected. Nevertheless, it is interesting that, in the celebrated rendition of Pericles’ *epitaphios logos*, the only one of all the classical buildings on the Acropolis to be named by Thucydides is the Propylaia.3

The second of the two Kallias decrees, *IG* I3 52, is a further contemporary document that makes clear reference to structural works on the Acropolis, and in this case also the only named building is the Propylaia. This decree, according to widely accepted restoration of the text, orders the following:

… the stone [statues] and the gold victories and the Propylaia [should be] completed; … according to what has been decreed, and the Acropolis [should be delivered cleared of the] wrought [building? material] and restored, spending ten talents each year until it is delivered and fitted out as finely as possible; and let the treasurers and the superintendents supervise the work jointly; and the plan shall be made by the architect of the Propylaia; let him supervise with the superintendents so that the Acropolis is put in order in the best and [cheapest] way and that [what is necessary] is fitted out. The other monies of Athena, what is now on the Acropolis and whatever may be brought up in future, should not be used [or spent] for anything else.4

The most widely accepted date for the Kallias decrees is 434 B.C. I always tended to think that between this and the outbreak of the

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3. Thuc. 2.13.3.

4. The translation is mine; I tried to render in English the restoration of the text proposed by Wade-Gery and Meritt 1947, 283–4, taking into account interpretations by scholars referred to in this article. Bundgaard presents a freer adaptation of the original text, seeking a more or less similar meaning; see Bundgaard 1976, 125–7; Bradeen 1971. In relation to the interpretation of some passages of the inscription, I think it is important to remember that in ancient Greek, *ἐπισκευάζειν* may equally mean *repair* (that is the only meaning in modern Greek), or *complete or fit out*. 
war in 432/1, there was too little time for the existing parts of the Propylaia to have been completed and that changes in the plan of the work can be better understood as consequences of both the Kallias decrees and the war. Furthermore, taking also into account the new evidence presented below, I would agree with Lisa Kallet’s view that the Kallias decrees could date later than 434.5

Epigraphical and literary evidence have established a tradition that building at the Propylaia started in 437/6 and was completed within five years, i.e., in 432/1. Until very recently, it was taken for granted that at the outbreak of the war in 432/1, the Propylaia had reached their final uncompleted state; that is, the central building and the two lateral wings were built and roofed, and it was only the finishing touches of carving the final aperga on the walls and floors that still remained to be done. According to this view, the building remained incomplete because works on the site were never taken up again, during or after the war.6 However, this explanation for the hemiteles (=non-finito) nature of the Propylaia is very simplistic, since it presupposes that the work was given a deadline as part of a planning that had a pre-ordained date for the outbreak of the war. One could accept as natural, of course, that awaiting a probable war with Sparta, the Athenians would have accelerated the pace of the works. However, it is very improbable that the works were projected to end by a certain date. The newly discovered evidence, however, summarised below, proves beyond any doubt that, even if there had been a deadline, certain events did not allow it to be met.7

2. New discoveries at the Propylaia and their vicinity

The recent investigations referred to above have revealed that considerable parts of the Propylaia, certainly those that were eventually to be completed, continued to be under construction for at least another decade after the war began, under the direction of the same architect, known from later sources as Mnesikles.\(^8\) I will summarily present first the most important of the published evidence (a–c) and then the most recent evidence that has not been fully published (d–h).

(a) Between the Ionic columns in the west hall of the central building, regular marble floor slabs were used instead of proper stylobate blocks (Fig. 2). There is no doubt that, after the cancellation of the northeast and southeast wings, floor slabs that had already been worked for their paving became available for use in other places. Some of these were used to fill in the stylobate between the Ionic columns. The floor slabs, being lower than proper stylobate blocks, left an undesirable horizontal gap 30 mm wide, visible from the central passageway;\(^9\) additional local supports were needed for their accommodation.

(b) Meticulous examination of building remains to the northeast of the Propylaia proved that the foundations of the north and the northeast wings of the Propylaia, the Mnesiklean drainage channel, the Acropolis north wall, and the so-called North-West Building are closely interrelated, indicating that they were all under construction during the same period of building activity (Fig. 3, upper left). Only the north wing, known today as the Pinakotheke, and the Mnesiklean drainage channel were in fact completed. The channel had to be finished because it was necessary for conducting rainwater out of the Acropolis precinct.\(^10\)

The surviving section of foundations from the east wall of the

\(^8\) See above, note 7. Plut. *Vit. Per.* 12, 13. See also below, nn. 43, 44.

\(^9\) Tanoulas 1996; 2002c.

\(^10\) Tanoulas 1992b, conclusions at 210–15; idem 1994c, 182–3; 1997b, 558–9, fig. 5; 2017, 78–9, fig. 4.
Propylaia’s northeast wing is overlapped by the upper courses of the foundations of the North-West Building at their meeting point. This shows that when the construction of the northeast wing of the Propylaia was cancelled, the foundations of the North-West Building were raised to cover part of the foundations of the abandoned project (Fig. 3, below).\(^\text{11}\) The North-West Building was, in the end, reduced to a simple court, which possibly received some sort of roof at some point (Fig. 3, upper right). The North-West Building was a project independent of the Propylaia;\(^\text{12}\) however, the wall that crowns the north side of the North-West Building’s foundations, which cannot be older than the Propylaia, is made of ashlar poros masonry similar to that surviving within the Acropolis north wall further to the east (as mentioned below in (d) and B).\(^\text{13}\)

(c) The upper surfaces of the central lintel blocks in the central building of the Propylaia carry surviving dowel cuttings for five missing superposed blocks that are of a craftsmanship very different from and inferior to all the classical sockets on the Acropolis. In addition, they correspond to a technology that is found later and that is normally not seen in structures dated before the late fourth century (Fig. 4, above). It seems certain then that these five blocks were added sometime later. This is corroborated by the fact that two of the blocks were key-blocks (καταφραγή) in the middle of the course and, consequently, were the last to be put in place. Until these five

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\(^{11}\) Tanoulas 1992b, especially 203–4, pl. 50, 2, foldout 12.

\(^{12}\) Shear 2016, 282 note 29, claims that in my article I maintain that the Propylaia northeast wing and the so-called North-West Building were both constructed by Mnesikles. A careful reading of the article (Tanoulas 1992b, 210–15) makes clear that both buildings belong to different projects, despite their being under construction at the same period of time.

\(^{13}\) See also Bundgaard 1976, 121–7. Later, Korres challenged my conclusions regarding the relations between the North-West Building and the Propylaia (Korres 1997, 244–5) in a few sentences, presenting no factual evidence against my (and others’) interpretation of the existing material evidence that I lengthily presented and discussed in Tanoulas 1992b.
blocks were laid in their final positions, considerable parts of the superstructure could not have been built (Fig. 4, below).\textsuperscript{14}

3. The Acropolis north wall reconsidered

(d) Ashlar masonry similar to that in the North-West Building’s north wall still crowns the reused older building material further to the east, in the so called Arrephorion, and to the north and north-east of the building known today as the Erechtheion.\textsuperscript{15} All these similar walls of ashlar masonry rest on reused material from older buildings, which must have been lying around before being built into the north Acropolis wall. The substantial use of blocks from the Older Parthenon and the Old Temple of Athena in the north wall could very well be ascribed to Mnesikles’ efforts to use up the blocks lying around on the Acropolis that could not be employed in regular buildings with formal architecture (see fig. 5, above). This would be a most successful response to the demand expressed in the Kallias decree to clear the Acropolis of otherwise useless material,\textsuperscript{16} and in addition, due to the architect’s genius, it established a model which proved highly influential in terms of using redundant architectural material, not only for practical reasons, but in a symbolic context as well.\textsuperscript{17}

The elaborate style resulting from the way the older material was

\textsuperscript{14} Tanoulas 2006a.

\textsuperscript{15} The identity of the building known today as the Erechtheion has often been disputed. This problem has brilliantly been discussed recently in van Rookhuijzen 2020, especially pages 22–32; van Rookhuijzen proposes the term “Karyatid temple” for what is known today as the “Erechtheion”, as it refers to the most individual formal characteristic of the building.

\textsuperscript{16} See above, notes 4 and 9.

\textsuperscript{17} See below note 22. I consider the Beulé gate, which still marks the west end of the post-Herulian fortifications of the Acropolis, as being modelled after the poros entablature built into the north wall of the Acropolis, see Tanoulas 2020, 88–94.
incorporated in the north wall has nothing to do with the hasty use of recycled material in the city walls initiated by Themistokles, as reported by Thucydides.\textsuperscript{18} The Thucydidean passage leaves no doubt that it concerns only the city’s circuit wall, and yet in spite of this it has been used in earlier and some recent scholarship as a fundamental argument for ascribing to Themistokles the incorporation of material from the Older Parthenon and the Old Temple of Athena into the Acropolis north walls.\textsuperscript{19} Another basic argument for ascribing the north wall to Themistokles has been the fact that the Acropolis wall to the north of the area where the korai were found by Kavvadias is crowned with the reassembled entablature of the Old Temple of Athena, which rests on a low wall made of poros blocks. However, a careful reading of Kavvadias’ report makes it clear that the north limit of the pit containing the korai just mentioned was a low wall in poros stone, built expressly to serve as the retaining wall of the korai deposit, as indicated by the levelling of the deposit with the top of this wall.\textsuperscript{20} Kavvadias admits that the structural or excavation data cannot be decisive for dating the north Acropolis wall. He also says that he considered it more probable that the north wall was built before Kimon, since the Kimonian south wall exhibits regular ashlar masonry on its outer faces cut specifically for this wall, while the use of material from the Old Temple of Athena and the Older Parthenon makes the north wall appear untidy and, consequently, hasty and unprepared.\textsuperscript{21}

If we look at this architectural project as a scheme of political rhetoric, as more recent scholarship does,\textsuperscript{22} one has to consider it as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Thuc. 1.89–93. Skouteropoulos 2011, 140–5.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Sioumpara 2019, 31–2 with selected earlier references. Kolbe 1936, 63 refers to this view only to reject it.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Cavvadias 1886, 75–82; Cavvadias and Kawerau 1906, 25–31, figs 1–2, table K below. See also Bundgaard 1974, 222–3, pl. 39.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Cavvadias and Kawerau 1906, 79–80, 81–2.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Boersma 1970, 46; Hurwit 1999, 142; Di Cesare 2015, 131–6.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
part of a major plan with political connotations. Some of the scholars who ascribe it to Kimon or Pericles observe that, in comparison to the south Kimonian circuit, it looks shabby.\textsuperscript{23} I, on the contrary, believe that it imposes the order of a sophisticated design that aims at enhancing the rhetorical effect: the building material of the two destroyed temples of Athena – the Old Temple and the Old Parthenon – were exhibited in the north wall in positions roughly corresponding to their original places on the temples behind the wall.\textsuperscript{24} One has to keep in mind that the sheathing of the inside of the entablature and the visible parts of the Acropolis north wall that are built upon the material from the Old Parthenon are made in poros ashlar masonry, similar to that crowning the Acropolis wall along the north side of the North-West Building which, as we have already seen, is contemporary with the Propylaia.\textsuperscript{25} In consequence, one has to admit that ascribing the whole scheme discussed above to the building activities of Mnesikles in the second half of the fifth century seems very logical.\textsuperscript{26} If one considers, furthermore, that this rhetorical scheme serves one of the main tasks assigned to the architect of the Propylaia by the Kallias decree (\textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 52), that of the Acropolis being ‘put in order in the best and [cheapest] way and that [what is necessary] is fitted out’, one can only date it after 434/3, the earliest possible date for \textit{IG} I\textsuperscript{3} 52.

\textsuperscript{23} To Kimon: Boersma 1970, 46; Hurwit 1999, 142; Holtzmann 2003, 93–5; Di Cesare 2015, 131–6. To the second half of the 5\textsuperscript{th} c.: Kolbe 1936, 61–3; Tschira 1940, 261; Travlos 1960, 56, 60; Bundgaard 1976, 52–60, 70, 121–5, 129. Hurwit 1999, 159–60, agrees that parts of the north wall are Mnesiklean. Lindellauf 1997, 71–2, characterizes this part of the north wall “Patchwork-Bauweise”, that is, structural patchwork.

\textsuperscript{24} The blocks from the Old Temple of Athena correspond to their original positions when seen from the Panathenaic way, while the Old Parthenon members correspond to the position of the temple they came from when seen from the north.

\textsuperscript{25} Tanoulas 1992b, 210–15; Hurwit 1999, 159. Also, see above, 2, (b).

\textsuperscript{26} Travlos 1960, 56; 1971, 53–4; Bundgaard 1976, 121–5, 129.
The recycled poros Doric column drums and capitals immured further to the east in the north wall (Fig. 5, below) were intentionally cut and placed so that they look, from the outside, like normal ashlar blocks (Fig. 5, middle), thus conforming to the south Acropolis wall that is generally considered as Kimonian, following Plutarch. Consequently, they should have been built before the builders of the north wall conceived the sophisticated rhetorical scheme that was realized further to the west.

4. Observations on the south wing

Important new information has also been revealed by my investigations in the south wing over the last three decades. This new information corroborates the view that building activity continued at the Propylaia, and certainly at the south wing, into the late 420s. These discoveries are here summarized below.

The south wing has always been considered part of the original Mnesiklean complex; indeed, the invention and final shaping of this hybrid part of the Propylaia are so brilliant and reflect the same frame of mind as the rest of the architectural complex that there can be no doubt that the work was carried out under the direction of Mnesikles himself. However, the absence of beam-sockets on the east side of the east wall super-structure, for the accommodation of the rafters of the southeast wing’s roof, and the way the original plan of the south wing was curtailed, show that, when the construction of the latter began, the southeast wing had already been cancelled (Fig. 6, above). The shift of the south wing’s west face to its present position to the east presupposes the physical presence of the Athena Nike temple and its altar, which were not completed before 425 (Fig. 6,

28. The most recent publications on the south wing are: Tanoulas 2015; 2016b.
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middle; Fig. 12, below). Even if construction in the south wing was begun before the war according to the original plan, substantial evidence that the foundations of the west face had been laid is lacking. The temple’s completion after 425 corroborates the conclusion that Mnesikles was active in this area of the Acropolis in the advanced 420s. At this time, the construction of the Erechtheion began.

As several scholars have previously observed, important architectural features concerning special architectural forms and compositions which are not found in other contemporary or later buildings are shared both by the Propylaia and the Erechtheion, suggesting that they could be assigned to the same architect, Mnesikles. These scholars include no lesser figures than Dörpfeld, the authors of The Erechtheum, and Dinsmoor. Tiberi, after minutely analysing the features common only to these two unique buildings, concludes that it was possibly designed by Mnesikles, but that the final result is rather due to an unknown skilled architect.

However, important discoveries during the disassembly and reas-

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29. Rubel 2014, 123 reaches the same conclusion after detailed discussion of the relevant literature. Miles 1980, 322 (profile in the Propylaia south wing is grouped with a similar one of the Temple of Athena Nike), 323–5 (parallel building, at least at the lower levels); Leventi 2014, 61, 64. See also Wrede 1932; Schleif 1933; and Wesenberg 1988, 18–20.

30. Shear 2016, 297 and 300, note 86: “If Korres’s phase b was ever conceived, it was certainly never built”, referring to the successive changes of plan in the south wing proposed in Korres 1994, 46. As far as it concerns the Propylaia and their vicinity, Shear 2016 refers mainly to Dinsmoor and Dinsmoor Junior’s publications, discussing none of the new evidence published in Tanoulas 1992a, 1992b, 1994a, 1994c, 1994, 1996, 2002c, 2002d, 2006a, and 2012a.


33. Stevens et al. 1927, 455.

34. Dinsmoor 1975, 188. The same view was shared by Shoe 1949, 347.

35. Tiberi 1964, 168–73.
Assembly of the blocks in the superstructure of the south wing, carried out between 2013 and 2015, have added further arguments to the thesis that the Propylaia and the Erechtheion were designed by Mnesikles. These discoveries, presented by the author in lectures and the Thucydidides conference, have not yet appeared in print; full publication will provide a detailed presentation and analysis of the data. Until then, I present here, as comprehensively as the restrictions of this volume allow, what is necessary for an adequate support of my arguments.

(e) The clamps and dowels discovered in the east end of the central building south wall were of the highest quality, regarding both the raw materials and the craftsmanship. I have already expressed my idea that the superior quality of the iron shows that the clamps and dowels were done in the early years of the Propylaia’s construction, when the Athenians could still have access to the best quality iron ores in the Peloponnese, which were controlled by the Spartans.36 During the recent intervention in the south wing, a new discovery was made which corroborates the conclusion that Mnesikles was supervising the completion of the south wing in the late 420s. In the south wing superstructure, some corroded iron bonding elements bear traces of the inscription ΑΘΕ, similar to that found on clamps and dowels in the central building. The clamps and dowels uncovered during the dismantling of thirty-eight blocks at the east end of the south wall of the Propylaia central building were of the highest quality and very well preserved, some of them being practically intact. They comprise the only group where the original characteristics can be thoroughly studied. Among them, only fifteen of the dowels and seven of the clamps were inscribed. Their places in the wall show that there was no pattern in the distribution of the inscribed clamps and dowels in the wall, and the inscriptions were inscribed into the hot iron at the worksite using a chisel (λαμάκι). This improvised procedure shows that these inscriptions were due to a spontaneous

36. Tanoulas 2006a, 448–52.
gesture of the workers. Among the 35 original clamps and dowels uncovered in the south wing, the inscription ΑΘΕ was found only on five dowels and on one clamp. I believe that the continuation of this spontaneous gesture for, more or less, two decades provides strong evidence for continuity in the labour force, due to the continuous presence of the same project leader. This means that the works at the Propylaia were directed by Mnesikles for about two decades, that is, from 437 to the late 420s, if not until the mid-410s.

(f) Close study of the superstructure blocks and their arrangement in the wall makes it clear that, after they had been prepared, they were left on the ground for a considerable period of time, only to be put up under some pressure, resulting in occasional imperfections in the superstructure which, however, could not be noticed from below. For example, there are small gaps between some blocks due to their original carving on the ground, which could not be corrected or recut during the final positioning on the building because of lack of time and/or money. These gaps were certainly filled with lead, a common practice in antiquity, documented on the Acropolis and especially in the Ionic stylobates of the Propylaia, something we repeated in the present restoration (Fig. 6, below). Some sockets for clamps and dowels bear no traces of having been used, as the fact that they do not align with their counterparts makes clear. This indicates that these sockets had also been cut while the blocks were on the ground and, when the blocks were put in their final positions on the building and the incompatibility of the sockets became evident, they were not corrected, obviously because of lack of time and/or money.

(g) The sockets for the accommodation of the wooden ceiling

38. Matthaiou’s paper in this volume, already mentioned in note 5, suggests that the second Kallias decree should be dated within 426 BC. This view corroborates my idea of Mnesikles being active on the Acropolis in the 420s.
beams in the blocks of the superstructure demonstrate considerable inconsistencies in shape and dimensions (Fig. 7). That is, if the ends of the beams corresponded exactly to the shapes of the sockets, most of the beams would have ends differing in size, while the widths of the beams and the gaps between them would also vary considerably. This could not but escape the attention of previous students of the south wing, with the result that they all represented the ceilings as “slot ceilings” with equally sized beams divided by regular, narrow, convenient gaps. Most of these gaps would be wide enough to allow not only humidity but also birds of some size to be trapped below the roof, with very undesirable effects, which would make it imperative to seal them with planks. It is obvious that the whole situation would result in a conspicuous disorder in the ceiling, which would not be typical in a building of this quality. It is impossible to believe that this situation would have been acceptable to Mnemonikes or any Athenian in the heyday of classical architecture. Careful analysis of the data leads to the conclusion that this problem would be solved only when all of the wooden ceiling beams had the same width of 62 centimetres, with the result that they abutted each other lengthways. Both ends of each beam were trimmed to fit the irregular sockets discussed above. Thus, a flat surface was provided for the ceiling, on which coffers could be painted or – given the considerable thickness of the beams – even carved (Figs. 7b, c). The porch of the Caryatids provides the only parallel of an existing “flat” coffered ceiling (that is, with no hanging beams to interrupt the continuous level of the lower surface of the coffered slabs) (Fig 8, below).

(h) In the early 1990s, the study of certain fragments led me to

40. Hodge 1960, 102, 104, fig. 21c, having only a very scant knowledge of the material, restored the south wing ceilings as regular “slot ceilings”. Also, Dinsmoor 1975, fig. 75; Dinsmoor and Dinsmoor Jr. 2004, 423–4, fig. 21.13.

41. Stevens et al. 1927, 110–19 (especially 114–16), fig. 69, pls. 26–8.
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the discovery that each one of the two areas usually called “niches” between the central building and the north and south wings was covered by a huge slab (Fig. 9).\textsuperscript{42} Horizontal and practically flat from below,\textsuperscript{43} it had the upper surface cut in forms which allowed it to fit into the lower end of the roofs of the adjacent wings and, at the same time, to conduct rainwater collected from the roofs of the neighbouring wing and the central building out to the west end, letting it to flow beyond the borders of the floor underneath, onto the steps of the krepis. In 2015, a model half the size of the original object was constructed, a picture of which is published in this article (Fig. 9, below).\textsuperscript{44} This hybrid form has only one contemporary parallel, in the ceiling-roof of the porch of the Caryatids at the Erechtheion; indeed, in this case too, the horizontal flat ceiling and the flat sloping surfaces above for rainwater drainage are carved out of the same block (Fig. 8, above).\textsuperscript{45}

These last two discoveries in the Propylaia (the flat ceiling in the south wing and the marble covers of the niches), by having their only parallels in the Erechtheion (the roof of the porch of the Caryatids), when considered together with the features already noted that are common to the two buildings, add even more substantial arguments for the view that Mnesikles planned both buildings and had at least begun the construction of the Erechtheion. I would say, also, that the

\textsuperscript{42} Tanoulas 1994a, 180‒3; Tanoulas 2012b, 57‒8; Tanoulas 2015, 41‒4; Tanoulas forthcoming. The general form of the roofing of the niches was understood by J. Wood, but Wood’s incomplete drawing was not published before 2004, in Dinsmoor and Dinsmoor Jr. 2004, fig. 21.23.

\textsuperscript{43} Underneath, there was a slight projection at the west end, which prevented rainwater leakage.

\textsuperscript{44} Tanoulas forthcoming.

\textsuperscript{45} Stevens et al. 1927, 117 fig. 69. The closest parallels I can think of are Roman; I have in mind the three coffered slabs covering the “niches” between the porticoes of the ground floor façade on the gate to the market of Miletus, dated in the second century A.D., now in the Pergamon Museum, Berlin; see Strocka 1981.
5. Conclusions

In conclusion, a question has to be answered: how can all the new information presented above be fitted into the chronology of the historical events described in Thucydides’ *History*?

Fig. 10 shows a chart with chronologies from 450 to 400 above, and the names of Acropolis buildings on the left. Full and partial building activity conjectured for each of the buildings in every year is suggested by the stretch and density of the colour in the corresponding boxes. The basic framework is provided by the ancient sources.

Construction in the Parthenon was completed in 438/7. The Propylaia were started in the following year, 437/6, when building accounts of the Propylaia appear for the first time. These accounts also cover the following four years, leaving no doubt that the Propylaia were under construction from 437/6 to the year of the outbreak of the war between Athens and Sparta in 432/1. Plutarch assumes that the Propylaia were completed within these five years under the direction of Mnesikles, information we also find in other sources of the Roman period. The second of the Kallias decrees, widely

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46. For earlier assumptions about Mnesikles’ authorship of the Erechtheion, see above, notes 32–5. It is not without significance to note here that, when we had to dismantle a number of *in situ* blocks from the south wall of the south wing, I was struck by the similarity of the treatment of the (until then unexposed) horizontal surfaces to those I had observed on blocks from the Erechtheion, when I was inventoring *disjecta membra* in the late 1970s.

47. Dinsmoor 1975, 159; Travlos 1971, 444.


50. Harpocration refers to Philochorus (4\textsuperscript{th} c. B.C.) and Heliodorus, see
accepted as dated to 434/3 or later, imposes the suspension of works on the Acropolis but includes the Propylaia in the works to be completed. So, the Kallias decree should not necessarily be related to an interruption of the works in the Propylaia in 432/1; it is equally probable that an interruption of the works would have been due to the outbreak of the war in 432/1. Pericles’s mention of the Propylaia in the famous funerary oration soon after the outbreak of the war (431/0) indicates that, by then, a considerable part of the Propylaia was already completed.\footnote{Thuc. 2.13.3.} However, the recent evidence presented above proves that even if the war had caused an interruption, the works continued in the south wing until the late 420s and in the superstructure of the central building (for an indefinite amount of time) and, potentially, in other parts of the Propylaia and the surrounding area as well. In any case, a great deal of the original design had to be cancelled. We cannot tell exactly when construction was interrupted but I think that this most probably happened in 432/1 or a little later.

Within the five years recorded by the ancient sources,\footnote{See above note 6.} substantial parts of the central building could have been erected: firstly the doorways, so that the gates of the sanctuary could be controlled; secondly, the east and west porticoes, the Ionic colonnades and the walls, in order to provide the building with a solid functioning body. This is corroborated by Aristophanes’ reference to the opening of the doors of the Propylaia in his comedy \textit{Knights}, dated to 424: καὶ γάρ ἀνοιγμένων ψόφος ἦδη τῶν προπυλαίων (‘for already there is the sound of the Propylaia being opened’).\footnote{Ar. \textit{Eq}. 1326.} The interruption of construction work indicated by the dowel sockets above the central lintel could be due to the outbreak of the war in

432/1 and/or to the plague, in 430/29. It seems that construction works in this area of the central building superstructure were not revisited before a few decades had elapsed.\textsuperscript{54}

I here summarise the succession of building activity related to the specific buildings and their parts on the Acropolis discussed above:

A. In the Pinakotheke, the fact that the east wall bears sockets for the accommodation of the roof beams of the northeast wing means that it was erected before the cancellation of the latter (Fig. 11). An early date for the northern wing seems natural, since its foundations rest on the lowest part of the Acropolis rock and, consequently, starting construction of the foundations at this area would have allowed the builders to establish the floor level of the entire western part of the complex (Fig. 12).

B. The foundations of the northeast wing of the Propylaia must be ascribed to the same period before the war, that is, from 437/6 to 432/1, at the latest (Fig. 3, below). After this wing was cancelled, the construction in the North-West Building progressed, but was never completed (Fig. 3, above right).

C. The southeast wing must have been cancelled at the same time as the northeast wing or even before (Fig. 6, above; Fig. 12, below).

D. The stylobates between the Ionic colonnades in the Propylaia’s west hall (Fig. 2) were completed after the cancelling of the northeast and/or southeast wings, that is, shortly before or after the outbreak of the war (Fig. 12, below).\textsuperscript{55}

E. Construction of the south wing started, most probably, sometime later. The south wing and the Nike temple were built more or less simultaneously, primarily in the 420s (Fig. 12, below).\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54} See above 2(c) and note 14.

\textsuperscript{55} This is an obvious explanation for the floor pavement slabs inserted between the Ionic columns’ stylobate blocks, see above in the text, paragraph 2(a) and note 9.

\textsuperscript{56} See above, section 4 and note 29.
F. Concerning the Erechtheion, there is no doubt that, after the
destruction of the Old Temple of Athena, there was a plan to restore
a monumental setting for the oldest and most sacred cults. The
absence of any pertinent reference in the Kallias decrees indicates
that nothing or very little had been accomplished in this direction.\textsuperscript{57}
The extant building widely known as the Erechtheion is a state-
ment of the autochthony of the Athenians and of their Ionian iden-
tity and, consequently, its construction must be connected to the
demonstration of these ideas, which were all the more emphasised
as the Peloponnesian war advanced.\textsuperscript{58} The importance to the Athe-
nians of their Ionian identity and their autochthony is mentioned by
Thucydides,\textsuperscript{59} and stressed by the literature of the last quarter of the
fifth century, such as in Euripides’ *Erechtheus* (about 423/2)\textsuperscript{60} and
*Ion* (about 412-410).\textsuperscript{61}

In my view, Mnesikles planned and started the Erechtheion,
probably in the advanced 420s. It is reasonable to assume that the
victory at Pylos in 425 and, even more, the Peace of Nikias in 421,
both discussed in the fourth and fifth books of Thucydides’ *History*,
promoted construction at the Erechtheion.\textsuperscript{62} Work at the site was in-
terrupted most probably after the tragic end of the Sicilian expedition
in 413, summed up in Thucydides’ words closing the seventh book:
πανωλεθρία δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπώλετο.\textsuperscript{63} The recovery of building activity at the Erechtheion

\textsuperscript{57} Stevens et al. 1927, 454; Rubel 2014, 116.
\textsuperscript{58} Despotidis 2014, 151–2.
\textsuperscript{59} Thuc. 1.2 (especially sections 5–6); 1.7–8; 1.95; 1.124; 2.15–16; 2.36.
\textsuperscript{60} Clairmont 1971, 490–1, and W. M. Calder’s answer, ibid. 493–5; Mar-
ginesu 2001, 43; Sonnino 2010, 24–8, 37–45, 83–5, 100–1; Despotidis 2014,
54.
\textsuperscript{61} Young 1941,141–2 (Ion as Erichthonios); Di Pietro and Burian 1996;
\textsuperscript{62} Stevens et al. 1927, 454–5; Rubel 2014, 116.
\textsuperscript{63} Thuc. 7.87.6. Stevens et al. 1927, 453.
between 409 and 406 could be related to a restoration of self-confidence due to the victories of the Athenians over the Spartans, a period beyond the end of Thucydides’ narrative.\textsuperscript{64} Sadly, the inscribed Erechtheion accounts leave no doubt that Mnesikles was no longer working on the project.\textsuperscript{65}

G. It has been shown above, in (d), that the northern wall of the Acropolis to the north of the so-called House of the Arrephoroi and to the north and northeast of the Erechtheion, could be ascribed to Mnesikles’ aim to conform to the orders of the Kallias decrees to deliver the Acropolis clear of worked building materials and fitted out as finely as possible, so that the Acropolis be put in order in the best and cheapest way (Fig. 5, above).\textsuperscript{66} It must be understood as a highly original piece of political rhetoric worthy of a genius such as Mnesikles, which was conceived and realized at the same time as the Erechtheion.

A single thread closely connects the Propylaia, the Erechtheion, and the recycling of blocks from the Old Temple of Athena and the old Parthenon in the north Acropolis wall. One can follow the thought of the Propylaia’s architect developing through the successive invention of hybrid architectural forms facilitating the imposed curtailment of the original plan, towards the gradual acceptance of the incompleteness of the Propylaia as legitimate architecture of a valuable original style. This became the starting point for the conception of the free, imaginative architectural composition of the Erechtheion, where the hybrid forms resulting from the imposed incomplete character of the Propylaia became the basis of creative inspiration in order to serve and reflect the unique and complicated functional character of the new building. The non-architectural character of the Acropolis north wall provided Mnesikles the opportunity

\textsuperscript{64} Stevens et al. 1927, 453; Strocka 1975, 48.
\textsuperscript{65} Stevens et al. 1927, 277–422.
\textsuperscript{66} See above, section 3 (d) and notes 15–26; Bundgaard 1976, 121–33.
to proceed one step further, towards the invention of an atypical form by the rebuilding of fragments from strictly formal architectural entities in a way that allowed the identification of their provenance, with all the related historical implications. The result is a hybrid which, in post-Renaissance terms, could be defined as a *capriccio*. The power of the resulting unconventional form allowed it to serve as a strong manifestation of abstract concepts, in other words as a rhetorical scheme. I believe that the qualities of this process I have described in these three construction projects reflects the developing thought of only one person, an architect of genius in the modern sense.\(^{67}\)

6. Epilogue

In the end, one cannot miss the fact that Thucydides does not provide much information about the buildings of the Acropolis, except for a simple mention of the Propylaia. In his work, as much as in other contemporary texts, inscriptions and literature, nothing is said about an aesthetic appreciation of the art of those marvels, emerging in all their pristine forms and colours, in the middle of the most unfavourable practical conditions. Whatever this may mean, the precision with which each Greek term for structure or form renders their factual qualities is astonishing. It is with equal accuracy that Thucydides weaves the text of his *History* in phrasing his words. One cannot but wonder, how can it be that this strong volition of the Greek Word for specifying qualities of realities finds no route to the verbal expression of what we call works of art? It seems that, to the Greeks, facts or objects can be conceived or perceived in their full essence and substance, just by being named; is it not an aspect of the Platonic

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\(^{67}\) I am grateful to my friend Prof. Lila Marangou for pointing me towards Eisenwerth 1959, containing among others an article by André Chastel on *Le fragmentaire, l’hybride et l’inachevé* (Chastel 1959), which made me see beyond strictly archaeological-architectural concepts.
concept of the word as defining the abstract idea in the Being and, at the same time, its sensible substance in the Kosmos?

I think that the following passage by Martin Heidegger conceptualises this phenomenon in a more descriptive way: “The fact that the Greeks did not describe and talk about their ‘works of art’ ‘aesthetically’ bears witness to the fact that these works stood well secured in the clarity of the word, without which a column would not be a column, a tympanum a tympanum, a frieze a frieze. In an essentially unique way, through their poetizing and thinking, the Greeks experience Being in the disclosiveness of legend and word. And only therefore do their architecture and sculpture display the nobility of the built and the shaped. These ‘works’ exist only in the medium of the essentially telling word…” 68 Heidegger speaks about the Greeks before the middle of the fourth century B.C. It is true that later descriptions and appraisals of works of art become too common and standardized by rules of rhetoric. But that is not Thucydides’ world.

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Figures

All drawings and photographs are by Tasos Tanoulas unless otherwise stated in the captions. The digital editing of the images was undertaken by Markos Toufeklis.

Fig. 1. The Propylaia. Finished parts of the complex in full lines; never erected parts of the original design in broken lines. a) Bird’s eye view from SW. b) Plan. c) Western façade.

Fig. 2. Regular floor slabs inserted between the central (right) and the eastern-most (left) columns of the Propylaia’s northern Ionic colonnade. I. Plan (indicated as section B in II). II. View from north (indicated as section A in I). Below: photograph from the north. The undesirable gap between these blocks and the substructure was visible from the central passageway.

Fig. 3. Above, left: the area to the north and northeast of the Propylaia central building (1991 plan). The remains of the Propylaia northeast wing foundation are in ochre yellow. The remains of the northwest building foundation are in olive green. Above, right: area plan with the proposed reconstruction of the building which was built on the foundations intended for the northwest building (existing parts of the superstructure in black) and of the Mnesiklean gutter at the extension of the older rock-cut gutter still in use (blue). Below: Detail drawings of the junction between the northeast wing foundation (ochre yellow) and northwest building foundations (olive green), plan and frontal view from the west. The uppermost blocks of the junction are aligned with the northeast wing foundations.

Fig. 4. A. Plan of the upper surface of the central door lintel of the Propylaia and the blocks flanking it on the north and south showing the surviving sockets for dowels. Above and below the plan, cross-sections showing the way each of the dowels were put in place and sheathed in lead. Five of the sockets above the lintel blocks (a, b, c, d, e) indicate a technology much later than the ones flanking them on both ends. B, C, D. Drawings showing parts of the superstructure of the Propylaia central building that could not have been built before these five blocks were placed in their final positions above the central lintel. B. View of the ceiling from below. C. East front of the door-wall. D. West front of the door-wall.
Fig. 5. Acropolis north wall. Above: from the northwest corner of the Ar- rhetoreion (far right) to the angled section northeast of the Mycenaean gate (far left). Middle: from the angled section to the northeast of the Mycenaean gate (far right), to the angled section northeast of the sanctuary of Zeus Polieus (far left). Below: poros column drums and capitals built inside the north wall, cut as to show a regular ashlar masonry on the outside, see middle picture in this figure (left photograph: DAI AK. 39, Bundgaard 1974 vol. 1, 72, fig. 15; right photograph: Markos Toufeklis).

Fig. 6. Above: view of the Propylaia from the SE (photograph: Markos Toufeklis). Middle, left: west end of the Propylaia and temple of Athena Nike temple, view from the north. Middle, right: the SE corner of the Athena Nike temple and the Propylaia south wing, view from SW. Below, left: Propylaia south wing, southwest corner of the superstructure, showing the junction of the raking cornice, the entablature of the southwest corner and the south wall. View from the SE. Below, right: detail of the junction between the raking cornice of the Propylaia south wing, the geison block of the southwest corner and the wall during restoration, before the placement of the next cornice block to the right. The original gap between them has been filled with lead, as it must have been originally. View from the SE.

Fig. 7. The superstructure of the Propylaia south wing. a) View of the south wall from the inside (north) showing sockets for the ends of the ceiling beams above the epicranitis. b) The inside of the top of the northern colonnade entablature, with sockets for the ends of ceiling beams and sloping rafters of the roof. On the left and right, sections of the recesses for the westernmost and easternmost beams. c) Plan of the upper surface of the epicranitis showing sockets along the top of the entablature (top) and the south wall (bottom) for the ends of the ceiling beams. Left and right, sections of the recesses for the easternmost (right) and westernmost (left) beams. The broken lines in the middle indicate the joints of evenly distributed beams, with a uniform width of 0.62 m. d) Graphic restoration of the plan of the beams in the wooden ceiling indicating the arrangement of a possible decoration with painted (or sculpted) coffers, in the style of the coffered ceiling in the Porch of the Maidens at the Erechtheion (digital drawing: Samuel Holzman).

Fig. 8. Erechtheion. Roof (above) and ceiling (bottom) of the Porch of the Maidens. The upper surface with slopes allowing drainage through the
perforated sima and the cornice elements underneath, as well as the coffered ceiling, are carved out of the same marble slabs (lower photograph: Markos Toufeklis).

Fig. 9. The marble cover of the south niche of the Propylaia. Above: reconstruction of the cover in its original position between the roof of the south wing and the southernmost Doric column of the central building western façade. View from the NW. Below: model of the original form of the cover from the west end (after drawings and guidance by Tasos Tanoulas. Photograph: Telemachos Souvlakis).

Fig. 10. Chart showing the probable dates of building activity on the Acropolis in the second half of the fifth century BC.

Fig. 11. Propylaia's northern wing, sockets above the epicranitis in the eastern face of the eastern wall intended for the west ends of the northeast wing sloping rafters. Only the first two blocks with sockets from the south are in situ. Above: view of the superstructure (photograph: Markos Toufeklis). Below: view of the wall, actual state.

Fig. 12 Above: view of the west end of the Acropolis, from the NW (2016). From left to right: the north wing (so-called Pinakotheke), the Agrippa pedestal, the Propylaia central building and south wing, the Athena Nike temple. Below: plan of the western end of the Acropolis including the buildings discussed in this study in relation to the building procedure of the Propylaia.
Fig. 3.
Fig. 8.
Fig. 9.
PROBABLE DATES OF BUILDING ACTIVITY ON THE ACROPOLIS
SECOND HALF OF FIFTH CENTURY

Fig. 10.
This paper focuses on a little-known episode in the history of scholarship on Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War: the criticism which the Modern Greek historian, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos (1815–1891), levelled against the views on the causes of the war advanced by two eminent contemporary Western European scholars: the English historian, George Grote (1794–1871), and the German, Ernst Curtius (1814–1896).

Was fifth-century Athens an oppressive, imperialist state that attested to the dangerous nature of radical democracy and that had to be contained, or was it, rather, a benevolent hegemon unjustly attacked by the enemies of democracy? Was Pericles a populist warmonger or a wise political leader? What was one to make of Thucydides’ account of the causes of the Peloponnesian War? These questions were at the centre of Paparrigopoulos’ disagreement with Grote and Curtius. As we will see, the rival interpretations put forward by the three historians were informed by personal political convictions and biases and provide examples of the ideological usages of ancient Greek history in nineteenth-century historiography.
Paparrigopoulos on the Peloponnesian War

In contrast to Curtius and, above all, Grote, who remain internationally recognisable figures in the history of classical scholarship, Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos is hardly known outside Greece. In the latter, however, he enjoys the reputation of being one of the founding fathers of Modern Greek historiography. Indeed, his *History of the Hellenic Nation* (1860–1874) has been called ‘without serious risk of exaggeration as the most important intellectual achievement of nineteenth-century Greece’. Paparrigopoulos is most famous for advocating the highly influential thesis of the continuity of Greek history from antiquity to the present. Studies of his work tend accordingly to concentrate on his incorporation of Macedonian and Byzantine history into a unified history of Greece. Much less attention has been given to his treatment of ancient Greek history, which, however, forms an integral part of his *History*. It is often assumed that Paparrigopoulos’ account of it is derivative. Paparrigopoulos was unquestionably very heavily reliant on contemporary Western European historiography; however, he was not a mere passive recipient of the views that had currency in Western scholarship. An examination of his approach to the causes of the Peloponnesian War may serve as an illustration of how he carved out his own independent stand-point.

When he came to dealing with the Peloponnesian War in the first volume of his *History*, Paparrigopoulos asserted that it constituted one of the most crucial episodes in the history of ‘our forefathers’, affirming, in this manner, the unity between ancient and modern Greeks. He emphasized that, in contrast to the Persian Wars, the war between Athens and Sparta and their allies was a civil war which divided the entire Greek race into two opposing camps and caused

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2. On Paparrigopoulos’ life and work see Dimaras 1986.
such a material and moral strain on the nation that it greatly contributed to the decline of ancient Hellenism. Moreover, Paparrigopoulos, who was certainly not immune to rhetorical amplification, maintained that, owing to its remarkable mixture of both the most devious and the noblest principles, passions and deeds, the Peloponnesian War became the most terrifying spectacle and most instructive lesson of all time and of all nations. Given how consequential the Peloponnesian War was, Paparrigopoulos underscored that it was all the more important to form a correct opinion of who was responsible for it. We may further add that in view of the extraordinary didactic importance that Paparrigopoulos himself attached to the Peloponnesian War, it is of particular interest to see how he handled this issue. Paparrigopoulos remarked that there was a trend among contemporary historians to exonerate the Athenians and Pericles in particular of the blame for the war. He mentioned Grote and Curtius as the chief advocates of this position.

The causes of the Peloponnesian War according to Grote

As a historian of ancient Greece, Grote is perhaps best-known for his favourable portrayal of democratic Athens which went against a long tradition of philo-Laconism in modern historiography. Scholars commenting on Grote’s work have stressed how his vindication of Athenian democracy had contemporary political resonances. In the wake of the French Revolution the question of whether democracies were predestined to degenerate into violent ‘tyrannies of the multitude’ became acutely topical. A major representative of the an-

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. 629.
6. Ibid. 603.
ti-Athenian and anti-democratic tendencies of the historiography of that period was William Mitford.\(^9\) In his discussion of fifth-century Athens in his *History of Greece* (1784–1810), Mitford characteristically fulminated against ‘the inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism of democratic government’.\(^10\) As James Kierstead points out, the *History of Greece* (1846–1856) by the liberal parliamentarian Grote may be seen as an attempt to counter the account of Greek history put forward by Mitford and like-minded historians.\(^11\)

An important yet under-discussed aspect of Grote’s pro-Athenian attitude is his treatment of the question of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. Grote took issue with the prevalent view at the time which regarded Athens as responsible for the war. We may observe that, more than a hundred years later, this remained the majority opinion, becoming the target of de Ste. Croix in his *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* in 1972.\(^12\) It is worth noting in this context that at the beginning of the latter, de Ste. Croix stated of Grote’s *History* that it was ‘still supreme in many ways’ and that Grote’s ‘judgment on many historical and philosophical matters [was] superior to that of most subsequent writers’.\(^13\) As we shall see, some of the points which de Ste. Croix raised in favour of Athens in the *Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, as well as in his earlier ‘The character of the Athenian empire’ (1954), recall those of Grote. Other than mentioning Grote’s general pro-Athenian stance, de Ste. Croix did not refer, as far as I know, to Grote’s specific arguments, but there may well have been some influences.

At a first level, Grote argued that none of Athens’ actions – from

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9. Ibid. 192–204.
10. Mitford 1808, 68.
12. ‘The predominant view among historians in recent years has been that Athens was the aggressor in the Peloponnesian War, and that she forced war on a reluctant Sparta’, de Ste. Croix 1972, 290.
13. Ibid. 4.
the enforcement of the Megarian decree to her defensive alliance with Corcyra – constituted a violation of the peace treaty with Sparta.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, he emphasized that while Athens showed willingness to submit contested matters to arbitration, her offer was rejected by Sparta. According to Grote, it followed that the ones who were in breach of the treaty, being ‘manifestly the aggressors’, were the Peloponnesian confederates and not, as was usually assumed, the Athenians.\textsuperscript{15} As is well known, this was the thrust of de Ste. Croix’s \textit{Origins of the Peloponnesian War}.\textsuperscript{16}

In addition, Grote sought to absolve Pericles of blame for the war. This should be seen in the light of his broader portrayal of Pericles. For Grote, Pericles was not the profit-seeking politician who was responsible for the corruption of the Athenian people and the degeneration of Athenian democracy into an ochlocracy as his critics alleged. In support of his view, he highlighted Thucydides’ depiction of Pericles: ‘We may thus appeal to the judgment of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Pericles of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character and government’.\textsuperscript{17} It is notable that, whereas in the case of Pericles Grote relied on the ‘trustworthy’ judgment of Thucydides, he notoriously questioned it when it came to Cleon.\textsuperscript{18}

Concerning the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Grote dismissed the allegations that Pericles came up with the Megarian de-

\textsuperscript{14} Grote 1851, 104, 107–8. ‘Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the Thirty Years’ truce’, Grote 1851, 126.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. 126.
\textsuperscript{16} De Ste. Croix 1972, 290.
\textsuperscript{17} Grote 1851, 237.
\textsuperscript{18} Turner 1981, 228–9.
More importantly, he defended Pericles’ policy of not letting Athens yield to Sparta’s demands. Grote argued that doing as Sparta asked would have been tantamount to ‘such an abnegation both of dignity and power as no nation under any government will ever submit to, and as would have even left her without decent security for her individual rights’. He further suggested that a concession to Sparta would have been construed as a sign of ‘weakness and fear’. We may compare de Ste. Croix who stated that ‘it is difficult to see what concession Athens could have made without giving an impression of fear and weakness’. To return to Grote, in his opinion, the stance of the Athenian democracy under Pericles’ leadership was not then unreasonably intransigent or aggressive as her ideological opponents would have it: any state under any form of government would have acted similarly. According to Grote, then, Athens was acting out of a legitimate right to self-defence.

At this point, we should stress that Grote sought to vindicate the conduct of the Athenian democracy as an imperial power in general – as de Ste. Croix also did. Thucydides famously treated the alleged breaches of the truce as mere pretexts pointing to Sparta’s fear of Athenian power as an underlying reason for the war. Grote observed that modern historians influenced by Thucydides tended to regard Athenian ambition for ever more power as forcing Sparta to go to war. He suggested that that was but ‘a partial view of the case’. Grote conceded that the rapid growth of Athens after the Persian Wars had been a cause of alarm for Sparta and her allies. However, he underscored that in the decade preceding the Peloponnesian War,

19. Grote 1851, 139.
20. Ibid. 149.
21. Ibid.
23. Thuc. 1.23.
24. Grote 1851, 150.
Periclean Athens had actually not pursued an expansionist foreign policy.\textsuperscript{25} Contrary to what Thucydides stated, Grote contended that it was not so much fear, but rather hatred that made the Peloponnesian allies attack Athens.\textsuperscript{26}

Sparta, on her side, claimed to be undertaking the war for the sake of Greek freedom. Grote did not dispute the nobility of the cause and the appeal of her rhetoric to Greek ears. He acknowledged that Athens did not preside over a voluntary alliance, but ruled an empire as a despot. This he admitted as a fundamental injustice. Nevertheless, he fervently objected to Mitford ‘and so many other’ historians who accused the Athenian democracy ‘of peculiar cruelty and oppression’. As de Ste. Croix would also do,\textsuperscript{27} Grote suggested that, as far as despotic powers went, Athens was a relatively moderate one and that she generally did not treat her subjects harshly before such ‘aberrations’ as the suppression of the Melians. Grote provocatively argued that, in fact, if one compared Athens’ attitude towards her subjects to modern empires, including the British during the eighteenth century, the comparison would be in Athens’ favour.\textsuperscript{28} He further maintained that in those cases where a subject state revolted, the initiative tended to come from small oligarchic groups and not from the bulk of the people. We may note again that this is a point which de Ste. Croix greatly stressed.\textsuperscript{29} Going even further, Grote advanced

\textsuperscript{25} Kagan 1969, 345–6 also emphasized this point: ‘We have argued that Athenian power did not grow between 445 and 435, that the imperial appetite of Athens was not insatiable’.

\textsuperscript{26} Grote 1851, 128, 150.

\textsuperscript{27} De Ste. Croix 1954, 14.

\textsuperscript{28} ‘[one] will be inclined to think that the empire of Athens over her allies makes comparatively a creditable figure. It will most certainly stand full comparison with the government of England over dependencies in the last century’, Grote 1851, 64 n. 1.

\textsuperscript{29} Thus de Ste. Croix 1972, 40 argued that there was ‘a marked difference of attitude towards the imperial city between the ruling Few and the mass of lower-class citizens’; he granted that the ordinary citizens of the subject states
the view that at least the smaller subjects of Athens would stand to lose considerably from the dissolution of her empire inasmuch as the Athenian navy provided safety on the seas which was necessary for trade.\textsuperscript{30} Once again challenging the testimony of Thucydides, he asserted that ‘the feeling common among them [the member states of the Athenian empire] towards Athens, seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy’.\textsuperscript{31}

Grote then dismissed both the legal and the moral case against Athens: Athenian democracy was not the inherently violent and oppressive political actor that her modern detractors alleged. Instead, she was a cautious and moderate hegemon whose rule brought advantages to her subjects. As we have mentioned, at a time of great political fermentation in Europe, which witnessed intense debates on the pros and cons of democratic government, Grote’s exoneration of Athens from the blame for the Peloponnesian War and his partial whitewashing of Athenian imperialism formed part of a wider argument in defence of democracy.

To return to Paparrigopoulos, he was a great admirer of Grote. In his opinion, the latter ‘applied the rules of modern historical science more correctly, grasped the spirit of ancient Hellenism more accurately and interpreted its institutions more practically than anybody else’.\textsuperscript{32} Nevertheless, Paparrigopoulos was no uncritical follower of Grote. On fundamental questions, such as, for example, the assessment of Athenian radical democracy, Paparrigopoulos took issue with him.\textsuperscript{33} As will be shown, his disagreement with Grote regarding

\begin{itemize}
\item may not have felt enthusiasm for Athens, but suggested that they may ‘have seen Athenian domination as a “lesser evil” than being subjected to their own oligarchs’.
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\textsuperscript{30} Grote 1851, 64. Cf. de Ste. Croix 1954, 1.
\textsuperscript{31} Grote 1851, 43.
\textsuperscript{32} Paparrigopoulos 1860, 37–8.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. 667.
the causes of the Peloponnesian War was closely linked to their different perspectives on Athenian democracy. Before discussing Paparrigopoulos’ critical response to Grote, however, let us consider the standpoint of Curtius.

*The causes of the Peloponnesian War according to Curtius*

Ernst Curtius was one of the most distinguished German historians and archaeologists of the second half of the nineteenth century.34 His *History of Ancient Greece*, written between 1857 and 1867, enjoyed great success in Germany and was translated into other European languages, including Modern Greek at the very end of the nineteenth century.35 In 1860, when the first volume of Paparrigopoulos’ *History of the Hellenic Nation* appeared, Curtius was not yet as well-known in Greece as he would later become, and Paparrigopoulos felt the need to inform his readers that the German scholar was the author of an Ancient Greek History.36

Curtius too maintained that it was Sparta and her allies, especially Corinth, rather than Athens that bore the responsibility for the Peloponnesian War, without making mention of Grote, to my knowledge. In part, his argumentation resembled Grote’s, but, as we will see, he also placed emphasis on other points. Like Grote, Curtius contended that the Peloponnesian allies were wrong to accuse Athens of violating the peace treaty and that Athens had done nothing illegal.37 He stressed that Athens’ foreign policy under Pericles was carefully designed not to offer Sparta any legitimate grounds for holding that Athens had broken the terms of the truce. In this context, we should call attention to Curtius’ idealised por-

34. On Curtius, see Christ 1972, 68–83.
36. Paparrigopoulos 1860, 603.
37. Curtius 1861, 298.
trayal of Pericles. Curtius highlighted Pericles’ outstanding intellectual gifts and his qualities as a statesman. Thus he maintained that Pericles possessed a superior intellect and was highly cultivated; he also combined inner strength with external composure. Pericles’ nature, asserted Curtius, was thoroughly aristocratic; and yet in his politics he was a democrat. Curtius argued that by the fifth century BC the times of hereditary aristocracy in Athens were over – power could no longer reside in the hands of a few families whose claim to it was based exclusively on their noble lineage. He spoke of the emergence of a new Athenian aristocracy, an aristocracy of merit, which was eager to take over command of the city. Athens would henceforward be ruled not by its noblest, but by its best citizens. In using such language, Curtius can be seen to express the ideology of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie that was challenging the European aristocracy’s grip on power.

It should be observed that if Curtius was against the rule of hereditary nobility, he was, however, no supporter of radical democracy either. As Näf remarks, Grote and Curtius disagreed deeply in their politics. In contrast to the former, a patronising and condescending tone is noticeable in Curtius’ references towards the ‘people’. The Athenians, he stated, could not govern themselves efficiently on their own. In his eyes, the Attic citizenry, like any other citizen body, were incapable of acting with resolution and reasonableness. Curtius held that the masses always needed an outstanding individual to govern them and in the case of fifth-century Athens none was better qualified than Pericles – who was himself

42. Curtius was a royalist with personal ties to the Prussian throne, although, as should be evident, without being a reactionary: Christ 1996, 126.
43. Näf 1986, 42.
fully aware of the insufficiencies of the demos.\textsuperscript{44} To Curtius, Pericles indeed appeared as a model king and his reign as a \textit{Monarchie des Genius}.\textsuperscript{45} Curtius further argued that as a politician Pericles followed the principle of the reconciliation of opposites.\textsuperscript{46} This constituted, in his eyes, one of the greatest ideals.\textsuperscript{47} Curtius had lived through the political and social tensions in the German world during the first half of the nineteenth century which culminated in the revolutions of 1848.\textsuperscript{48} We may conjecture that the experience of these events made him appreciate the importance of reconciling opposing sides and inclined him to associate this with the great political figures of history.\textsuperscript{49}

As regards external affairs, Curtius suggested that Pericles had rightly perceived that the war with Sparta could only be postponed – not avoided.\textsuperscript{50} However, as we mentioned, he argued that Pericles took care not to give Sparta any valid reason for accusing Athens of breaking the peace treaty. Curtius maintained that Sparta, on the other hand, for all her claims to be standing on the side of the law, showed complete disregard for it. Recalling Grote, Curtius emphasized that by rushing to war without giving a chance to arbitration at the instigation of Corinth, which in his account – along with Sparta

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} ‘Aber Niemand konnte mehr als Perikles von der Unfähigkeit des Haufens, selbst zu regieren, überzeugt sein. Jede Volksmasse muss regiert werden’; ‘War die attische Bürgerschaft ... zwar wie jede andere Volksmasse unfähig, aus eigenen Antrieben vernunft-und zweckmässig zu handeln’, Curtius 1861, 176–8; Christ 1996, 131. On the (largely negative) perceptions of Athenian democracy in nineteenth-century German historiography, see Näf 1986.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Curtius 1861, 174; Christ 1996, 132.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Christ 1996, 132.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Christ 1972, 73.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Christ 1996, 132.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Curtius 1861, 155, 192.
\end{itemize}
took the place of Athens as the villain, Sparta blatantly violated the truce. Curtius denounced her behaviour as unreasonable and totally incommensurate. At this point, we should note the strong tradition of idealisation of the Dorians in German scholarship, the greatest representative of which was Curtius’ revered teacher, K. O. Müller (1797–1840). While Curtius had been full of praise for the Sparta of the archaic age, recalling K. O. Müller, he launched a diatribe against what he alleged she had turned into by the second half of the fifth century. The Spartan position, that they would fight for the sake of Greek freedom, he dismissed as empty words. Curtius asserted that the Greeks, deceived by the lofty proclamations of Sparta, failed to realise that the state of Lycurgus had been gradually transformed into a regime of self-seeking aristocrats in which narrow family interests were decisive. This indictment of Spartan aristocracy may be read as an implicit attack on the dangers inherent in aristocratic rule in general.

The causes of the Peloponnesian War according to Paparrigopoulos

Paparrigopoulos strongly opposed Grote’s and Curtius’ attempts to shift the blame for the Peloponnesian War from Athens to Sparta


52. Christ 1972, 76.

53. ‘Dabei war die Menge der Hellenen über Sparta in völliger Täuschung; man kannte es gar nicht, man wusste nicht, wie der lykurgische Staat immer mehr zu einer selbstsüchtigen Aristokratie geworden war, in welcher engherzige Familieninteressen massgebend waren’, Curtius 1861, 308.
and her allies. Unlike them, he took the view that with her actions in the late 430s Athens had indeed broken the Thirty Years Peace. However, he did not dwell on the legal dimensions of the case. He emphasized that the crucial question was not whether Athens had violated the letter of the law, but, rather, whether she had behaved in a way that undermined the preservation of peaceful relations with the Peloponnesian League, confirming the suspicions that she was not prepared to stay content with what she already possessed, but was eyeing the subjugation of the whole of Greece.

Paparrigopoulos maintained that to obtain answers to these questions one should consult the most reliable historical source on the Peloponnesian War: this, he stressed, was neither Ephoros nor the comic poets who accused Pericles of inciting the war to save his political future, but, by a wide margin, Thucydides. Both Grote and Curtius focused on the years between the Thirty Years Peace and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War to suggest that during that period Athens was actually not being expansionist. Paparrigopoulos went back to Thucydides’ account of the whole of the Pentecontaetia. He highlighted Thucydides’ opinion that it was Sparta’s fear of the growth of Athenian power that made her decide to go to war and his statement that Athens had started to encroach upon Sparta’s allies. Furthermore, he drew attention to Thucydides’ report that Greek public opinion initially favoured Sparta. If this were how things stood, according to Thucydides, was it reasonable for modern historians, Paparrigopoulos asked, to disregard his testimony and contend that Athens had done the Peloponnesian League no wrong, and that the Greeks had been collectively mistaken in believing that Athens wanted to enslave them? And, moreover, to make these claims not

54. Paparrigopoulos 1860, 588ff.
55. Ibid. 603–4.
56. Ibid. 604–5.
57. Ibid.
by appealing to another ancient source that could be considered as outweighing Thucydides, but merely on the basis of their personal view of the matter?\(^{58}\)

Paparrigopoulos meant these as rhetorical questions; but, if tempted to reply, one might point to how the evidence offered by Thucydides has been used to question Thucydides’ statements.\(^{59}\) Indicative of the different ways in which Thucydides has been read is that de Ste. Croix, in drawing the opposite conclusions from Paparrigopoulos, emphasized that they were backed by Thucydides’ narrative: ‘I would claim that the picture I have drawn is thoroughly based upon the evidence of our most reliable sources, Thucydides above all, and that anyone who dislikes that picture had better begin by trying to discredit Thucydides, if he can’.\(^{60}\) From Grote to Meyer to Kagan, de Ste. Croix and others, the impartiality or correctness of Thucydides’ judgments have often been called into question on different grounds.\(^{61}\) Paparrigopoulos’ implied assumption of the self-evident superiority of Thucydides over the counter-argumentation of modern scholars will to many seem contestable; we may, however, take his objections to Grote and Curtius as an invitation to reflect on how strong is the evidence in each case adduced by scholars who seek to challenge Thucydides.

To go back to Paparrigopoulos, granting that Athens was the aggressor, who, in his eyes, was responsible for her aggressiveness? As we saw, both Grote and Curtius absolved Pericles. Paparrigopoulos did not lend credence to the accusations that Pericles provoked the war for the sake of his political survival. He stressed, however, that,

\(^{58}\) Ibid. 606.

\(^{59}\) De Ste. Croix, for example, suggested that ‘the news columns in Thucydides, so to speak, contradict the editorial Thucydides’, de Ste. Croix 1954, 3.

\(^{60}\) Ibid. 290.

\(^{61}\) For a survey of modern scholars in disagreement with Thucydides, see Kagan 1969, 357–74.
according to Thucydides, it was he who urged the Athenians to fight rather than cave in to Sparta. In contrast to Grote and Curtius, who justified Pericles’ stance, Paparrigopoulos argued that even if the war were indeed inevitable, what would have been in line with Athens’ real interests was not to offer Sparta even the slightest pretext for starting hostilities – so that at least the war could be postponed as long as possible. In advancing this view Paparrigopoulos arguably approached the question not only from the perspective of the Athenian land-owners who had most to lose from the war; he can be seen as assuming here the mantle of the ‘national historian’ of Greece, who, as we mentioned, conceived the war between Sparta and Athens and their allies as a civil war that should have been avoided at all costs. It should be remembered in this context that the unification of Greece was one of the goals towards which Greek history progressed, according to Paparrigopoulos’ teleological conception of historical development.

In addition, Paparrigopoulos emphasized that what made the war inevitable was nothing other than the despotic rule of Athens over her subjects. In his eyes, the root cause went back to the changes in the Athenian constitution in the middle of the fifth century. Paparrigopoulos regarded as the best constitution of Greek antiquity the Athenian democracy before that period inasmuch as it ensured that the kaloi-kagathoi – the land-owners and, in Paparrigopoulos’ telling words, the most prudent and just citizens – were in charge of the city. Like Grote, Paparrigopoulos was no admirer of Sparta. In his eyes, the early Athenian democracy was vastly superior to the much-touted Spartan oligarchy. However, Paparrigopoulos argued that, had the wise citi-

63. Ibid.
64. Ibid. 719.
66. Ibid. 622.
67. Ibid. 701.
zens who had run Athens at the time of the Persian Wars still been in charge in the 430s, they would certainly have rescinded the Megarian degree in order to prevent war. As a result of the reforms of Pericles, however, the best citizens became marginalised. From then on the city came under the control of the nautikos ochlos. Paparrigopoulos asserted that their ignorance proved to be ruinous for Athens and ultimately made the war unavoidable. According to him, the multitude were not only indifferent to the prospect of the destruction of the estates of the Athenian land-owners by the Spartan army, but may have actually desired it inasmuch as ‘the poor are naturally envious of the rich’. The ‘naval crowd’, he further maintained, were only too eager to listen to Pericles since they looked forward to profiting from the naval attacks on the Peloponnesian.

Paparrigopoulos, as must be abundantly clear by now, manifests an elitist attitude, portraying the lower classes in a negative light and, conversely, favouring the upper tiers of society. It comes as no surprise, then, that, for Paparrigopoulos, Pericles was far from being as blameless as Grote and Curtius claimed. Although Paparrigopoulos did not dispute that he was an ingenious politician, in his eyes, Pericles was at least partly responsible for handing over too much power to the Athenian people, corrupting them through ‘populist measures’ and, ultimately, for bringing on the war. Paparrigopoulos’ verdict, then, was that what caused the Peloponnesian War consisted of poor judgment in the conception and execution of

68. Ibid. 720.
69. Ibid. 622.
70. Ibid. 692.
71. Ibid. 622, 623.
72. Ibid.
73. It should be noted, however, that in other parts of his work Paparrigopoulos characterized the upper rungs of society as by nature prone to profligacy and looked to the lower ones for the moral regeneration of society: ibid., 766
74. Ibid. 641–3.
Athenian foreign policy, which stemmed from fundamental flaws in the Athenian constitution.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{Conclusion}

In the case of Grote, the attribution of blame for the war to Sparta entailed a vindication of the conduct of Athens as an imperial power and formed part of a broader rehabilitation of Athenian radical democracy. Curtius, on the other hand, in alleging that Sparta was responsible for the war, condemned the role of the Spartan aristocracy; conversely, he extolled Pericles as a model political leader who domestically imposed himself on a fickle and ignorant crowd while handling external affairs with prudence. Lastly, Paparrigopoulos, in rejecting the revisionist views of Grote and Curtius in favour of the traditional position, according to which the responsibility for the war lay with Athens, denounced Pericles’ reforms as opening the floodgates to ochlocracy and looked back with nostalgia to the times when the ‘best citizens’ ruled the city. In all three cases, then, the question of the responsibility for the Peloponnesian War became intertwined with praise for, and blame of, different social groups and political systems, irrespective of their given historical context, in accordance with each scholar’s ideological standpoint. Thus a contentious issue concerning Greek history of the fifth century BC became invested with modern political implications.

It might be tempting for present-day scholars to regard the influence that the ideological filters and prejudices of their predecessors exercised on their work as something that modern scholarship with its increasing sense of self-awareness has largely outgrown. Before jumping to such a conclusion, however, we should recall that \textit{The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War} in which Kagan ar-

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid. 720.
guessed that the war was not inevitable and that ‘there was good reason to think that the two great powers and their allies could live side by side in peace indefinitely’ appeared during the Cold War;⁷⁶ and that de Ste. Croix concluded his Origins of the Peloponnesian War emphasizing that it was the Helot threat that forced the Spartans to go to war in 431 and that Sparta provided ‘an admirable illustration of the maxim that a people which oppresses another cannot itself be free’.⁷⁷ It would seem, then, that the tendency to politicise the question of the causes of the Peloponnesian War and to approach it through the filters of alleged modern parallels has remained potent in scholarship.

References


Dimaras, K. Th. 1986: Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρριγόπουλος. Η Εποχή του, η Ζωή του, το Έργο του [Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos. His Time, his Life, his Work], Athens.


On the 2nd November, 1914, a young German officer named Schwartz was killed on the Western Front. The following week his father received a telegram informing him of the tragic news. That young man’s father was one of the greatest philological minds of his generation, Eduard Schwartz. The next day the elder Schwartz turned aside from producing a monumental study of the *Acta* of the Ecumenical Councils. His new object of study was Thucydides. Reeling from his misfortune and the trauma of the war, Schwartz sought out the Athenian historian as a kindred spirit. Thucydides had lived through the trauma of the Peloponnesian War and survived long enough to see the golden age of his city’s culture brought to an end and her power destroyed. Schwartz’s study focused on understanding Thucydides as a man and as a historian shaped by the trauma of the war. Before the Great War, German scholars such as Wilamowitz and Classen had argued endlessly over the precise dates of the composition of various parts of the *History of the Peloponnesian War*, positing the production of first and second drafts by the historian, in an ongoing debate called the *Thukydidesfrage*. Schwartz realised intuitively that a ‘creative’ historian such as Thucydides could only write so authoritatively of an event when it lay completed before him. Thucydides had, in this interpretation, made notes and even drafts throughout the conflict but returned to a bro-
ken Athens only after the end of the Peloponnesian War to rewrite his project into a unified whole. Working in the shattered ruins of his beloved city, Thucydides began to revise the layers of his work, interpreting the Peloponnesian War through the prism of Athens’ defeat. In reliving Thucydides’ trauma, Schwartz was attempting to make sense of his own.

I discovered this key moment in Thucydidean scholarship via a transcript of Enoch Powell’s 1936 speech given to the Classical Association in London on the effect of the Great War upon Thucydidean studies, which is now housed in the archives of Churchill College Cambridge. He called his paper *The War and Its Aftermath in their Effect upon Thucydidean Studies*. This remarkable text argues that the Great War had led to an unprecedented seventeen years in Thucydidean studies that had produced new interpretations of such vitality that they were unmatched in the history of scholarship.1 Powell’s paper serves as a suitable jumping-off point to consider how ideas of Thucydides’ world are not always understood from a purely historicist point of view. Indeed, even the most philologically-minded scholars often imagine Thucydides’ context through the prism of contemporary events. Powell speaks throughout the paper of how the direct experience of the war or its effect upon loved ones, communities, and nations had led to readings of the text that embraced Thucydides’ depiction of the brutality of politics and human nature. For Powell, Schwartz stands right at the beginning of this tradition. His personal trauma represents the moment at which this explosion of scholarship began. Referring to the day that Schwartz received his dreadful telegram, Powell writes: ‘To this event we owe a book

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1. Powell noted that the terrible toll in men and materials exacted by the war had generally held back classical scholarship, but ‘in mere bulk the Thucydidean literature of the past seventeen years is probably superior to that of any preceding period of equal length’ (Churchill archives 1/6/19: 1).
which is the most momentous ever dedicated to Thucydides’. Later German scholars – Powell named Max Pohlenz and Wolfgang Schadewaldt – were left to debate only the details of Schwartz’s reinterpretation of the *Thukydidesfrage*. However, this is not the end of the story. As we shall see below, Powell was very aware that the trauma of war had shaped not only Schwartz’s reading but had also shaped a number of subsequent British engagements with Thucydides, including Powell’s own. In this paper, I will explore how Powell thought the trauma of the Great War had opened up new interpretations of Thucydides both in the work of other scholars and in his own work that embraced the Athenian historian’s brutal depiction of man, war, and politics.

*Thucydides and trauma*

Trauma is not an entirely neglected topic in Thucydidean scholarship today. W. R. Connor notes early in his study that he was reading a newspaper article that drew an equivalence between the My Lai massacre and Mycalessus that led him back to the text, thereby acknowledging that even classical scholars are not immune to the emotional force of Thucydides’ words. More recently, Neville Morley has explored in depth how Thucydides’ presentation of trauma influenced Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s discussion of the Holocaust. Morley notes that Thucydides’ text is the product of trauma and has become, in the mod-

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2. Churchill archives (1/6/19: 2).
4. There are, of course, differences in interpretation, if not in approach, between these scholars. Schadewaldt, for example, moved away from considering Thucydides as solely a ‘historical scientist’, as Schwartz and Pohlenz had to consider him as an ‘historical artist’.
ern world, a literary model for contemporary descriptions of the horrors of war. Similarly, Victoria Wohl argues that ‘Thucydides’ text lifts itself up through the negation of its material: it transforms the trauma of Sicily into a *ktēma es aiei* and, in that form, achieves its own unimpeachable authority and lasting presence’.\(^7\) That said, trauma is hardly a routine topic of investigation among either classicists or social scientists. The vast majority of scholarship today focuses on Thucydides’ historical and political thought from a remote, scientific, standpoint. It is often noted that the trauma of the Peloponnesian War deeply affected Thucydides’ worldview and writings,\(^8\) but little space is devoted to how we receive and react to that trauma today and how the trauma of previous scholars has shaped subsequent readings of the text.

Trauma is, nevertheless, a crucial element to the modern ‘turn’ to Thucydides as one of the great writers of antiquity in both the classics and the social sciences. Scholars have seen Thucydides as a text for troubled times from the wars of religion in the sixteenth century, through the English Civil War and the French Revolution, to the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.\(^9\) However, Powell goes further than merely claiming that Thucydides is a comfort or guide to those who live through such traumas. Rather, he draws attention to the fact that Thucydides’ work, his genius even, is a product of the greatest trauma to have shaken the Greek world and that only readers who have experienced similar turmoil can truly appreciate his thought. He makes this point by drawing a sharp distinction between those scholars who had read Thucydides in a world of Victorian stability, such as J. P. Mahaffy, Francis Cornford, and Gilbert Murray, with those who came after the war, such

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8. For a recent example of this view, see Hawthorne 2014.
9. There has been a significant leap forward in our knowledge of the modern reception of Thucydides in recent years. See the papers collected in Fromentin, Gotteland, Payen 2010; Harloe and Morley 2012; Lee and Morley 2015, as well as the monographs Morley 2013 and Earley 2020.
as Eduard Schwartz, Albert Thibaudet and George Abbott. These latter scholars, Powell believed, had come to embrace Thucydides’ harsh depiction of human nature and politics, while the Victorians had attempted to ignore or explain it away. Powell’s Thucydides, therefore, serves not only as a reminder of the central place of trauma in the *History* and its reception but also as a provocation. Is it possible to understand the text, no matter how philologically and historically sophisticated our methodologies are, in a world divorced from trauma? And what does that trauma look like? These are difficult questions about the relationship between Thucydides’ world and our own that cannot simply be ignored.

*Learning to tolerate Thucydides*

Powell summed up his idea of the effect of the Great War on Thucydidean studies in one word: ‘toleration’. He believed that after the war scholars had become increasingly accepting of Thucydides’ harsh realism and no-holds-barred description of the brutal reality of Greek politics and warfare. Before the war, Powell argued, scholars such as J. P. Mahaffy of Dublin had baulked at Thucydides’ depiction of the violence and turmoil of Greek politics as distracting from the golden age of Athenian culture. Victorian peace was not conducive to reading Thucydides. After the horrors of the trenches, such squeamishness disappeared and a general acceptance of Thucydidean realism began to emerge. ‘To appreciate the gulf which separates

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10. Churchill archives (1/6/19: 8).
11. Mahaffy 1874, see also Murray 1903.
12. References to Thucydides began to proliferate at this time. Pocket editions of the text were carried into battle by both British and German troops and quotations from the funeral speech found their way onto the sides of London omnibuses and war memorials across the world. See Keene 2015, Morley 2018a, and Earley 2020.
pre- and post-war in this respect, one should turn for example from the priggish superiority of Arnold’s appendices, or the theoretical superiority of such pre-war books as “Thucydides Mythistoricus”, to the ardent sense of kinship which animates a Thibaudet or an Ab- bott’. Powell here refers to Albert Thibaudet and George Abbott who published books in the 1920s on Thucydides, intended for a public readership that fully accepted Thucydides’ dark depiction of human nature, imperialism, and the causes of war and civil dissension. We shall return to these two writers in a moment. Firstly, however, I wish to consider what Powell meant by toleration.

Previous scholars, in Powell’s estimation, had never really got to grips with Thucydides himself. They did not understand the historian’s personality, the influence of the Peloponnesian War upon his thinking, nor the lessons that he was attempting to communicate, despite the undoubted refinement of scholarly (both philological and historical) techniques throughout the nineteenth century. This lack of understanding was a failure of reading. Thomas Arnold and Francis Cornford had failed to read Thucydides in a suitable frame of mind. They possessed all the advantages of nineteenth-century philological advances but, living in a world of peace, they could not understand the harsh political realities of his time. Likewise, at the outbreak of the war Eduard Schwartz, still living in a world of peace, was studying the ecumenical fathers. It was only after he received a telegram informing him of the death of his son in the trenches that he turned to Thucydides. Powell believed that Schwartz, personally touched by the war in the trenches, was not only in a better position to understand Thucydides’ Greek but was also in a better position to feel kinship with Thucydides, perhaps even to understand something of his personality. What was required, therefore, was a coming together of political tragedy, personal angst, and the modern skills of the philologist. In the person of Schwartz, these elements came together. Schwartz had attempted to sweep away the arcane debate that had arisen in Germany over when particular passages of the History had been written, the so-called Thukydides-
frage, to focus on Thucydides as a man and as a historian. The German philologist felt instinctively that Thucydides could only have written a text as full of pathos and insight as a mature man, deeply traumatised by the fighting, after he had returned to a shattered and defeated Athens. Schwartz led scholars to see that running through Thucydides’ work was a bi-polar political order divided physically and spiritually between Athens and Sparta. This dualism is introduced in the Archaeology, and recurs in the Pentekontaetia, Pericles’ speeches, and from there into the rest of the work. It divides Sparta from Athens, oligarchy from democracy, land power from sea power.

**Thucydides and the reality of war**

Let us now return to the two writers Powell singled out has having understood the true import of Thucydides’ thought and its relevance during and after the Great War. George Abbott and Albert Thibaudet were not trained philologists – indeed, by profession, both were journalists and writers – but they had understood the angst, tragedy, and trauma of the war and poured those feelings into their interpretations of Thucydides, although they were, of course, both educated in the classics. Abbott published his monograph, *Thucydides: A Study in Historical Reality*, in 1925. It presents Thucydides as first and foremost a scientist in the sense that he recorded events as they really were, as a guide to future students of politics. In other words, Thucydides dissects the political system of his world in a way that the intelligent reader (1.22) should be able to comprehend and use to critique the political system under which they live. Of much more interest is Abbott’s claim that Thucydides is a realist. I have argued elsewhere that Abbott’s vision of Thucydidean realism extends beyond the literary to embrace the political. Thucydidean realism

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consists of an unflinching depiction of human nature and psychology that is extremely useful today as a political lesson. While the Athenian historian was a man deeply concerned with the morality of the actions he describes, he creates a ‘realistic’ depiction of events, which demonstrates the limits of morality as a force in international politics in both the ancient and modern worlds.

Abbott’s Thucydides is driven by the tension between the morality of the individual and the reality of the brutal world of the Peloponnesian War. In his monograph, Abbott presents Thucydides as living through one of the most profound disturbances in human history. For thirty-one years, as Thucydides describes the war, the Greek world, indeed the entire known world, was moved (kinesis: 1.1, 3.82) by political passions into an unparalleled ferocious conflict. Abbott dryly notes that these passions were hardly comprehensible to modern man ‘though our forefathers of the seventeenth century might, and Frenchmen of the Revolution period would, have understood it’. Of course, the Peloponnesian War played out on a much smaller canvass than the Great War but Abbott notes that this only made the violence worse. The war pushed aside old certainties and beliefs, what we might call the ancestral nomos. ‘Idealists saw things which astonished them; moralists were no longer sure of themselves’ (ibid.). Thucydides was the only man to see through this confusion. He abandoned his own morality to adopt instead a cold, hard realism. Through this intellectual project, he created his ktēma es aiei.

Thucydides ... having started with no illusions, either as to divine providence or as to human wisdom, suffers no disillusion. Amid the wrecks of men and cities he steers a clear course; in this tossing sea of madness he holds fast to his own sanity: his feet ever firm upon solid fact. He confronts events as a scientist confronts

Nature: aware that what is happening has happened before and will necessarily happen again in the future.¹⁵

Thucydides’ intellectual project was a direct product of the trauma of the war. Contemporaries acknowledged that Abbott’s own turn to Thucydides was similarly a product of trauma. W. A. Thorpe, a British man of letters who worked at the Victoria and Albert Museum, notes in his essay *Thucydides and the Discipline of Detachment*, which began life as a review of *Historical Reality*, that Abbott’s book was the ‘fruit’ of this Great War turn to Thucydides.¹⁶ Powell, as we have seen, also saw Abbott’s book as a direct result of the war. However, what is notable in the quotation above is the way in which the trauma of the war shapes the way Abbott imagines Thucydides’ intellectual project. Thucydides is not simply a historian or a political philosopher. Instead, he is a realist clinging to facts among the turbulence of war. He is also brave in the face of the powerlessness of conventional morality in an age of power politics. Abbott found comfort in Thucydides in such trying times and his book is an exhortation to his readers to find similar succour. To summarise: it is Abbott’s acceptance of Thucydidean realism and morality that most attracted Powell to his book.

The French poet and literary critic Albert Thibaudet published his *La campagne avec Thucydiide* in 1922. As with Abbott, Powell found this book to be profoundly shaped by the Great War in its embrace of Thucydidean realism. Indeed, throughout his work, Thibaudet offers extensive parallels between the Peloponnesian and Great Wars, which fully embrace Thucydides’ realist depiction of human nature and politics. In particular, Powell was attracted to Thibaudet’s thoughts on Thucydides’ view of imperialism as a topic particularly relevant to English readers. In an appendix, Thibaudet

¹⁵. Abbott 1925, 163.
¹⁶. Thorpe 1926, 630–1.
points to the supposed universal ‘truth’ that an insular sea power is always invulnerable to a land power. He then goes on to suggest that it was Athens’ status, even her nature as a sea power, that defined her imperial project and created a bi-polar political world divided between her maritime supremacy and Sparta’s unchallenged prowess on land. Powell felt that the utility of such thought should be obvious to an Englishman living under an imperial system sorely tested by the stresses of the Great War. The trauma of war, therefore, had not only led to impressive new scholarly interpretations of Thucydides, in the shape of Schwartz and his followers, but also novel and relevant political interpretations of the text in the shape of Abbott’s and Thibaudet’s monographs.

_Powell’s Realpolitik in Thucydides_

Such was Powell’s view of the positive effect of the Great War on Thucydidean scholarship, particularly in Britain and France, as it stood in the 1930s.\(^{17}\) The trauma of the Great War, building upon the philological advances of the nineteenth century, had led to an unprecedented acceptance of Thucydides’ thought. Let us now turn to how this scholarship shaped Powell’s own thoughts on the place of morality and politics in Thucydides. My evidence is Powell’s unpublished dissertation for a fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge, _The Moral and Historical Principles of THUCYDIDES and their influence on later antiquity._\(^{18}\)

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17. Powell further argued that that the rise of Fascism and Nazism in Italy and Germany, and Pacifism in Britain and the US, was putting an end to this positive effect by 1936.

18. The first iteration of the dissertation was born of Powell’s need to win prizes. It was submitted in 1933 to the Cromer Prize, which it won, and was later sent to the British Academy in application for another prize. The manuscript of this earlier iteration has not survived. The typescript which is
Powell is best known today among Thucydidean scholars as the editor of Stuart Jones’ *Oxford Classical Text* edition of the *History* and as a tireless compiler of lost and obscure manuscripts of Herodotus and Thucydides.\(^\text{19}\) It is no surprise to discover, therefore, that Powell rooted his reading of Thucydides in the dissertation in a thorough philological analysis of the text. However, throughout his work Powell was sensitive to contemporary developments, particularly the Great War and the recent history of the British Empire. The confluence of these two influences allowed Powell, or at least so he believed, to create a new analysis of Thucydides’ mind and personality as it was shaped by the Peloponnesian War. Powell’s Thucydides is a Janus-like figure. The historian is an accomplished literary artist and astute observer of human nature who felt great empathy with his fellow Greeks caught up in the tragedy of the Peloponnesian War. Moving beyond the interpretations of Abbott and Thibaudet, Powell introduced a new term to describe his vision of Thucydides. He saw him as a Realpolitiker who excluded moral considerations from his description of the actions of men and states. Thucydides lived in ‘the age of political realities, Realpolitik, whether conscious or unconscious, an age of which moderns can grasp the aims and motives.
with full sympathy’. Thucydides is, therefore, the perfect historian to capture both the age of the Peloponnesian War and to help contemporaries understand the new age of total war as it had played out on the Western Front. For Powell, the organising principle of Thucydides is to look at Greece and focus on man as the constituent unit of political organisation and, therefore, history. Powell notes that the word *anthropos* occurs only at very significant points in the *History*, namely at 1.22, 76; 3.82; 5.105, or in the methodological statement, the stasis passage, and the Melian dialogue. This focus on man as a political animal makes Thucydides, in Powell’s estimation, a ‘political thinker’. Ultimately, for Powell, Thucydides simply ‘Stands as a Realpolitiker aloof from patriotic and imperialist feeling! The forces of human nature which built an empire, would also, he saw, destroy it; and his part was not that of a champion or an apologist, but of an observer who cared only for realities’. Powell’s definition of Realpolitik in Thucydides focuses on the Athenian historian’s presentation of morality in the *History*. Powell argues, as we have seen, that many scholars, particularly those writing before the Great War, had decried the lack of moral exposition and judgement offered by Thucydides. But such views fundamentally misunderstood Thucydides’ views and purpose. Realpolitik is a difficult concept to define precisely. Powell offers an entirely conventional definition in

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24. On Powell, Thucydides, and Realpolitik, see Earley 2020, where I argue that Powell’s vision of Thucydides’ Realpolitik is part of a much larger British ‘turn’ to Thucydides, comparing and contrasting his reading to later realist interpretations of the *History*. In what follows I will pay much closer attention to how Powell’s Realpolitik reading interacts with the ‘trauma’ of the Peloponnesian War as recorded by Thucydides.
25. Realpolitik is easy to caricature as the concern with power in politics
which Thucydides’ view of politics focuses on the realities of power. Thucydides’ standpoint is Realpolitik because he presents the world as it really is, not how he would like it to be. When morality and sentiment are present in the text, they are voiced by certain actors in the pursuit of advantage. Morality becomes only ‘a single force among the many whose interplay makes up the grand, un-moral, or indeed super-moral, sweep of history’.

Powell’s view of Thucydidean Realpolitik is rooted in his reading of the entire *History*, but particularly in the speeches. Powell believed that all the speeches are Thucydidean compositions intended to elucidate the lessons of the text and to indulge the historian’s love of composition and rhetoric. In Powell’s view of the speeches, it was more than likely that Thucydides knew what was said at each oration either from his personal experience or by report. However, when it came to ‘writing them up’ for his *History*, he gave himself free reign to show off his skill, only preserving the upshot of what was said. In terms of Powell’s understanding of Thucydides’ personality this is an absolutely crucial point because

at the expense of morality, akin to reason of state in early modern Europe and realism today. However, the modern historian John Bew (2016) has recently traced the history of Realpolitik from its origins in the thought of Ludwig von Rochau (1810–1873), who argued that the Enlightenment had showed the world that might does not necessarily make right but also that post-Enlightenment political theorists had failed to grasp that the realities of power politics remained. Bew argues that it is only later in the first half of the twentieth century that Realpolitik begins to take on negative connotations, particularly following the carnage of the Great War and the aggressive expansionism of Nazi Germany. It is in this later context in which Powell is using the term.

27. This opinion ran contrary to that of many German scholars engaged in the *Thukydidesfrage* in the previous century, who argued over the exact composition date, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Jebb (1907), who divided the speeches between those Thucydides heard from those he had reported to him.
it means that the speeches are all Thucydidean compositions that can be used by the modern scholar to try to understand his views on morality and politics, what Powell calls his ‘political philosophy’.\(^ {29}\) At the same time, Thucydides’ speeches are true because they display his vision of the innermost motives of the speakers, sometimes matters that they may even have wished to hide.\(^ {30}\) It is on the canvas of the speeches that Thucydides depicted his grand Realpolitik vision and also, to the right reader, betrayed the vestigial marks of his own thoughts and opinions.

The summation of this vision is to be found in the Melian dialogue. Referring to the dialogue, Powell asks ‘if it is true that Thucydides, however unconsciously, has given in his speeches not dramatic fictions on a slender basis of fact, but his own most genuine interpretation of human actions and historical events, we are justified at last in seeking there above all his moral principles and his philosophy of history’.\(^ {31}\) Powell positions his Realpolitik reading of the dialogue as contrary to much previous British scholarship. He cites, for example, the following lines from J. B. Bury: ‘the historian has artfully used the dialogue to indicate the overbearing spirit of the Athenians, flown with insolence, on the eve of an enterprise which was destined to bring signal retribution and humble their city to the dust. Different as Thucydides and Herodotus were in their minds and methods, they both had the same, characteristically Greek, feeling for a situation like this... although Nemesis is not acknowledged by Thucydides, she seems to have cast a shadow here’.\(^ {32}\) Powell notes,
conversely, that other scholars saw the Melian dialogue as a moment when Thucydides’ literary qualities had begun to desert him. He mentions that G. B. Grundy, who had written an extensive analysis of Thucydides and his world before the Great War, had wondered if the dialogue were simply preparatory notes yet to be worked up. Abbott had, despite his engagement with Thucydidean realism, somewhat surprisingly doubted the literary worth of the dialogue, which he labelled as ‘flabby’, and had not even bothered to engage with the political points raised. Powell thought that even Schwartz had not really understood the true import of the dialogue. He argued that it belongs to the same ‘stratum’ of speeches as those written for Pericles after the fall of Athens, that is to say, when Thucydides had returned to Athens after her destruction, disillusioned with the imperial project as it had developed under Cleon, Alcibiades, and others. Although Schwartz, writing during wartime, claimed that the Athenian arguments were logically unanswerable, Powell believed that he was wrong to find in the dialogue a condemnation of empire. Instead, Powell suggested that an unbiased reading of the dialogue would reveal that both Athens and Melos put forward logical and unanswerable points. It is logical for the larger power to want to conquer her smaller neighbours, and for the smaller power to want to defend her liberty. Both positions make perfect logical sense and are worked up to a high degree of literary polish by Thucydides. Powell even went so far as to claim that, read aloud – and we should imagine that he actually tried this – the dialogue has the sound and qualities of a hymn.

Powell is at pains to point out that there is no religious or theological critique of the Athenian position in the dialogue, despite his

33. Grundy 1911, 436.
34. Abbott 1925, 192.
35. Schwartz 1919, 137ff.
comparison with the hymn. In particular, he points to a line from 5.105, which he quotes in untranslated Greek, where the Athenians assert that ‘There is nothing in our claim or our conduct which goes beyond established human practice as shown in men’s beliefs about the divine or their policy among themselves. We believe it of the gods, and we know it for sure of men, that under some permanent compulsion of nature wherever they can rule, they will. We did not make this law, it was already laid down, and we are not the first to follow it; we inherited it as a fact, and we shall pass it on as a fact to remain true for ever; and we follow it in the knowledge that you and anyone else given the same power as us would do the same’. Powell acknowledges that this sentence has proved shocking to modern critics. How could Athens, only a few years after the golden age of her culture embodied in the Parthenon and the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles speak so unreservedly about the realities of her own power? The standard interpretation was at the time, following 2.65, that Athens had begun to follow a harsher form of imperialism under the influence of demagogues such as Cleon. Cornford had

38. See, for example, Alfred Zimmern 1911, who ends his laudatory history of the Greek Commonwealth (i.e. Athens) with the destruction of Melos to emphasise the fall of Athenian politics and morality from an Athenian golden age. The first edition of the Cambridge Ancient History Volume 5 takes a more long-term view by charting the evolution of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire before noting the ‘tyranny’ Athens showed to the Greeks of the Aegean; cf. Walker 1927 and Ferguson 1927. Powell is suggesting that this Athenian view of empire is found from the very establishment of the Delian League, and indeed, is found in all subsequent empires, including the British.
39. Powell believed that similar views of Athenian imperialism appear in speeches throughout the History, including those given by Pericles. ‘For essential similarity of thought to this chapter, I went to read (in the Greek, for this is one of the rarest gems of Greek prose) an Athenian speech from the Melian dialogue (5.105). You see that the Athenians here and there, like Euphemus at Camarina, are saying essentially and often verbally the same thing, which turns up again in the rest of the great “defensive” speeches, if I may so call
suggested that Athens was here displaying the hybris of the classical hero before meeting her nemesis on the battlefields of Sicily. However, Powell argues that there is no impiety or insolence in the Athenian words. The Athenians merely claim that they are acting as men believe the gods themselves to act. They did not create this system of empire and expansion. Rather they are simply the latest in a series of powers, not the first nor the last, ‘in the grip of an eternal necessity under which all men do alike’.\(^{40}\) This is simply an observation of the reality of the situation, rather than an \textit{a priori} attempt to remove morality from politics. The Athenians understand that they are bound to act by an immovable force of necessity common to all men. Therefore, those modern writers who have attempted to find a moral point of view in Thucydides, and in the dialogue in particular, are mistaken. Powell maintains that Thucydides is neither a pacifist nor anti-imperialist.

And yet Powell was aware that the trauma of the conflict and the terrible fate of the Melians lay just beneath the surface. He adds that ‘no writer can have had a deeper sense of human suffering than Thucydides’.\(^{41}\) Beneath the Realpolitik of the situation, Thucydides felt a great deal of kinship with both the Athenians and Melians, locked in the iron grip of necessity. Powell concludes his analysis of the dialogue with the following question: ‘And is it not only when man sees his helplessness in the power of eternal forces that true piety begins?’\(^{42}\) It is here that I believe we come to the profound influence of the contemporary trauma of the Great War.

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40. Churchill archives (1/6/24: 64).
42. Churchill archives (1/6/24: 64).
on Powell’s thinking. The Melians had to suffer and Athens had to invade, just as Belgium, France, Britain, Germany, and a host of other nations were compelled to suffer and fight, not by tragic or religious forces, but by the necessity of human nature and politics. The trauma of war, both ancient and modern, was a product of those forces. The intelligent reader (1.22) might begin to understand how and why by reading Thucydides. Understanding these forces, however, was no guarantee that war and trauma could be avoided, man’s nature being what it is.

The trauma of the war had also led Powell to depict Thucydides as not only a hard-nosed theorist of power and advantage, but also a deeply moral man, who saw that suffering was an inevitable consequence of human nature and the weaknesses of political order. Perhaps, then, Powell had been wrong to suggest in the Classical Association paper that the only effect of the war had been to make readers tolerant of Thucydides’ brutal depiction of the Peloponnesian War because it had also led to a greater appreciation of the strength of his moral thought in a world torn apart by trauma.

Thucydides’ influence on ancient historiography

But what of Thucydides’ influence on later ancient writers? Had they understood the relationship between Thucydides’ thought and the trauma of the Peloponnesian War? I can do no better than quote Powell’s own words:

So Thucydides, though in respect to later Greek literature, he occupies much the same position as Vergil does to western, could not teach more than one or two of the ancients to understand his profoundest and most peculiar of principles. The moral colourlessness of those elemental forces of human nature whose operation governs the course of history, the historian’s duty to write not merely the truth but an objective monograph on a rigidly limited subject for the instruction, not the edification, of posterity
- these ideas were all but lost. But Thucydides’ more obvious and less original characteristics, - impartiality, rejection of the supernatural, belief that the future follows the lines of the past, - were often seized, often copied and often distorted.43

As Powell puts it later on the same page, smaller men could grasp only the smaller aspects of Thucydides’ genius. Over the remainder of the final chapter of the dissertation, he points to the similarities between Thucydides’ and Polybius’ views of chronology, Sallust’s rhetorical style, and Tacitus’ approach to religion and divination. Powell is here being unfair. These three are highly original and thoughtful historians who, while undoubtedly influenced by Thucydides, were pursuing their own agendas, often to great effect. However, the key point is that Powell is here playing with how he contextualises Thucydides in his ancient setting. We have seen throughout this paper that Powell believed that the only way to understand Thucydides’ personality and political thought was by carefully considering what the text tells us within its setting at the time of the Peloponnesian War. Given what he said in the Classical Association paper, he also seems to believe that it is only at similar times of movement, turmoil, and trauma that readers can fully grasp Thucydides’ thought. Powell believed that the Roman historians had not lived in such times. The methodology of reading which Powell had outlined in his dissertation, allied with troubled times, became his vision of the only true way of understanding both Thucydides the man and the thinker.

Conclusion

What are we to make of Powell’s claim that the Great War led scholars to be more tolerant of Thucydides’ harsh depiction of human nature and Realpolitik? Few, I think, would disagree today that the

great power of Thucydides’ *History* lies in its unflinching portrayal of humanity at a time of great stress. Yet, even fewer would argue that Thucydides the man and the thinker excludes all moral concerns from the text, as Powell argued.44 Instead, scholarship today often draws attention to the tension between the Realpolitik exercised by the Athenians, Spartans, and others and Thucydides’ deeply moral analysis of events as they unfolded.

We are much more aware of Thucydides’ presence not as a dispassionate recorder of events but as an artful reporter skilfully crafting a narrative that shapes the reader’s world view. And yet, there is value to Powell’s reading of Thucydides. It serves as a reminder not only of the ways in which trauma shapes readings of the text but also how trauma pushes forward interpretations. Powell is right to claim that many Victorian scholars were repulsed by Thucydides’ depiction of brutality because it did not accord with their own ordered view of the world nor their idea of the Athenian golden age. It took the horrors of the Great War for scholars to fully embrace Thucydides’ realism and Realpolitik. We might disagree today with the extremity of some of these views, but we must remember that they were born of a traumatised society.

As a renowned philologist, it is no surprise to find that Powell thought the only way to understand Thucydides was to study his Greek intensely. However, he also maintained that one could only truly understand Thucydides’ thoughts on politics and human nature in a world, like that of Greece during the Peloponnesian War, overcome with motion and turmoil. Powell believed that the decades between the Great War and the Second World War fit that requirement perfectly.45 Driven by the trauma of war, Powell attempted to em-

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44. On this point see, for example, Crane 1998, Lebow 2003, and Hawthorne 2014.

45. Morley has explored the shift in the reception of Thucydides from a literary to a doctrinal realist in a perceptive recent paper: Morley 2018a.
brace Thucydides’ hard-nosed depiction of political reality by presenting him as a Realpolitiker. This interpretation of Thucydidean thought has, *mutatis mutandis*, remained prominent in scholarship ever since.\(^{46}\)

The lesson, therefore, that I would encourage readers to take away from Powell and the other Thucydidean scholars of the Great War is that it is not just possible but imperative that we use contemporary experience of trauma, turmoil, dislocation and upheaval to understand Thucydides.\(^{47}\) The Athenian historian’s work is defined, above all, by the context of the war itself. It is a text produced by trauma and about trauma. Philological and historical techniques will take us only so far in understanding this world. We also need to allow our own world and experiences to inform our interpretations of a text as profound as the *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

### References

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\(^{46}\) That is to say, we still speak of Thucydides in terms of tragedy and historical science. The term Realpolitik has, of course, fallen out of fashion but in many ways looks like the idea of realism that came to dominate Thucydidean studies in post-Second World War academia. For an attempt to re-integrate tragedy and realism in Thucydides, see Lebow 2003.

\(^{47}\) Cf. Morley 2017, who notes that many scholars deliberately exclude contemporary ideas of trauma from their analyses of Thucydides.


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